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ABSTRACT 
 
My thesis tackles the debate regarding (in)compatibility of rational moral philosophy and 
caring theory. My thesis argues and demonstrates that by unifying Noddings’ caring theory with 
ethic(s) of care presented by scholars from social and political science, in both practice and on 
relational grounds, the new caring theory not only is compatible with rational moral philosophy, 
but is also more inclusive and capable of facing challenges derived from the modern age of 
information technology. 
 My thesis first identifies four core components presented by various caring theorists and 
then integrates them into what I call a neocaring theory. These four components are: caring 
nature, caring as activity, contextuality or motivation replacement, and relational ontology. 
Second, I apply both Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of 
dependent co-arising to bridge the gap between Noddings’ caring theory and Tront-Hankivsky’s 
interconnection and interdependent nature. This new relational ground or relational ontology, 
therefore, expands to embrace three characteristics of human existence: first, that the fabric of 
human existence is the synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the 
private, as well as rationality and affectivity; second, human life is an ongoing process of 
becoming and synthesizing; and third, humans and sociopolitical activity are interconnected and 
interdependent with each other, and thereby, they are mutually conditioned and supplementary.  
Based on the four core components and three characteristics of neocaring theory, I 
construct my neocaring theory of autonomy, and meanwhile demonstrate the ways in which 
Kant’s moral autonomy is included in this new theory. In the final chapter, I conclude my thesis 
by showing the differences that the neocaring theory of autonomy can make, compared to the 
theories of Kant and neoliberalism, with respect to tackling problems emerging from the modern 
digital age, and administrating higher education, respectively. Lastly, my thesis shows the ways 
in which a moral education will affect our society and the formation of citizenship, and the ways 
in which this neocaring theory of autonomy can help to nurture students’ caring minds and 
ability to reflect on the interdependent nature of human existence to become positive netcitizens 
in the digital age.  
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INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH FOCUS, THESIS STRUCTURE, AND CONTRIBUTION 
Research focus 
    In the past two decades, one of the most significant events in moral philosophy has been the 
initiation of a debate between caring theory and the Kantian rational moral philosophy that 
undergirds modern social justice and rational liberal theory. The debate between these two 
influential theories has always been formulated in a dichotomous way. For instance, in the 
earliest stage, the issue was seen as a debate between feminist views and a masculine 
perspective, whereas in a later stage, the focus became debating the public principle of social 
justice versus the private relation/virtue of mothering care. In the process of this debate, some 
scholars, such as Tronto, Clement, Held and Bubeck, tried to reconcile these two theories by 
proposing that one could perform social justice within the framework of caring, but this 
reconciled view is rejected by Slote. Slote (2007) claims that the foundation of caring theory is 
empathetic caring, which is incompatible with that of rational moral philosophy, i.e., the rational 
thinking of autonomy, equality and freedom. Held (2006), although not explicitly rejecting this 
compatibility, says that these two are “separated moral theory which used in different domains”. 
This implies that in Held’s view, caring theory can co-exist with, but is not compatible with, 
rational moral philosophy. Both Slote’s and Held’s views indicate that in the recent 
development, caring theory is conceived of as being incompatible with rational moral philosophy 
on the foundational level.  
        Formulating the relationship between caring theory and rational moral philosophy as 
such, a fear of incompatibility between these two theories is generated and a dilemma as  
whether to use caring theory or rational moral philosophy to guide our teaching, schooling, as 
well as social and political practice is produced. This dichotomous view, in turn, seems to have 
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become orthodoxy. However, on re-reading and re-examining caring theorists’ and Kant’s 
primary writings, and the literature on the debate regarding this (in)compatibility, I found that the 
dichotomous view is derived from at least three problems: first, the lack of a unified caring 
theory; second, a not-yet-fully developed relational ground that serves as the ontological 
foundation of caring theory; and third, some misinterpretation of the core elements of caring 
theory and rational moral philosophy.  
       My thesis, therefore, aims to re-visit the debate and tackle the (in)compatibility of these 
two most influential moral theories. My thesis contends and demonstrates that by combining 
Noddings’ caring theory and ethic(s) of care, presented by scholars from social and political 
science, on the practical level, it is possible to identify some core components to unify caring 
theories presented by various theorists. Also, with the help of both Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
intersubjectivity and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising, the different 
characterizations of relational foundations constructed by Noddings, Tronto and Hankivsky can 
be bridged and enhanced. With the unified caring components and an enhanced relational ground 
or relational ontology, my thesis demonstrates that it is possible to form a neocaring theory of 
autonomy, which not only is compatible with that of Kant’s rational moral autonomy, but also is 
more inclusive and effective to cope with problems emerging from the modern information 
technology age.  
 
Thesis Structure 
        In the first chapter, my thesis reviews the debate and development of the (in)compatibility 
of caring theory and rational moral philosophy. Then, I discuss my methodology and the 
philosophical framework used in my thesis. In the second chapter, I analyze and clarify the 
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various definitions of caring concepts, and different characterizations of relational ground 
presented by different caring theorists. Then, my thesis goes on to identify four components to 
unify Nodiings’s caring theory and Tronto-Hankivsky’s ethic(s) of care. The new caring theory 
is named neocaring theory. In the second part of chapter two, my thesis also reveals the core 
components that have or have not been studied by caring theorists. In the third chapter, my thesis 
continues the second chapter’s discussion, and applies both Merleau-Ponty and Nāgarjuna’s 
philosophies to connect and enhance Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky’s relational ground. In 
the fourth chapter, I build on the four core components of unified neocaring theory, and my 
enhanced relational ground to construct a neocaring theory of autonomy. In the final chapter, my 
thesis presents the differences that this new theory can make, compared to Kant’s moral 
autonomy and neoliberalism’s personal autonomy, regarding the problems emerging from the 
modern digital age, and a better way to administrate higher education.  
 
Contribution 
  The reason my thesis focuses on investigating the (in)compatibility of caring theory and 
rational philosophy is because these two theories are the most influential moral theories that 
shape and guide modern moral theory in education and sociopolitical activities. The separation of 
these two presents us with a great dilemma, not merely in teaching and schooling, but also in 
social and political practices. Through my thesis, I hope to bridge the gap between these two 
theories. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s theory of subjectivity and Nāgārjuna’s dependent co-arising, 
my thesis contends and demonstrates that rational thinking is not necessarily in opposition to 
affective feelings, and that subjective experience is not incompatible with objective factors, 
because all are intrinsic components of human life. The key rather lies in how to clear theoretical 
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space for both components—which I argue are both necessary to any robust moral theory—while 
remaining aware of their limitations or insufficiencies. Particularly, such an approach will enable 
us to utilize critical thinking firmly rooted in humane caring. It is, thereby, possible to establish a 
more caring and inclusive neocaring theory for the modern information technology age.  In my 
view, guided by this neocaring theory, we would take a more inclusive and humane view, and 
bring a broader, and more effective way of thinking to the resolution of disagreements and 
conflict in the social and political arena. As educators we should not take rational theory to be 
the only “right” way to tackle moral issues and dismiss any theory that rests on affect. In a liberal 
democratic society, people’s lives and capacities are diversified. It is insufficient to adapt a moral 
theory that utilizes a “one size fits all” approach to evaluate and develop the minds of our youth. 
Furthermore, such a neocaring theory should contribute to a deeper engagement with and 
appreciation of other cultures within a global context.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
LITERATURE REVIEW, RESEARCH PROBLEMS, METHODOLOGY, 
AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Literature Review Regarding the (in)Comparability between Caring theory and Rational 
Moral Philosophy 
 
In the past two decades, one of the most noticeable phenomena in the field of philosophy 
of education is the emergence of theory of caring, and the ethic(s) of care (hereafter, I will use 
caring theory/ethic(s) as a shorthand for these two theories)
1
. Since Carol Gilligan and Nel 
Noddings published their ethic of care and caring theory in 1982 and 1984, respectively,
2
 the 
caring theory/ethic(s) has attracted great attention from various disciplines, such as education, 
feminist theory, medical care, social work, political science, philosophy, and so forth. Caring 
theory/ethic(s) has been so well received that many scholars suggest that it should be the 
alternative theory, in both moral education and social and political practice, to the rational moral 
reasoning theories presented by Immanuel Kant, Lawrence Kohlberg, and John Rawla.
3
 In 
                                                 
1
 In my dissertation, caring theory indicates Nel Noddings’s theory; the term “caring theories” refers to the different 
caring theories presented by different scholars, including Nel Noddings, Carol Gilligan, Joan Tronto and other 
caring theorists. Also, the term “caring theory/ethic(s)” is used as an exchangeable term of caring theories because 
Gilligan, Tronto, Held and so on, sometimes, use both caring theory and ethic(s) of care or caring ethic to indicate 
their theories. Ethic(s) of care represents both ethic of care and ethics of care, because some caring theorists, such as 
Tronto and Hankivsky, use ethic of care to refer to their caring theories whereas other scholars Gilligan and Slote  
use ethics of care for their theories.  
  
2
 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Massachusetts: 
Harvard university Press, 1982); and Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 
(Los Angeles: university of California Press, 1984). 
 
3
 See Nel Noddings “An Ethic of Caring and Its Implications for Instructional Practice,” (1994), 171.; Joan C. 
Tronto “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care,” Signs 12(4) (1987): 644-663 and “Care as a Basis for 
Radical Political Judgments”, Hypatia 10 (2) (1995): 141-145. Also see Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A 
Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 40; Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: 
Personal, Political and Global (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3; Maurice Hamington, Embodied Care: 
Jane Addams, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Ethics (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 11; Michael 
Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy (New York: Routledge, 2006) and so on.  
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another camp, however, strong opposition also exists to conceiving of caring theory/ethic(s) as a 
moral theory, let alone treating it as an alternative that can replace the rational moral philosophy 
that undergirds modern social justice theory and rational liberal theory.
4
 Many factors contribute 
to this opposition; and the debate focus seems to alter as the theories have developed. More often 
than not, the relation between caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy, particularly 
social justice theory, is formulated in dichotomous terms, although some scholars try to reconcile 
them. Most recently, the two representatives of caring theory/ethic(s) Virginia Held (2002, 156-
59) and Michael Slote (2007, 1-9), still partially or entirely reject the compatibility of caring 
theory and rational moral philosophy.  
The development of caring theory in relation to its compatibility with rational moral 
philosophy can be roughly classified into three stages, based on each theory’s focus. In the first 
stage, caring theories are conceived as advocating the idea of a female perspective that differs 
from the male view regarding moral judgment and decision. In the second stage, caring theories 
are considered to be able to assist social justice theory or vice versa. In the third stage, whereas 
Noddings and Hankivsky argue that ontologically speaking, caring theories are compatible with 
rational moral philosophy, Slote and Held either entirely or partially reject the compatibility.  
In the earliest stage (between 1980 and 1989), caring theory was seen as an ethic(s) 
derived from a feminist and feminine outlook, since the studies in Carol Gilligan’s research are 
all based upon female students and Nel Noddings’s caring model is grounded upon mothering 
care. Hence, the central issue of the debate was whether caring theory can be a universal ethics; 
                                                 
4
 See Philip Warelow, “Is Caring the Ethical Ideal?” Journal of Advanced Nursing 24 (4) (October 1996): 655–61, 
and Phyllis Rooney, “A Different Voice: On the Feminist Challenge in Moral Theory,” Philosophical Forum 22 (4) 
(1991): 335. In fact, Tronto also points out the limitation. See Tronto Moral Boundries, 62. 
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because, if caring theory is derived from private and partial perspectives—i.e., mothering and 
feminist viewpoints—it cannot reach the level of impartiality that rational moral philosophy has 
achieved.
5
 Hence, the argument goes, it is incompatible with rational moral philosophy. In Carol 
Gilligan’s breakthrough book, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and of 
Morality (hereafter, A Different Voice), she points out that, in contrast to Kohlberg’s cognitive 
stages of moral development, which ranks moral stages based on abstract moral principles, 
women usually prioritize social relations and contextualize their moral judgments and decisions 
according to empirical conditioning. Gilligan calls the female moral attitude the “ethics of care” 
or the “caring ethic.”  
Gilligan’s ethic of care clearly differs from the mainstream view proposed by Kohlberg, 
which emphasizes the development of a moral hierarchy corresponding to whether one can 
perform a moral act based upon reasoning through different levels of moral principles. Although 
Gilligan (1982) does not conceive the ethics of care as a category based on gender difference 
(2),
6
 many feminist scholars interpret it as showing that women view morality differently than 
men do. For instance, Linda Kerber states that “by emphasizing the biological basis of distinctive 
behavior … Gilligan permits her readers to conclude that women’s alleged affinity” or 
“relationships of care [are] both biologically natural and a good thing.”7 Similarly, Catherine 
Greenon and Eleanor Maccoby note, “The fact remains, however, that Gilligan claims that the 
views expressed by women in her book represent a different voice—different, that is, from men.” 
                                                 
5
 See Tronto’s “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care”, 644-663. 
 
6
 Gilligan says that “The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme.” See Gilligan’s A 
Different Voice, 2. 
 
7
 Linda K. Kerber, “Some Cautionary Words for Historians,” 304-320.  
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Carol Stack, as well, conceives of Gilligan’s work as representing “a female model of moral 
development.”8  
Similarly, in this earliest stage of caring theory, Noddings formulated her caring theory as 
exemplified by mothering and the feminist viewpoint, or that which is characterized by feminine 
perspective in contrast to fathering, or a masculine perspective of rational moral philosophy. 
Noddings (1984) explains that, traditionally, moral reasoning is formulated in the father’s 
language—i.e., in rational terms—whereas, in reality, natural caring (such as mother caring), the 
memory of being cared for and feelings are the foundation of morality for most people (2). 
Virginia Held agrees with Noddings and suggests that moral characteristic derived from the 
motherly caring relationship is a wiser moral framework than the traditional contractual views of 
human relations.
9
 In the same manner, Sara Ruddick writes that an ethic of care develops from 
maternal work that prioritizes the preservation, growth, and acceptance of one’s children, leads 
to the development of the virtues of scrutiny, cheerfulness, humility, and commitment in the 
context of the realities of life.
10
  
The feminine origin and feminist perspective of caring theories are, therefore, explicit in 
the earliest writings of caring theories. Hence, caring theories, as initially conceived by many 
scholars, propounded the idea of a female perspective that differs from the male view regarding 
                                                 
8
 See Carol B. Stack, "The Culture of Gender: Women and Men of Color,” in “On ‘In a Different Voice’: An 
Interdisciplinary Forum,” in Signs 11 (2) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Winter 1986): 321-324; 
Greeno and Maccoby, “How Different Is the ‘Different voice’?” Signs 11(2) (Winter 1986): 310-316; and Stack, 
“The Culture of Gender,” Signs 11 (2) (winter, 1986): 321-324. 
 
9
 Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Cultural, Society and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993) and Held, “The Meshing of Care and Justice,” Hypatia 10 (2), (Spring 1995): 128–32. 
 
10
 See Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 213-30. Also, 
see Ruddick, “Preservation, Love and Military Destruction,” in Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory, ed. J. 
Trebilcot (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 239. 
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moral judgment and decision. This earliest view, although it found many feminist supporters 
across such disciplines as social work, education, medicine, and political science, received much 
criticism toward the end of its first stage of development. The criticisms chiefly focus on two 
issues: First, the applicability and impartiality of using caring theory as a universal ethic. That is, 
if caring theory/ethic(s) was derived from the views of women alone, it was gender specific. As 
such, caring theory/ethic(s) would be insufficient as a universal ethic on an equal footing with 
rational moral philosophy. Tronto (1987, 659-660) argues that if caring theory/ethic(s) relates 
only to the care of those who are emotionally, physically, and even culturally closer to us, the 
ethic(s) of care could become a defense of caring only for one’s own family, friends, and group. 
As such, caring theory/ethic(s) would become a justification for any set of conventional 
relationships, thus possibly leading to the reinforcement of existing sectarianism and raising the 
question of relativism. As the second focus of criticism, several researchers proposed that caring 
theory/ ethic(s) is not necessarily gender specific or even gender related. For instance, Tronto 
(1987) mentioned that Robert Coles’s 11  research showed that Chicano, Eskimo, and Indian 
children criticize Anglos’ inattention to proper moral concerns, including their lack of care for 
other people and for the earth (650). Tronto (1987) said that John Langston Gwaltney
12
 also 
noticed that African American culture tends to share the same views as the children in Cole’s 
study, because that culture honors basic respect for others, a commitment to honesty, general 
respect for the choices of others, and so on (ibid.). Tronto thereby contends that the caring ethic 
is not gender specific but, rather, a social construction (ibid).  
                                                 
11
 Robert Cole, Eskimos, Chicanos and Indians (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977). 
 
12
 John Langston Gwaltney,  Drylongso: A Self-Portrait of Black America (ed. New York: Random House, 1980). 
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These criticisms led many caring theorists, including both Gilligan and Noddings, to 
defend the caring theory/ethic(s). Gilligan,
13
 continuing to carry out psychological studies based 
on her findings in A Different Voice, discounted some of her previous findings by saying that 
although caring social relations were gender related—i.e., most females cared more about 
relation than men did—they were not gender specific. Specifically, she found that when her 
research questions were formulated in different ways and using different terms (such as not using 
the word “dependence” but using “be with”) the positive answers from males regarding caring 
relations increased. (1988, 3-9)  Thus, a caring nature might be not as biologically related to 
female as both Noddings and Gilligan originally had assumed; rather, it was a result of 
socialization through education and sociopolitical construction. Gilligan’s new findings were 
clearly in line with Tronto’s previous statement that a caring nature was not limited to females; 
but the gender-related view was also wrong when examining caring relations in ethnic groups 
other than European Americans, as noted earlier.  
The conclusion of the first stage of the development of caring theory/ethic(s) is well-
represented by Tronto’s (1987) view, which urged caring theorists to reinvestigate the meaning 
and implication of the caring theories in order to have an impact on social and political practices. 
Tronto says that if the ethic of care is to be taken seriously as a moral position, then what 
advocates need to explore are the assumptions on which such moral position is founded. She 
maintains that “[u]nless the full social and philosophical context for an ethic of care is specified, 
the ethic of care can be dismissed as a parochial concern of some misguided women” (677).  
                                                 
13
 Carol Gilligan, “Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in Relationship.” In Mapping the Moral 
Domain: A Contribution of Women’s Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education, ed. Carol Gilligan, Janie 
Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean Taylor with Betty Bardige (Massachusetts: Center for the Study of Gender, 
Education, and Human Development, Harvard University, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1988): 3-9.  
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As a result of these criticisms, many caring theorists reformulated the central issue at the 
heart of the debate between caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy. Thus, in the 
second stage of the theory’s development (1990–1997), the issue, as caring theorists saw it, was 
the public principle of social justice versus private relations (or disposition) of caring. During 
this stage, caring theory/ethic(s) was redefined as theory of “caring virtue,” “caring disposition,” 
“caring attitude,” “caring relation,” and caring as a practice or activity.14 These definitions are 
particularly relevant to medical care, as well as social and political sciences, where the foremost 
issue is whether social justice or empathic caring should be ranked first when making a political, 
social, or medical decision.  
Many excellent papers and books have been published related to this debate.
15
 The shared 
finding of these papers and books was that caring theory/ethic(s) does not necessarily conflict 
with rational moral philosophy: one can think rationally with the virtue of a caring attitude or one 
can treat people rationally with an ethic(s) of caring, while working for social justice within the 
framework of caring. For example, Tronto (1993) suggests that “since caring rests upon the 
satisfaction of needs for care, the problem of determining which needs should be met show that 
the care ethic is not individualistic, but must be situated in the broader moral context. Obviously, 
a theory of justice is necessary to discern among more or less urgent need” (138). Diemut 
Ellisabet Bubeck (1995) also points out that, in fact, the “considerations of justice are at the very 
heart of what to any feminist surely must be a version of the ethic of care that is preferable to the 
                                                 
14
 See Tronto (1993) and Held (1993). 
 
15
 To name just some of the most prominent: such as Held (1993), Tronto (1993), Diemut Ellisabet Bubeck, Care, 
Gender and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Grace Clement, Care, Autonomy, and Justice: 
Feminism and the Ethic of Care (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), Selma Sevenhijsen,  Citizenship and the Ethics of 
Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality, and Politics (New York: Routledge, 1998).  
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self-less version” (194-95), because it is necessary for women to consider themselves as 
“deserving of equal moral concern, respect, or consideration if they are to move from the self-
less second to the self-inclusive third state of the ethic of care” (ibid.). Therefore, in both Tronto 
and Bebuck’s view, as well as the view of others, including Noddings, Clement, and Held,16 
locating the concept of social justice within the framework of caring theory or the ethic(s) of care 
is indispensable to a developed social justice theory. 
In the third stage of the development of caring theory/ethic(s) (1998–2008), the question 
of its compatibility with rational moral philosophy and social justice theory is further developed 
into three different views. These three views all related to the ontological grounding of caring 
theory and the ethic(s) of care. The first view is represented by Grace Clement (1998, 121) and 
Held (2006, 16), who attempt to integrate social justice and caring theory by suggesting that 
these two theories should work hand in hand in the same society. They found, however, that 
social justice and caring theory can only be integrated when they are applied in different domains 
(i.e., public or private)—not fully integrated. Full integration cannot occur because, although an 
interconnection and an interdependent relationship exists between human life and sociopolitical 
activity, the method, priority, and ontological foundation upon which caring theory is grounded 
are different from those of rational moral philosophy. For instance, Clement (1998) maintains 
that it is conducive to think of care and justice as distinct ethics, “which can be integrated in the 
sense that they can jointly determine deliberation in public as well as personal contexts” (121). 
Yet, we need to acknowledge that care and justice are different because caring theory and 
                                                 
16
 Held, “The Meshing of Care and Justice,” Hypatia 10 (2), (1995): 128-132; Clement (1998) and Noddings, 
Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).  
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rational moral philosophy possess different ontologies, methods, and priorities (120). Similarly, 
Held (2006) suggests that a more adequate and comprehensive moral theory would include “the 
insights of both the ethic of care and the ethics of justice” (16). However, she rejects the earlier 
stage’s reconciled view that suggesting caring theory can be “incorporated into the [rational 
moral philosophy] in the sense of supporting” and “it can provide the grounds for judgments 
characteristically found in the other” (ibid). Rather, Held proposes to integrate care and justice in 
a way “to keep these concepts conceptually distinct and to delineate the domains in which they 
should have priority” (ibid.). In other words, although both Clement and Held accept that care 
and justice are equally significant for constructing a moral theory, they could not find the 
grounds on which to merge or integrate them because of the different methods, priorities, and 
ontological foundations of each. Hence, care and justice need to be kept as distinct concepts that 
are prioritized in either public domains or private domains, respectively.  
The second view of caring theory/ethic(s)’s compatibility with rational moral philosophy 
is presented by Noddings and Orena Hankivsky
17
, who disagree with Clement and Held’s 
rejection of such compatibility with regard to method, priority, and ontology. They both argue 
that the ontological grounds of the two are compatible when considered from the viewpoint of 
the interrelatedness, interconnection, and interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical 
activity. Noddings (1984) points out that “[t]he ethical self is an active relation between my 
actual self and a vision of my ideal self as one-caring and cared-for” (49-50). As such, our 
fundamental recognition of relatedness, i.e., that which connects us naturally to others, enables 
us to reconnect through the other back to ourselves. The fact is that as we care for others, we also 
are cared for by others. As such, my caring for others, in effect, also leads to my being cared-for 
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(ibid.). Furthermore, Noddings (1984) suggests, although in the web of relatedness, we are free 
to reject the impulse of caring, we would feel lost in the wilderness of strangers and loneliness 
and leave behind all whom we cared for, and even ourselves, if we moved away from the world 
of “caring relation” (51). The reason for that isolation is that we, as humans, are not naturally 
alone. Rather, we are naturally in relationships and obtain nourishment and guidance from our 
relatedness. Our individuality is defined within a set of relationships that are the basic realty of 
human life. Noddings, thereby, maintains that the ontological ground of an ideal ethic should be 
characterized by that interrelatedness, i.e., caring relation, represented by the ideal caring self. 
She also proposes that since caring relationships are at the core of human existence, we should 
redefine social justice theory in terms of caring. By so doing, the caring quality would prevail in 
justice theory and the justice concept would penetrate caring theory. The two moral theories, 
then, coexist as a whole. 
Similar to Noddings’ interrelated ontological view, Hankivsky expands Tronto’s view 
and argues for the compatibility of caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy on the 
basis of the interconnection, and interdependent nature, of human life and sociopolitical activity. 
Tronto’s (1995) original statement maintains that, in order to reconsider how caring theory can 
inform a different political view from that of rational moral philosophy, we must reformulate our 
account of human nature. That is, “[p]eople qua people are interdependent rather than 
independent” (142). This is because individuals act politically—not based merely on their self-
interest, but also as a result of “the particular constellation of caring relationships and institutions 
within which they find themselves”(ibid.). Families, welfare states, and the market are all 
institutions that provide care. Hence, people’s identities and interests are greatly shaped by the 
culture of these social and political groups and institutions. In the same vein, Hankivsky (2004, 
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34) contends that the relational ontology of caring theory/ethic(s) reveals how individuals’ 
identities, social status, and needs are shaped by their intersection with a range of social and 
institutional arrangements (private and public), since humans are interdependent with each other 
(111-12).  At different points in people’s lives and in different contexts, they alternate between 
providing care and needing care. Accordingly, “human being are interdependent and in need of 
others for their growth and survival”(105). 
  Both Tronto’s and Hankivsky’s arguments clarify the ways in which individuals’ lives 
are intrinsically interconnected to social and political policies, structures, arrangement, and other 
factors, all of which have the power not merely to shape people’s social identities but also to 
affect them on a day-to-day basis. Tronto and Hankivsky, thereby, suggest that social and 
political policies and activities should be directed toward the interests of the cared-for, or should 
care about the contextual reality of the cared-for. In this sense, social justice cannot be actualized 
without caring theory; and caring theory cannot be fulfilled without taking justice into account.  
However, the third view of these theorists’ compatibility, presented by Slote, rejects the 
partial and full compatibility presented by Clement, Held, Noddings, and Hankivsky. Slote, after 
closely examining the core element that serves as the foundation of a caring attitude/activity and 
rational moral theory, respectively, rejects the notion of compatibility between the caring 
theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy. Slote
18
 argues that the foundation of caring 
theory/ethic(s) is grounded on empathetic care or affective feelings, whereas rational moral 
theory is grounded on rational thinking about individual rights, autonomy, and social justice; 
these two foundations are in conflict with each other. Those scholars who suggest, as Slote 
(2007) points out, that caring theory can work harmoniously with rational moral philosophy, in 
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fact, place caring theory in a supplementary position to assist rational theory, or vice versa (1-9). 
Slote (2007) himself argues that empathetic caring not only is capable of being the foundation of 
a moral theory, but also is a better foundation than that of rational moral theory (ibid.). The 
compatibility of caring theory and rational moral philosophy, thereby, is rejected by Slote at the 
end of the third stage.  
 
Research Problems 
The third stage, in the development of caring theory/ethic(s), could be considered as the 
pinnacle of the evolution of caring theory and the ethic(s) of care to date. It not only summarizes 
the problems and the possible solutions involved in the first- and second-stage developments of 
the theory, but also reveals a deeper and more fundamental problem. To briefly summarize these 
problems and proffered solutions: Ontologically speaking, while Noddings and Hankivsky 
suggest that caring theory/ethic(s) is compatible with rational moral philosophy based on the 
interrelatedness and interdependent nature, Clement and Held, hold that both caring 
theory/ethic(s) and social justice, though could be applied to tackle the same moral issue, are 
incompatible with regard to their ontological grounds. Slote is in line with Clement’s and Held’s 
view and rejects the compatibility of the ontological foundation of caring theory/ethic(s) and that 
of rational moral philosophy. He insists that, at the level of ontological grounding, caring 
theory/ethic(s) is incompatible with rational moral philosophy since they are based upon two 
incompatible foundations—respectively, empathetic caring or affective feelings, and rational 
thinking concerning autonomy, social justice, and equal rights. Slote’s view to a certain extent 
can be seen as the continuation of the debate between the masculine view and feminine/feminist 
view presented in the first stage of the development of caring theory/ethic(s). This dichotomous 
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formulation can also be considered as the dual view of rationality versus affectivity. Clement’s 
and Held’s views, on the other hand, imply the incompatibility of public principle (or objectivity) 
and private relation (or personal disposition/virtue/attitude, i.e., subjectivity).  
Noddings and Hankivsky are the only two caring theorists who see rational moral 
philosophy and caring theory/ethic(s) as fully compatible. They suggest that the relational 
ontology of the interrelatedness of human life and sociopolitical activity is the key to overcoming 
the suggested incompatibility of the two philosophical systems. However, both Noddings’s and 
Hankivsky’s theories of relational ontology have not attracted as much attention from caring 
theorists as they deserves. Both Gilligan (1987) and Tronto (1995), although in the earlier 
development of the caring theory/ethic(s), briefly mentioned that caring theory/ethic(s) is a better 
moral theory than rational moral philosophy if one considers the interconnection and 
interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical activity, they two did not go further to 
develop their views. The rest of caring theorists, with the exception of Noddings and Hankivsky, 
have not pursued that line of reasoning at all.  
Clement’s, Held’s, and Slote’s rejections of the compatibility of caring theory/ethic(s) 
and rational moral philosophy clearly reveal this negligence. Clement and Held, although they 
attempt to integrate Noddings’s caring theory and Gilligan’s and Tronto’s ethic(s) of care, still 
overlook possibilities inherent in the relational ontology of caring theory/ethic(s). Slote, likewise, 
ignores the relational ontology of human life and sociopolitical activity suggested by Tronto, 
Noddings, and Hankivsky. Slote’s book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy (2007), articulates the 
dichotomous view of affective feelings vis-à-vis rational thinking offered by David Hume, but 
does not investigate the relational ontology suggested by caring theorists.  
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          One of the most fundamental problems that results in the negligence of relational ontology 
of caring theory/ethics  is that Slote, Clement, Held, Noddings, and Hankivsky all use different 
sources to articulate the ontological ground of caring theory/ethic(s) without taking notice of 
their differences. In Slote’s case, his investigation is exclusively focused on caring nature/virtue 
and ignores the relational ontology of interrelatedness as presented both by Noddings and by 
Tronto and Hankivsky. Clement and Held, on the other hand, pay more attention to the objective 
factors of the relation of sociopolitical activity and human life, but overlook the subjective 
experience of the caring nature/virtue presented by Noddings. Clement and Held both conceive 
that caring (as a practice or activity) can be carried out either in a rational manner or based on 
affective feeling, but not both.  
            Noddings and Hankivsky are the only theorists who provide a way to solve the 
hypothesized incompatibility of caring theory and rational moral philosophy, but they two also 
define the relational ontology in different terms. Both Noddings’s and Hankivsky say that in 
view of the interrelated and interdependent ontology of human existence, caring is not simply an 
activity or practice, it is also a quality and relation; i.e., caring disposition/virtue and caring 
relationship. Hence, carrying out a social work or a political act based on a caring mind/virtue 
and caring relationship is compatible with performing a social justice activity. However, they 
define and characterize relational ontology in different terms. Whereas Noddings defines 
relational ontology as the caring relation that occurs in human encounters, Hankivsky 
characterizes it as the interconnection and interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical 
activity. Neither Noddings nor Hankivsky clarifies the differences between their relational 
ontologies. In fact, no caring theorists to date have delved into the meaning of ontological 
ground of relations, and its potential ground for solving the incompatibility dilemma vis-á-vis 
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caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy. Hence, my aim in this dissertation is to 
bridge this gap by firstly investigating and clarifying the different definitions of their relational 
grounds, and then integrating, and enhancing the relational ontology presented by Noddings, 
Tronto, and Hankivsky.  
 
 The difficulties that hinder the investigation of integrated project 
          Three difficulties complicate the integrated project: first, the absence of a unified version 
of caring theory/ethic(s) and an one-sided characterization of the meaning of caring; second, the 
different definitions and formulations of the relational ontology; and third, different views about 
whether the relational ontology of interrelatedness and interdependent nature is simply a 
different epistemological holding from rational notion of autonomy or an ontological grounding 
of human reality.  
The contributions of many scholars, from various disciplines, have greatly enriched 
caring theory and ethic(s) of care. These contributions, in turn, have led to diverse ways of 
characterizing and defining the content of caring theory. For instance, scholars from the field of 
education and philosophy—such as Noddings and Slote—tend to look at the mental phenomena 
of subjective experience manifested in caring activity and loving relationships, and  define caring 
components as caring nature, caring relation, receptivity, responsibility, relatedness and 
motivation replacement. They name their theory “caring theory.” Another group of scholars—
such as Gilligan, Tronto, Clement, Hankivsky, and Held—are from psychology and the social 
and political sciences. They define and characterize “caring” as a practice or activity, and 
emphasize the social and political factors related to caring activities, such as social and political 
policies, arrangements, work, and so on. This group of scholars calls their theories primarily an 
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“ethic of care” or “caring ethic.” Sometimes, they also loosely use “caring theory” as term 
interchangeable with “caring ethic.”  
Hence, we have at least two kinds of caring theories: one is the caring theory put forth by 
Noddings and Slote, who focus on the subjective experience of caring nature and caring 
relationship. The other theory is ethic of care, offered by Gilligan, Tront, Clement, Hankivsky, 
Held, and others, which highlights the caring factors related to social and political activity. These 
differing characterizations and emphases reveal two things: first, caring theorists from different 
disciplines have used—and confined themselves to—different expertise for their research. 
Second, and more important, these theorists’ formulations are deeply affected by the traditional 
Cartesian dichotomous view that separates mind from body and subjectivity from objectivity.  
The Cartesian dichotomous view, as Thompson, Locander, and Pollio point out, assumes, 
first, that external factors (outside the human mind) are objective; and internal (mental) 
activities, such as thoughts, feelings, and the like, are subjective. It assumes, second, that “[m]ind 
is an entity that manipulates symbols representing the external world,” 19  and these 
manipulations, although bringing the external world to internal consciousness, are the cognitive 
processes where the mind has its own domain. Hence, the cognitive structures and functions of 
the human mind can be isolated from the external world and studied in a “decontextualized 
manner.” And, third, this view assumes that objects in the world are empirical entities, 
independent of human subjective experience, and, therefore, this empirical reality can be 
described without considering the subjective experience, such as feelings and so on (1989, 134-
35). It is because of this deeply rooted dichotomous view that caring theorists from different 
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disciplines still characterize their caring theory/ethic(s) as based on a one-sided factor: either a 
mental phenomenon of subjective experience only, or an objective sociopolitical activity alone.  
The influence of this traditional Cartesian view can be illustrated not only in the way 
caring theorists formulate their concepts, but also in the way they reconcile caring theory and 
justice theory. As previously described, Noddings and Slote define and characterize their theories’ 
ontological ground based on the subjective factors of caring nature/disposition and motivation 
replacement, as well as caring relationship; while Gilligan, Tronto, Clement, and Hankivsky 
depend chiefly on the objective components of social and political practices. And in terms of 
reconciling theories, while several caring theorists (particularly Noddings, Tronto, Clement, 
Hankivsky, and Held) attempt to integrate different characterizations and definitions, their efforts 
are confined to using similar wordings; they do not tackle the differences in their caring contents. 
That is, these theorists may share the same phrases—such as “caring relation,” “care as a 
practice/activity”—but, at the root of their theories, they are confined by the expertise and 
research methods of their disciplines to separate social and political activity from a moral agent’s 
subjective experience or affective feeling. This separation, in turn, leads not only to the 
intellectual formulation of dualism, but also to notion of the incompatibility of subjectivity and 
objectivity (as well as of rationality and affectivity) at the ontological level.  
           The case in point can be illustrated by both Clement’s and Held’s integrations of caring 
theory and the ethic(s) of care. Even if Clement and Held suggested to put social and political 
activity under the check of the caring quality or vice versa, the caring quality would still be seen 
by them as a separate quality that differs from the rational nature of social and political activity. 
They do not mention that social and political activity can be grounded on a person’s caring mind. 
This separation is clearly revealed when Clement and Held (2002, 16) maintain that the ethic(s) 
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of care and social justice theory should be considered as distinct domains; and that caring theory 
is only used to inform justice theory, and vice versa. Clement (1998) argues that care and justice 
“should be understood as checks upon one another, such that both of the ethics are necessary for 
an adequate approach to morality”( 90). What Clement means by “as checks upon each other” is 
that either the ethic(s) of care is informed by justice concerns or justice theory is informed by 
care concerns (ibid.). That is, their relationship is solely informational; it does not reflect that 
caring mind and sense of justice are both intrinsic elements that together constitute a moral 
theory. This is the major criticism that Tronto makes about Held’s book, The Ethics of Care.20 
Tronto says that, although Held suggests that justice theory should work together with caring 
theory, there is no assurance that justice theory will be carried out caringly, because the caring 
quality is only a wish, not a necessity, in Held’s writing.  
The second difficulty of investigating the compatibility between caring theory/ethic(s) 
and rational moral philosophy derives from the diverse definitions and dichotomous 
characterizations of relational ontology. These definitions and characterizations distract the focus 
of the investigation from the identification of the relational ontology of caring theory/caring 
ethic(s). Similar to the first difficulty, these definitions and characterizations also confined to 
one-sided characterization, and are deeply shaped by dichotomous views and formulations of 
objectivity versus subjectivity, rationality versus affectivity, public principle versus private 
relation/disposition/virtue, and abstraction versus concreteness. The different ways in which 
Noddidngs, Gilligan, Tronto, Clement, Hankivsky, and Slote define relational ontology can 
illustrate this point.  
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Noddings (1984), according to the subjective experience of caring nature and caring 
relation, defines the relational ontology of human existence as a caring relationship that occurs in 
human encounters, such as a mother-child’s relationship or intimate circles of social members, 
such as family and friends (3-4). Gilligan, Tronto, and Hankivsky, on the other hand, based on 
the social and political factors, define and characterize relational ontology of human existence as 
the interconnection and interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical activity. Gilligan 
(1987, 8), though aware of the significance of caring relations in human social networks, focuses 
only on the social and political factors—not the moral agent’s caring nature, disposition, or 
virtue; i.e., not the subjective experience of caring. Hence, the interconnection, for Gilligan, 
seems to occur only in social and political activity. Tronto (1987) and Hankivsky (2004), 
although they connect subjective experience and sociopolitical activity, still characterize the 
relational ontology of the interconnection and interdependent as an one-sided link that connects 
sociopolitical policy, institutions, and so on to an individual. Specifically, they both highlight the 
way social policy and political activities condition human life, instead of the other way round. 
That is, Tronto and Hankivsky overlook how a moral agent’s caring nature, disposition, and 
virtue may affect social and political policymaking, structures, and other conditionings.  
These theorists’ characterizations of the relational ontology of caring theory/ethic(s) 
indicate that, yet again, they are confining relational ontology to one part of human reality, be it 
subjective caring experiences or objective social and political activities. As such, the 
incompatibility of subjectivity and objectivity regarding the ontological ground of caring 
theory/caring ethic(s) is still hidden in their formulations. This is different from one’s empirical 
life. In reality, one’s personhood cannot be formed without social and political activity; similarly, 
social and political activity requires individuals’ participation.  
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Slote presents another dichotomous formulation of relational ontology of caring 
theory/ethic(s), arguing that the ontological foundation of caring theory is empathetic caring or 
affective feeling; whereas that of rational moral philosophy is the concept of justice, autonomy, 
and equal rights. The other theorists’ formulations of relational ontology, noted above, all reveal 
Slote’s dichotomous view of the affective feeling and rational thinking, though they do not 
explicitly or systematically deal with that dichotomy. Thus, should the ontological ground of 
caring theory/ethic(s) be defined and characterized in concrete terms, such as “caring relation,” 
“empathetic caring,” “affective feeling”; or in abstract terms, such as “interrelatedness” and 
“interdependent nature”? These theorists’ dual view of concreteness and abstraction also 
challenges the compatibility of caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy. For instance, 
Noddings and Held criticize rational moral philosophy’s use of abstraction to formulate a moral 
theory; this criticism seems to suggest that abstraction is incompatible with concreteness.  
The last difficulty of investigating whether caring theory and rational moral philosophy 
are (in)compatible is that different scholars conceive the relational ontologies presented by 
caring theorists either simply as epistemological holdings different from rational thinking of 
autonomy, or as ontological foundations that constitute the very existence of human life. 
Gilligan, Tronto, Clement, and Held, for example, treat the question of the interdependent nature 
of human life and sociopolitical activity as a matter that is open to different viewpoints. Their 
treatment indicates that such interconnectedness is merely an alternative way of seeing the world, 
or of being in the world, and not necessarily the reality of human existence. Yet, for Noddings, 
and Hankivsky, caring relations, interconnection, and interdependent nature are the intrinsic 
components that constitute human personhood and social and political reality. These two 
different views inevitably lead to the debate about whether humans can function well if they 
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possess rationality without affective feeling; or whether social and political activities can be 
carried out without being affected by personal feelings, values, anger and the like. For, if one 
posits the relational ontology such that interdependence is simply an epistemological holding, 
then one is saying that people could exist without interdependence upon others. However, if one 
defines the relational ontology such that interrelatedness is the intrinsic component of human 
life, then, according to this theory, people cannot exist without being interrelated. Hence, the 
different viewpoints of the interdependent nature of human life—as an epistemological holding 
or as ontological grounding—affect the question of whether rationality can coexist with 
affectivity.  
In sum, three problems need to be solved prior to discussing the (in)compatibility of 
caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy. The first problem is to synthesize 
Noddings’s caring theory and Gilligan-Tronto’s ethic(s) of care into a unified neo–caring theory. 
Second, the synthesized neo–caring theory has to take into account the intersubjectivity and 
interobjectivity of human life and sociopolitical activity/factors. Third, this neo–caring theory 
has to solve the conflict between rationality and affectivity, subjectivity and objectivity, and 
public principle and private relation (or personal disposition/virtue). Furthermore, the new caring 
theory needs to clarify the compatibility of the concrete caring relation and the abstract 
interdependent nature, as well as resolve the question of a relational ontology that is both an 
epistemological holding and an ontological ground. Only when these problems are solved, can 
we go further to investigate the compatibility of caring theory and rational moral philosophy with 
respect to the relational ontology of caring theory.  
 
Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
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The methodology I use in this dissertation is philosophical interpretative. Philosophical 
interpretative is a reflective approach that uses a particular school of thought as a 
theoretical/philosophical framework to understand, analyze, explain and clarify the studied 
subject. It also serves as a philosophical foundation for bridging and overcoming the deficiencies 
of the theories in question, i.e. caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy. The 
philosophical theories in this dissertation are primarily based on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory 
of intersubjectivity of existential phenomenology and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-
arising. These two philosophical theories aim to eliminate the dualism rooted in both Western 
and Occidental rationalism and empiricism. Both Merleau-Ponty’s  theory of intersubjectiviey 
and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising systematically and thoroughly reveal the 
interrelatedness and interdependent nature of human experience, i.e., subjectivity, and the 
sociopolitical and natural world, i.e., objectivity.  
Merleau-Ponty ([1965], 2004) explains that the connections between an individual and 
the lived world are through at least two means—body and language. Regarding the first: he 
argues that the human body is a “lived body,” not simply an “objective body”; the lived body is 
the flesh field through which one experiences the world. The body provides individuals with a 
lived connection between themselves and their social, political, and natural environments. 
Merleau-Ponty uses the term “body schema” to describe the link that connects an individual’s 
subjective experience (or mental activity) to the environment of the world. Merleau-Ponty 
([1965], 2004) says, “[i]n so far as I have sensory functions, a visual, auditory and tactile field, I 
am already in communication with others taken as similar psycho-physical subjects.”21 This 
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means that as soon as one’s gaze falls upon a perceivable object, such as a table, dog, or man, the 
objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of significance, for the perceived object 
is no longer simply what he or she could make of it—the perceived size, shape, color, distance, 
and so on,—but the surrounding conditions that make what the perceived object look like. The 
reason for this is that any perceivable object is conditioned by a context of relation (353). When 
one sees a table in his/her room, the size and shape of the table is not a fixed law that governs the 
parade of phenomena, and an invariable relationship. For every change of the perceiver’s 
distance or orientation, a corresponding change of the table’s shape and size will follow, because 
there exists a constancy of relationships as the perceived object’s basis (ibid.). Merleau-Ponty 
argues that, for science and objective thought, the table seen from a hundred yards away is not 
different from the table seen from ten yards away. Yet, in real life, the former looks much 
smaller than the latter (351). According to Merleau-Ponty, this is because, as humans, we possess 
a body, which, in turn, let us come into being within the framework of a certain setting in 
relation to worldly objects. Sizes and shapes of any perceivable object, such as a table, merely 
provide a modality for a comprehensive hold on this world (353).  
Merleau-Ponty posits language as another intersubjective medium through which an 
individual is connected to natural world and others. He (225) suggests that 
[l]anguage certainly has an inner content, but this is not self-subsistent and self-conscious  
thought. What then does language express, if it does not express thoughts? It presents or  
rather it is the subject’s taking up of a position in the world of his meanings. The term  
‘world’ here is not a manner of speaking; it means that the ‘mental’ or cultural life  
borrows its structures from natural life and that the thinking subject must have its basis in  
the subject incarnate. (225) 
 
 The passage reveals that although every individual is an autonomous entity who is 
physically separate from social and natural world, while using language to express one’s 
thoughts, the individual has to root upon the structure of social and natural world to express 
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his/her thoughts. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty  points out that different individuals also merge into 
each other’s world through dialogue and discussion. He says that  
In the experience of conversation and dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and  
myself  a common ground, my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and  
those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into  
a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the  
other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are 
 collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other,  
and we co-exist through a common world. (413) 
 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s explanation shows that an individual’s life always interacts and 
intersects with others through the language, discussion and dialogue. As such, the world is 
constituted not simply by an individual alone. Rather, it is through the interconnected and 
interacted action and communication. Together, the interdependent activities of different 
individuals contribute to weave the fabric of human existence and the sociopolitical world.  
A similar message with a different approach is Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-
arising (or dependent origination), which explains that every activity of human life, including 
both mental and physical activities, results from many factors. The factors are interconnected and 
interdependent. Nāgārjuna’ lays out this theory in his masterpiece, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(MKK). Specifically, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising or dependent origination 
(pratītya samutpāda) characterizes the nature, structure, and constitution of human existence, 
describing human life and existential activity as a process of merging experience of things that 
we normally perceive.
22
 The core tenet of this philosophy articulates the interdependent nature 
and interconnection of an individual and other people and activities. According to the 
philosophy, no entity, including both animate and inanimate things, can exist isolated from other 
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conditions—whether the conditions are material or mental—because of the absence of svabhava 
(self-nature, or own-being).  
 The fact is that no person, thing, activity, and so on, comes into being through a single or 
a fixed entity. Rather, the emergence of a life, an event, et cetera, is through a process of 
becoming; and, in the process of becoming, many factors come to assist. Hence, the existence 
and emergence of an entity is dependent on and conditioned by many supplementary factors. In 
MKK, Nāgārjuna discusses this theory by investigating two questions related to the concept of 
motion: What is the locus of motion (i.e., where is the motion taking place)?; and, What is the 
object of motion (i.e., what is it that has the property of moving)?
23
 By asking these questions, 
Nāgārjuna shows that a motion and a mover are mutually dependent on and defined by each 
other. The motion is the property of the mover; whereas, the mover is the agent of the motion. A 
motion cannot be called a “motion” without the moving action of a mover. The mover, on the 
other hand, would not be called a “mover” if (s)he does not take the action of moving. Hence, 
they are mutually dependent upon and define each other. This interdependent nature of existence 
is called “dependent co-arising”  or “dependent origination”. 
According to Nāgārjuna, dependent co-arising does not merely occur in relation to an 
event or activity, but also in relation to an individual’s self-identity and construction of 
knowledge. Nāgārjuna argues that every individual is constituted at least by five components: the 
physical body (rūpa), sensation (vedanā), perception (vijñāna,), intellect (samskāra) and 
consciousness (vijnana). The individual self, Nāgārjuna suggests, cannot identify solely with one 
of the five components, such as the body or consciousness; nor can it separate from them, or only 
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contains part of them, or be part of the five components (Westerhoff  2009, 155), Human life is a 
process of emerging/becoming; and the sequential process involves both mental and physical 
activities. These activities are interdependent upon each other in order to constitute an 
individual’s life undergirded by the five components. Hence, even if an individual looks like an 
autonomous entity who is physically isolated from other human beings and from sociopolitical 
activity, by its very nature, (s)he is constituted by many factors.  
To further illustrate the interdependent relation between self and other factors, Nāgārjuna 
discusses the nature of epistemology and knowledge in MKK. According to Jan Westerhoff 
(2009), the significance for Nāgārjuna in discussing the theory of knowledge is that “objects of 
knowledge and means of accessing them form an essential part of our conceptualization of the 
world and our place in it” (155).   Westerhoff explains that “objects of knowledge” indicate 
objects which are perceived, and “means of knowledge” indicate perception, inference, 
recognition of likeness, and testimony. Thus, means of knowledge is the instrument that an 
individual uses to understand objects of knowledge, which connect one’s inner world with the 
world outside her/him. Nāgārjuna’s investigation starts from the assumption that both the 
perceived objects and the means of knowledge possess independent self-natures or own-being, 
i.e., svabhāva. Yet, through his investigation, he found that no independent perceptions  (or 
“means of knowledge”) can perceive an object without its referent, nor any independent, 
perceivable substance that, by itself, can give people knowledge without the help of perception 
and other means of knowledge, such as inference, and recognition of likeness. The means of 
knowledge and the objects perceived have to work together to make knowledge possible: without 
means of access, objects cannot be recognized; and without perceivable objects, the means of 
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access cannot produce knowledge. Thus, human personhood and other activity/existence are 
interdependent and mutually conditioned by each other.  
 
Reason to apply Mearleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s philosophies as the philosophical 
framework 
 
There are four reasons why I apply both Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity and 
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent origination to investigate, analyse, explain and enhance the 
relational ontology of caring theory/ethic(s). First, these two philosophical theories are capable 
of articulating the interrelatedness that most caring theorists have not yet fully spelled out. The 
existential account of relational ontology—although mentioned by Tronto, Noddings and 
Hankivsky—is still far from being completed. Both Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s 
philosophies can bridge this gap; the meaning of interrelatedness and interdependent nature of 
personhood and human life and socio-political activity are the primary focus of both Merleau-
Ponty’s existential philosophy and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising. Their 
philosophies provide me with a clearer lens to clarify and analyze the relational ontology 
presented by Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky. Also, these philosophies serve as the theoretical 
framework for my dissertation—not only to eliminate deficiencies of the caring theory/ethic(s) 
ontological viewpoints, but also to bridge the dichotomous gap between caring theory and 
rational moral philosophy. For this reason, these two philosophical theories are very helpful.  
Second, the primary criticism that caring theorists—Noddings and Gilligan, in 
particular—direct at rational moral philosophy is its lack of attention to existential and empirical 
reality relating to moral reality. That is, in these caring theorists’ view, rational moral philosophy 
pays too much attention to the abstract moral principle and a fixed, universal rule while ignoring 
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the concrete conditions of a moral reality. Always at the core of the concerns of caring theory 
and ethic(s) of care, on the other hand, are the relational conditions of human existence, 
including the moral agent’s experience and sociopolitical reality. For instance, Noddings argues 
that her approach to caring theory is based on both existential reality and individual mental 
phenomenology that reveal a moral agent’s needs/wants and related conditions. Gilligan, Tronto, 
and Hankivsky, while not highlighting the individual’s mental phenomenology of needs and 
wants, emphasize the requirement of caring components vis-á-vis the corresponding social and 
political conditions. In this sense, the contextuality (or the relevant conditions) of a moral reality 
and the moral agent’s subjective experience of needs and wants are among the most essential 
components that constitute the ontological foundation of caring theory and ethic(s) of care. 
Hence, the theoretical framework applied to investigate, analyze, explain, clarify and enhance the 
relational ontology of caring theory/ethic(s) has to be characterized by the existential concerns. 
These concerns, in fact, are the major themes articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
intersubjectivity and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising.  
Third, most of the caring theorists—particularly Gilligan, Noddings, Tronto, and 
Hankivsky—although aware of the interrelatedness and interdependent nature of personhood and 
sociopolitical reality, still confine their formulations of caring theory or ethic(s) of care either to 
personhood or to social and political activity. Connection and interdependency, although 
mentioned in their writings, are limited either to personal caring nature and caring relationship or 
to the caring activity of social and political practice. Hence, a bias toward the dichotomy and 
incompatibility of subjectivity and objectivity still implicitly lurks in their writings. This implicit 
dichotomy or incompatibility becomes explicit when these theorists discuss the compatibility of 
caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy with respect to their ontological ground. 
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This shortcoming, fortunately, can be mended with the help of both Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
intersubjectivity of existential phenomenology and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-
arising, because these two philosophies systematically focus on explaining and illustrating the 
intersubjectivity, interobjectivity, interrelatedness, and interdependent nature of humanhood and 
social and political reality.  
Fourth, the theoretical conflict between epistemological holding and ontological 
grounding, discussed above, confuses many caring theorists. The confusion sometimes is so 
great that they lose sight of the merits of caring theory/ethic(s) and treat it as simply an 
alternative view to rational moral philosophy. They conceive that the interdependent nature and 
interrelatedness of human life and sociopolitical activity is solely an epistemological holding, not 
an ontological foundation. The puzzling question of epistemological holding versus ontological 
grounding, as well as the consequence of one’s viewpoint in relation to these two, is explicitly 
explained and illustrated in both Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s philosophies. Their 
philosophies provide very good resources for me to explain and illustrate human’s 
epistemological holding and ontological grounding are interconnected and mutually define and 
condition each other. This explanation and illustration, in fact, will also shed light on the relation 
between abstractive principle and concrete reality, which is raised as another problem by 
Noddings, Held and other caring theories.  
 Therefore, on this issue, as well as the three described above, in next chapter, I will 
investigate, analyse and clarify the major shared components that are included in both Nodding’s 
caring theory and Gilligan-Tronto’s ethic(s) of care. Then, my thesis will synthesize these shared 
components to form an unified neocaringtheory.  Finally, I will point out and explain the non-
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shared element between these two theories, (i.e. relational ontology) and the philosophies which 
I will apply to bridge the gap between them.  
 
35 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
TOWARD CONSTRUCTING A UNIFIED NEOCARING THEORY 
 
          In the previous chapter, my thesis revealed that the caring theory/ethic(s) has been 
uncovered and enhanced by scholars from different disciplines, using different characterizations. 
Accordingly, caring theory/ethic(s) is characterized by two features. On the one hand, education 
and human sciences scholars, such as Noddings and Slote, emphasize the subjective experience 
of a caring nature and caring relations; on the other hand, social and political science scholars, 
including Gilligan, Tronto, Hankivsky, Held, etc., underscore caring as an activity/practice and 
outline the social and political factors related to the ethic of care(s), such as social policy, 
structure, arrangement, and institution. It is because of these contrasting characterizations that 
the (in)compatibility between caring theory and rational moral philosophy has not yet been fully 
resolved. Alternatively put, although the aforementioned caring theorists share the same words, 
the implications and referents for their caring theory/ethic(s) are rather different, and vice versa. 
Hence, the primary task for this chapter of my dissertation is to clarify and identify a shared 
conceptual framework and ontological ground for caring theory and the ethic(s) of care in order 
to form an integrated neocaringtheory.  
 For this purpose, three objectives have to be met: first, to identify a shared conceptual 
framework of caring theory and the ethic(s) of care by clarifying the differences and similarities 
between the conceptual frameworks presented by caring theorists, such as Gilligan, Tronto, 
Hankivsky, Noddings, Held, and Slote. Then, I discuss to what extent the shared conceptual 
framework has already been developed by these theorists, and in which area work remains to be 
done. Second, based on the shared conceptual framework that has been identified, my thesis will 
investigate further possible shared ground on the basis of the relational ontology mentioned by 
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Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky (hereafter Tronto-Hankivsky). I will also examine the 
differences and similarities between these characterizations. Third, I will apply both Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity—as shown in his existential phenomenology—and 
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising to connect Noddings’ caring theory and Tronto-
Hankivsky’s interdependent nature. In this manner, my dissertation will integrate, enhance, and 
establish a more comprehensive and inclusive relational foundation for the ethic(s) of care and 
caring theory. Based on the shared conceptual framework that has been identified, and the 
integrated inclusive and comprehensive ontological ground of caring theory/ethic(s), my 
dissertation will then have a more solid and complete ground to investigate and discuss the 
(in)compatibility of caring theory/ethic(s) and rational moral philosophy in subsequent chapters. 
In this chapter, my thesis will focus on discussing the first two objectives that have been 
described here, and leave the third issue to next chapter . 
 
Identifying a More Comprehensive and Inclusive Conceptual Framework for 
Unifying Noddidngs’ Caring Theory and Tronto-Hankivsky’s Ethic of care 
 
 
            First, identifying a more comprehensive and inclusive conceptual framework for the 
integrated neocaringtheory: as mentioned previously, at least two different definitions and 
characterizations of caring theory/ethic(s) are found in the caring theorists’ writings. That is, 
education and human sciences scholars, such as Noddings (1984 and 2002) and Slote (2007), 
conceptualize caring theory through human subjective experiences of a caring nature and caring 
relations; on the other hand, psychology, social and political sciences theorists, such as Gilligan, 
Tronto, Hankivsky, and Held, tend to define and characterize the ethic(s) of care through 
objective factors and the interconnected relations of personhood, and sociopolitical activity.  
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However, this does not mean that there is no shared ground between these two 
characterizations. In fact, as theories have developed, caring theorists from both sides have made 
efforts either to reconcile or integrate these different characterizations. However, their 
integration and reconciliation falls short in that it only adopts similar wordings and integrates 
part of the conceptual framework. For example, initially, the core components at the heart of 
Gilligan’s (1982) ethic(s) of care included caring relations and the contextual deliberation of a 
particular event, regarding how female students make their moral judgments and decisions. After 
Gilligan, in Noddings’ (1984) original version of caring theory, the components and contents of 
caring theory were enhanced to articulate a caring nature, motivation replacement, receptivity, 
responsiveness, relatedness, and responsibility. Noddings’ caring theory clearly focused more on 
uncovering the subjective experiential factors involved or manifested in the caring nature. 
Subsequently, Noddings (2002) added and emphasized caring relations as the ontological ground 
of caring theory. Slote (2007) continues Noddings’s notion of caring nature and exclusively 
focuses on articulating the manner in which an ethic based on sympathetic caring is better than 
modern political liberalism presented by John Rawls. The subjective aspect of caring theory, up 
to and including Noddings’s modified version of caring theory (2002) and Slote’s (2007) 
sympathetic caring ethic, has established a rather comprehensive conceptual framework. This 
framework comprises responsibility, responsiveness, relatedness, a caring nature and caring 
relations. However, the social and political dimensions of caring theory are not clearly 
articulated in Noddings’s theory. Slote, although describing how to apply caring theory, 
specifically focusing on empathic caring in the social and political arena, fails to pay attention to 
the relational ground presented by Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky. Hence, he describes 
empathetic caring rather than relational ontology as the ontological ground of caring theory.  
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 On the other hand, Gilligan’s ethic(s) of care is enhanced and enriched by scholars from 
social and political sciences, such as Tronto, Sevenhuijsen, Bubeck, Hankivsky and Held. 
Tronto, Hankivsky, and Held are particularly relevant to my project, because their caring theories 
contribute greatly to clarifying the meaning of care and caring relations, from both social and 
political perspectives. Their characterizations of caring share some similarities with those of 
Noddings’, but are not identical. For example, Tronto (1987, 1995, 1998) defines care as an 
activity or practice that reveals the interconnected and interdependent nature of human life and 
socio-political activity. She suggests that caring activity involves four components: attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. Similarly, Hankivsky (2004) highlights caring as 
a practice, contextual sensibility, and the interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical 
activity, such as policy, constitution and arrangement. Held (2006) also characterizes caring 
activity under the rubric of practice; however, she emphasizes the caring relations presented by 
Noddings, rather than the interdependent nature emphasized by Tronto and Hankivsky. In a 
sense, Held tends to integrate Noddings’ caring theory and Tronto’s ethic(s) of care because she 
adopts Tronto’s view and defines ethic(s) of care as a practice and value (perspective in Tronto’s 
term), but applies Noddings’s caring relations, instead of interdependent nature, to characterize 
the relation between personhood and sociopolitical activity. In this manner, Held is able to 
integrate part of Tronto’s ethic(s) of care into a part of Noddings’ caring theory. I say “part of 
caring theory” because Held leaves out the interdependent nature and interconnection of Tronto 
and Noddings’ caring nature. On the other hand, Gilligan, Tronto, and Hankivsky completely 
ignore the significant role that a caring nature plays in caring theory/ethic(s).  
 To sum up, the conceptual framework mentioned by the caring theorists, iteratively 
speaking, comprises four components: relational ontology (including caring relations and 
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interdependent nature), caring nature, caring as an activity/practice, and contextuality/motivation 
replacement. However, there are shared and non-shared components of this conceptual 
framework. I summarize the shared and non-shared major components in Table 1.  
 
Scholar Caring 
relation/ 
interdependent 
relation 
Disposition, 
attitude/caring 
nature 
Practice/activity 
(attentiveness, 
responsiveness, 
responsibility, 
caring nature 
and relational 
ontology) 
Contextuality/ 
motivation replacement 
 
Gilligan  X  X X 
Noddings X X X X 
Tronto X  X X 
Hankivsky X Sensibility X X 
Held X (x) X  
Slote  X (x) X 
  
Table 1: Summary of shared and non-shared components of caring theories. 
Note: The elements in parentheses indicate that these components are not explicitly 
mentioned in those caring theorists’ writings, although they may implicitly include these 
components in their caring theories. 
 
 
Caring as an Activity 
       From the above table, some shared components can be detected in the apparently diverse 
definitions and characterizations of caring theory and the ethic(s) of care. At least three shared 
components can be identified: caring as activity, relational ontology, and contextuality or 
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motivation replacement. Caring nature is the only component that is not shared.
24
 The first 
shared component is caring as an activity/practice. All the scholars explicitly or implicitly agree 
that care is a practice or activity. Tronto, Hankivsky, and Held explicitly use the rubric of caring 
as practice/activity to articulate caring theory, whereas Gilligan, Noddings and Slote, although 
not using the term “caring as practice/activity”, elaborate the manner in which caring practice is 
performed in the context of daily life and in social and political arenas. Although Gilligan and 
Hankivsky do not include a sub-heading of caring as activity in their book, they articulate the 
way in which care is performed in social works, policy, arrangement, etc. Hence, caring as an 
activity/practice can be seen as the first shared component of caring theory/ethic(s) among these 
caring theorists.  
 With regard to the content of caring as a practice, Noddings and Tronto identify four 
components of caring activity. Yet, these include shared and non-shared factors. For Noddings 
(1984, 2-6), these four components are receptivity, responsiveness, relatedness, and 
responsibility; in Tronto’s view, these four factors are attentiveness, responsiveness, 
responsibility, and competence. Apparently, Noddings and Tronto only share two components, 
responsiveness and responsibility, but do not share the other two components—receptivity and 
relatedness in Noddings’ list or attentiveness and competence in Tronto’s terms. However, a 
careful examination of their definitions of attentiveness and receptivity reveals some shared 
features, because these two terms describe the mental activity of paying attention to the one who 
is cared for, or the thing that is cared about. The difference between these two terms is the 
manner in which attention is given. Attentiveness indicates a conscious and neutral way of 
                                                 
24
. I did not include Held because she defines care as an activity or a caring relation rather than the affectivity or 
loving kindness and sympathy suggested by Noddings and Slote.  
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mental involvement for the one who attends to the care. The one who cares is not entirely 
engrossed in the situation of the cared-for and cared-about. However, receptivity denotes an 
involvement with the entire acceptance of the one who is cared-for or the thing that is cared-
about. This shows that different degrees of attention are paid to the cared-for and the cared-
about.  
 The different degrees of attention of these two terms show that Noddings’ caring theory 
is a strong version of caring because she describes the mental involvement of caring as an 
engrossment or motivation replacement. These two terms imply that the person who cares is 
deeply involved in the situation of the cared-for one because the motivation of the cared-for is 
the most important concern of the caring-one. This kind of caring, although good, has a narrow 
concern, for the cared-for is the only concern of a caring activity. As such, the caring may lead to 
not only overlooking other affiliated people and factors, but also to doing something harmful to 
the cared-for. For example, if a mother only cares for her child, but not the child’s friends, none 
of the child’s friends would really like to be the child’s friend. This is because whenever an 
accident occurs, the child is the only concern of the mother, but not other children. Hence, in 
order to broaden the notion of concern, I will use attentiveness of receptivity as one of the four 
core components of a caring activity. This attentive receptivity indicates that the caring one 
attends to the cared-for’s situation with not only receptive care, but also with a concern for those 
corresponding people and factors. This can help avoid the narrow focus of Noddings’ caring 
mode and does not overlook the caring nature that the receptivity of caring activity needs to 
embody. However, this notion of caring nature related to receptivity is overlooked by Gilligan 
and Tronto.  
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 With regard to another last two terms, relatedness (Noddings) and competence (Tronto), 
these are the only two components listed in Noddings’ and Tronto’s caring activity that do not 
share common ground. However, if the meaning of relatedness is closely examined, defined by 
Noddings as an intimate caring relation, it is plausible to say that it shares common ground with 
the meaning of relational nature/ontology, as mentioned by Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky. 
Hence, my thesis includes this term in relational nature/ontology, and treats it as included in both 
Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interconnected/interdependent nature. 
Noddings’ theory has no equivalent to the term competence, which is listed in Tronto’s caring 
components. However, the meaning of this concept is included in Noddings’ motivation 
replacement and Gilligan and Hankivsky’s contextuality. The reason for this is that Tronto 
defines competence as the capacity to understand the one who is cared-for, and to solve the 
cared-for’s problem effectively. The first meaning of understanding the one who is cared-for 
effectively is similar to the goal of contextuality (Hankivsky) and motivation replacement 
(Noddings). That is, to attempt to understand the cared-for’s problem in relation to what a cared-
for really needs. The second meaning of solving a problem effectively, unfortunately, is more 
difficult to resolve because solving a problem effectively requires not simply the competence of 
the cared-for, but also his/her personality and other corresponding conditions, such as the way in 
which to carry out a problem-solving plan, and who participates in this plan. I categorize the 
shared meaning of Tronto’s competence into neocaring theory and conceive it as included in 
contextuality or motivation replacement. However, I eliminate the non-shared meaning. I will 
explain the reason for this in the following section, which considers contextuality. 
 
Contextuality 
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        The second overlapping component of the conceptual framework recognized by caring 
theorists is contextuality, in Tronto’s terms, and motivation replacement, in Noddings’ list. 
Apparently, there is no common ground for these two terms; however, from their implications, 
we can detect some similar mental phenomena. Motivation replacement describes the idea of 
taking an individual’s situation into account closely, to the extent that one’s thoughts are entirely 
replaced by the cared-for’s situation and motivation. Similarly, the mental activity of 
contextuality indicates situating the case or the cared-for in a particular context in order to make 
a moral judgment or decision. If we replace the cared-for’s motivation and situation with the 
particular condition of a case or a person, then it is evident that the mental phenomena of the 
motivation replacement involves an activity similar to that of contextuality. That is, both 
activities situate a case or an individual in a particular context with respect to their corresponding 
conditions in order to make a moral judgment or decision. Hence, it is plausible to say that 
contextuality and motivation replacement denote a similar caring activity but from different 
perspectives, that is, either from an individual’s subjective perspective of motivation or from 
objective social and political conditions. As mentioned above, Tronto’s competence emphasizes 
the capacity of the caring one to implement the activity of contextuality, but, in both Gilligan and 
Noddings’s caring theory, capacity, although important, is not as significant as the actualization 
of contextuality and motivation replacement. This is why I did not use Tronto’s term of 
competence, and instead used contextuality to indicate contextual understanding of the situation 
of the cared-for person. Therefore, I will use both terms (contextuality and motivation 
replacement) to indicate that this category can be used either to consider a human agent’s 
motivation, or a social and political factor, that is, contextuality.  
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Relational Ontology 
          The third component of caring theory that is recognized and accepted by all the caring 
theorists is the relational foundation/ontology
25
 of caring theory/ethic(s). All the caring theorists 
realize that certain kind of relationship is involved in a caring activity, although this has been 
defined by them in different ways. Noddings and Held identify and characterize this relationship 
as caring relation, whereas Gilligan, Tronto, and Hankivsky characterize it as an interconnection 
(or interrelatedness) and the interdependent nature of human life and social and political activity. 
The meanings and implications of these two different characterizations are complex and will be 
discussed thoroughly in my later section on the ontological ground of caring theory/ethic(s).  
 
Caring Nature 
          The only caring component listed in Noddings’ caring theory that is not explicitly 
mentioned by Gilligan, Tronto, Held, and Hankivsky is caring nature. This component clearly 
plays a major role in Noddings and Slote’s caring theory. Hankivsky seems to be aware of the 
significant role of caring nature, but uses a neutral term, contextual sensibility, to describe the 
affective feeling involved in the caring activity. Similarly, occasionally, Held’s writing also 
describes the significance of care, but she tends to define care as an activity and as a caring 
nature. Her definition clearly differs from that of Noddings and Slote, as the latter define a caring 
nature as an affective feeling and empathetic caring, respectively. For example, Held (2007, 136) 
says that “[i]n a caring society, attending to the needs of every child would be a major goal and 
doing so would be seen to require social arrangement offering the kinds of economic and 
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 In caring theories writings, relational ontology is used as exchangeable word of relational ground, relational 
foundation or ontological relation. Hence, I also use these words as exchangeable terms.  
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educational and child care and health care support that members of communities really need.” 
Here, the concepts of childcare, health care, and even caring society all indicate that, in Held’s 
terms, care refers to an activity that attends to either a child or health, and the needs of the 
members of communities, rather than considering affective feeling and empathetic caring, as 
emphasized by Noddings and Slote.  
 It is understandable that social and political science scholars, that is, Gilligan, Tronto, 
Held, and Hankivsky, omit caring nature/disposition and solely focus on articulating the 
objective factors of personhood and sociopolitical activity. The reason for this mainly derives 
from the traditional dichotomous view that separates objectivity from subjectivity, as many 
scholars tend to conceive that the social and political sciences only aim to study the objective 
factors that construct our social and political structure, policy, arrangement, etc. These factors, in 
appearance, have nothing to do with subjective experience. Hence, they assume that it is not 
necessary to take subjective experiential factors into account. In addition, the term caring 
nature/disposition not only connotes a feminine or feminist origin, but also implies the 
involvement of subjective feelings. Downplaying this component makes the caring theory that is 
applied in social and political practice sound objective and neutral. As such, this kind of caring 
theory can bypass potential tensions, difficulties, and incompatibilities related to both care and 
social justice.  
These reasons for not including a caring nature in a caring ethic sound justifiable because 
they suggest that we should not or need not show caring feelings while tackling a social and 
political problem. Yet, paradoxically, this neutral-sounding position strays from the concerns and 
essence of caring theory to a certain extent. As both Gilligan and Noddings indicate, rational 
moral philosophy is lacking in that it only pays attention to the objective mechanism, principle, 
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and policy, but fails to attend to the human agent’s needs and human empirical conditions. 
Accordingly, rational moral philosophy is insufficient for tackling social and political problems, 
let alone human affairs, from a moral perspective. Noddings even spells out that a caring theory 
without a caring nature is empty. Therefore, it is necessary to include a caring nature/disposition 
in an integrated version of my neocaring theory.  
Keeping the notion of caring nature as a concept in an integrated theory has at least two 
advantages. First, a caring nature is one of the positive factors of human life, which one cannot 
live without. If we keep it, it can add significantly to the neocaring theory. This dimension, more 
often than not, has been ignored by moral theory in the modern era, particularly John Rawls’ 
social justice theory, and neoliberalism’s political theory. Since human life is different from 
lifeless machines or computers, including a caring nature would facilitate and ensure that we do 
not overlook or ignore the sensibility of human life and the essence of humanity. Moreover, by 
including the element of the caring nature, the neocaring theory will have a more inclusive and 
comprehensive ground for characterizing and constructing a moral theory. The constructed moral 
theory, then, will be able to come closer than rational moral theory to the empirical condition of 
human reality. Second, social and political practice is established and constructed by humans, for 
humans, and of humans. Leaving out the subjective core factor of human affective life is 
analogous to discussing a lamp without caring about its light, or playing a violin without 
attending to its music. In a sense, that would entirely eliminate the essence of caring quality. 
Hence, it is necessary to include the notion of caring nature in a neocaring theory, as it will help 
enable us to discover how a subjective experience and value may affect an individual’s moral 
judgment, decisions, and behavior, both in personal life and social and political activity.  
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Based on the above discussion, a shared conceptual framework with four principal 
components has been identified for the integrated neocaring theory. These four principal 
components are: caring as a practice/activity, relational ground/ontology, contextuality or 
motivation replacement, and a caring nature/disposition. Strictly speaking, this conceptual 
framework is not limited to these four core factors. Many factors can be added, such as a caring 
attitude, sympathy, etc. However, these four core factors will serve as the most important 
parameters by which we can evaluate a caring theory/ethic(s). These four are analogous to the 
four core pillars of the unified neocaring building, which cannot be reduced without affecting 
caring quality. Whatever caring theory is implemented in a social, political, or educational arena, 
these four factors are the yardstick for ensuring that the essence of true caring activity is retained. 
Metaphorically speaking, if the human world as a whole is a caring building, caring nature is the 
very substance of the constitution, which permeates every part of the existence. Caring activity is 
the event-dots for constructing the fabric of the building. Contextuality is the relational link 
connecting every dot together to form a whole. Relational ontology is the principle or ground 
that undergirds the interdependent nature of the previous three components.  
 
The Different Characterizations of Ontological Relations or Relational Ontology of 
Caring Theory 
 
             In the previous section, I identified and integrated a conceptual framework for my 
neocaring theory/ethic(s). This conceptual framework comprises four components: caring as 
activity, relational ontology/ground, contextuality/motivation replacement, and caring nature. 
Among these four core components, three – caring as activity, contextuality, and caring nature – 
have been discussed by the aforementioned caring theorists. For example, caring nature has been 
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thoroughly explained and discussed by Noddings and Slote, whereas caring as an 
activity/practice has been illustrated by Tronto, Held, and Hankivsky. Contextuality has also 
been discussed to a great extent by Gilligan, Tronto, and Hankivsky. Motivation replacement is 
one of the major themes of Noddings’ caring theory. The only remaining component is relational 
ontology, as mentioned by both Noddings and Hankivsky. Relational ontology is as important as 
the other components of a conceptual framework of caring theory because it relates to the nature 
and ontological foundation of caring theory. If the other three components of the conceptual 
framework are the flesh of caring theory, relational ontology is the backbone and skeleton that 
lays out the possible ground for constructing a caring theory/ ethic(s).  
Traditionally, ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or 
reality, and the basic categories of being and their relations. It deals with questions concerning 
whether entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within 
a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences.
26
 That is, ontology is the 
study of what constitutes human existence and sociopolitical reality. Many classical 
philosophical questions are related to the ontological problem, such as the question of whether 
there is a God, or the problem of the existence of universals, or whether a certain thing, or more 
broadly, entity, exists. There are also ontological questions that correspond with the most general 
features and relations of the entities that do exist. For example, an ontological question could be 
the problem of how a universal relates to something particular (assuming there are universals and 
particulars), or the problem of how an event like David eating a cookie relates to the particulars 
of David and the cookie, and to the relation of eating, assuming there are events, particulars and 
relations. In other words, we have “at least two parts to the overall philosophical project of 
                                                 
26. “Ontology.” Wikipedia, accessed October 2010, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology.  
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ontology: first, what there is, what exists, what the stuff is made out off, what reality is; second, 
what the most general features and relations of these things are.”27 
  It is plausible to say that the ontological ground discusses the most fundamental 
constituents of human existence, and the manner in which the state of human life is made 
possible, and its relation to other corresponding people and sociopolitical factors. In western 
tradition, this ontological problem is inevitably related to the transcendental Being or God 
because of the influence of Christian-Judaism, which suggests that the universe is created by 
God. Yet, in both existential philosophy and oriental philosophy, such as Taoism and Buddhist 
philosophy, the ontological issue is inseparable from daily reality. Let us take Taoist philosophy 
as an example from the first chapter of Dao De Jing, one of the most important books of Taoism. 
  
The truth that may be told is not the everlasting Truth. The name given to a thing is not the everlasting  
Name. Nothingness is used to denote the state that existed before the birth of heaven and earth. Reality is 
 used to denote the state where the multitude of things begins to have a separate existence… These two states, 
though bearing different names, have a common origin. Both are mysterious and metaphysical. They are the 
most mysterious, and form the gateway to all mysteries. (Yang, 1961, 2-5) 
 
           This passage describes the inseparable relation between the ontological dao and its 
empirical diverse realities. It says that although the dao is not equal to the perceivable empirical 
realities, it is inseparable from them. This is because, whereas the invisible ontological dao is the 
ground-base of diverse realities, the empirical reality is the manifestation of the ontological dao. 
This example t shows the relation between ontological ground and empirical manifestation. This 
is a pervasive concept regarding the relation between ontology and empirical realties in Asian 
philosophy. 
                                                 
 
27. “Logic and Ontology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed March  2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#3.1.  
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    My thesis will define ontology in accordance with the existential and Asian philosophical 
view and conceive that ontological ground is inseparable from daily reality. This ontological 
ground is one of the foremost essential issues of caring theory, for different ontological grounds 
will provide different components for constituting existential being. This different being of 
human existence will inform us to construct different kinds of social and political structures, 
organization, arrangement, and so on. This difference in construction will lead us to 
characterizing a moral theory differently. It is precisely the ontological ground and the 
aforementioned conceptual frameworks that differentiate the integrated neocaringtheory from 
rational moral philosophy, and unfolds a more comprehensive foundation for a modern moral 
philosophy.  
 However, the relational ontology/ground of caring theory/ethic(s) has been overlooked by 
most caring theorists, except for Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky. For example, Gilligan 
articulates how to situate a moral event within its context, that is, contextuality. Held particularly 
emphasizes caring as a practice and caring relation. Slote primarily underscores the caring nature 
as empathetic caring, and treats it as the ontological ground of caring theory. Yet, none of them 
concentrates on explaining the relational ontology of caring theory, be it caring relations or the 
interconnection and interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical activity. Noddings, 
Tronto, and Hankivsky are the scholars who have paid attention to relational ontology. However, 
they define and characterize the relational ontology of caring theory/ethic(s) in different ways. 
Noddings defines the ontological relation as a caring relation, whereas Tronto and Hankivsky 
characterize it as the interconnected relation and interdependent nature of personhood and 
sociopolitical activity. In order to clarify these two different definitions and characterizations, 
and find a shared ground for their discrepancies, my thesis addresses four questions. 
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First, the meaning of relational ontology: does relational ontology refer to caring relations, 
as Noddings and Held suggest, or interconnections and interdependent nature, as Tronto and 
Hankivsky maintain? Second, what is the difference and relationship between caring relations 
and interconnected and interdependent nature? Are they compatible with each other? Third, is 
the caring relation and interdependent nature an ontological ground or epistemological holding of 
caring theory? If it is an ontological ground, is caring relation or interdependent nature more 
suitable to form the ontological foundation for caring theory? Fourth, what is the implication of 
either caring theory or interdependent relations being the ontological ground, particularly in 
terms of a moral theory? The answers to these four questions will unveil not only the ontological 
ground of caring theory, but also the key factor of whether caring theory is compatible with 
rational moral philosophy.  
 
Different Characterizations of Relational Ontology 
Noddings and Held’s Caring Relation 
        First, the meaning of relational ontology: as mentioned previously, the relation involved in 
the caring theory is defined and characterized in two different ways. One is presented by 
Noddings and Held, who define and characterize an ontological relation as a caring relation of 
human encounters. Another definition is given by social and political scholars, such as Gilligan, 
Tronto, and Hankivsky, who characterize and define relation as the interconnection and 
interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical activities. The case in point can be 
illustrated by the way in which these caring theorists define the relational ontology of caring 
theory. For example, Noddings defines the caring relation as an ontological ground that is “a set 
of ordered pairs generated by some rules that describe the effect—or subjective experience—of 
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the members” (3-4). In the relation, “we recognize human encounter and affective response as a 
basic fact of human existence.” (4) In Noddings’s view, relation is the affective response 
occurring in a human encounter, which describes the “[s]ituations of relatedness,” and reveals “a 
picture of one-caring from a collection of concrete and unique situations” (33). These concrete 
and unique situations are characterized on the basis of the components of caring relations that are 
formed within a house, between mother-child and intimate family members. Noddings (2002, 
230) says that, although not being home, some of the attitudes that would be more familiar at 
home are encountered in the outside world. This could include “ways of responding, of 
controlling encounters, of coming to understand.” These ways of understanding, responding to 
the needs of the cared-for, and the responsibility of carrying out the care, are the core 
components of caring relations that can be applied to inform us how members of society should 
care for each other and establish a caring society. Noddings indicates the following in this 
regard:  
 
As we have wrestled with problem of ethicality, however, we have been led to identify something more  
basic—something from which both happiness and perfection spring, toward which they tend. For the  
one-caring, this “something” is the special relatedness of caring. To receive and to be received, to care  
and be cared-for: these are the basic realities of human being and its basic aims (1984, 173).  
 
          This passage explicitly reveals that the caring relation, including receiving and being 
received, caring and being cared for, constitutes the basic components and goal of human ethics. 
Moreover, Noddings (3) points out that the foundation of caring relations is derived from an 
affective response. Hence, we should locate “the very wellspring of ethical behavior in human 
affective response,” and remain in touch with the affectivity throughout our discussion of 
ethicality. Noddings explicates that although a caring ethic is not necessarily based on sentiment, 
53 
 
it is necessary to give an “appropriate attention and credit to the affective foundation of 
existence.” Noddings says, 
 
Ethical caring, the relation in which we do meet the other morally, will be described as arising out of  
natural caring—that relation in which we respond as one-caring out of love or natural inclination. The  
relation of natural caring will be identified as the human condition that we, consciously or  
unconsciously, perceive as “good.” It is that condition toward which we long and strive, and it is our  
longing for caring—to be in that special relation—that provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want  
to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one—caring (4-5). 
 
              This passage shows that since we are in the world characterized by relationships, we 
naturally recognize and long for relatedness out of natural caring or inclination. We are 
motivated to respond to others with natural caring, both consciously and unconsciously, because 
we want others to care for us and consider maintaining the caring relation as a good value. This 
is because, in the relational world, human existence consists of not simply an awareness of and 
commitment to what we are doing and how we are living, but also living with a heightened 
awareness that my existence cannot merely receive others, the world, and myself. It is also in 
need of directing my attention to that which I have already received. It is through the subjective-
receptive mode that I see clearly what I have received from the other, decide to implement the 
responsibility of care, and sustain the caring relation. Hence, this caring relation or relatedness 
forms the foundation of a caring ethic (35). 
    Noddings (1984, 51) argues that although we are free to reject the impulse of caring in the 
web of relatedness, we would feel lonely, as if surrounded by strangers when we move away 
from the world of caring relations. This is because humans are social by nature and obtain 
nourishment and guidance from a caring community. When one is alone, either because one has 
detached oneself or because circumstances have wrenched one free, one naturally seeks to 
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reestablish relatedness. This is because our individuality is defined in a set of relations and this is 
the basic realty of human life. Thus, Noddings maintains that the ontological ground of an ideal 
ethic should be characterized on the basis of a caring relation unfolded by the ideal caring self. 
Noddings says that “[t]he ethical self is an active relation between my actual self and a vision of 
my ideal self as one—caring and cared-for.” Our fundamental recognition of relatedness—that 
is, that which connects us naturally to another—enables us to reconnect, through the other, back 
to ourselves. The fact is that as we care for others, we are also cared for by others. In other 
words, my caring for others, in effect, also leads to my being cared for (49-54). It is the 
interaction of caring relations that gives rise to the thought of “I must care for others.” That is, 
one is willing to assume the caring responsibility because it responds to the call of the ideal 
caring self. Noddings explicates that “[i]t is this caring that sustains me when caring for other 
fails, and it is this caring that enables me to surpass my actual uncaring self in the direction of 
caring.” (49-50). In short, it is through the caring relation, being a caring one and being cared-
for, that my life is sustained and a care ethic becomes a necessity of human existence. Noddings’ 
elaboration shows that the ontological relation of caring theory is a caring relation because it 
gives rise to an interactive, affective response between the caring one and the cared-for, as well 
as the thought of willingness to assume the responsibility of care.  
     Similar to Noddings, Held, although not directly defining caring relations, presents a 
characterization of caring relations and says that “[t]he ethics of care values caring relations and 
their associated concerns of trust and mutual responsiveness.” Held (2006, 158) explains that 
care must attend to others’ needs with caring. Recipients of care sustain caring relations through 
their responsiveness. For example, a caring society has the responsibility to take care of its 
children and others who are dependent. That is, to enable the best possible up-bringing and to 
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educate its future generations, with appropriate response to its members in need of health care, 
and so on (159). Held’s elaborations show that hers and Noddings’ views of caring relations are 
shared. In other words, in Held’s view, caring relations refers to carrying out the responsibility of 
care and the affective response, such as trust, between the one who is caring and the cared-for. In 
order to sustain the relation, the caring one responds to the needs of the cared-for with caring 
motivation and responsibility, whereas the cared-for responds to the caring one affectively. It is 
through the caring relation of mutually affective response between the caring one and the cared-
for, as well as the carrying out of caring responsibility, that our existence and society are able to 
be sustained.  
 
Tronto and Hankivsky’s Interconnection and Interdependent Nature   
         Noddings’ and Held’s characterizations and elaborations of caring relations as the 
ontological ground of caring theory are different from Tronto and Hankivsky’s view. For Tronto 
and Hankivsky, the ontological relation refers to the interconnection and interdependent nature 
of human life and social and political activity. Tronto (1995, 142) maintains that in order to re-
consider how caring theory can inform a different political view from that of rational moral 
philosophy, we must reformulate our account of the nature of human existence. That is, “people 
qua people are interdependent rather than independent,” because an individual acts politically, 
not merely on the basis of their self-interests, but also as a result of “the particular constellation 
of caring relationships and institutions within which they find themselves”. The fact is that 
families, welfare states, and the market are all institutions that provide care. People’s identity and 
interests are greatly shaped by the culture of these social and political groups and institutions. 
Alternatively put, human existence relies on people who are mutually dependent on each other 
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and sociopolitical activity is constituted by the shared interests of various individuals. Hence, 
there is an interconnection and interdependent nature between personhood and sociopolitical 
society as a whole. According to Tronto, these two factors are the most fundamental factors that 
define the ontological ground for caring theory. Similarly, Hankivsky (2004, 34 and 111-112) 
contends that the ontological relation of human life is the interconnection and interdependent 
nature, for these two factors show us how an individual’s identity, social status, and needs are 
shaped and constructed through their intersection with a range of private and public, social, and 
institutional arrangements. Hankivsky explicates that we alternate between the roles of care-
provider and being the one who is cared-for at different periods of our lives and in different 
contexts. Accordingly, “human beings are interdependent and in need of other for their growth 
and survival” (105). Occasionally, one’s development and survival also depends upon mutual 
assistance and others’ help. At other times, we provide our help for another’s existence. 
Therefore, interconnected relations and interdependent nature are the two major factors that the 
ontological relation of caring theory/ethic(s) is based upon. Both Tronto’s and Hankivsky’s 
arguments unfold the way in which an individual’s life and sociopolitical policy and other factors 
are intrinsically interconnected with each other. Sociopolitical factors, such as social and 
political arrangement, policy, and structure, have the power not merely to shape our social 
identity, but also to affect our daily lives. Therefore, for Tronto and Hankivsky, the relational 
ontology (or relational foundation) is characterized by interdependent nature and interconnection 
rather than the caring relation proposed by Noddings and Held.  
 
The Relation Between Caring Relations and Interconnection and Interdependent Nature 
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            The abovementioned two different characterizations of the relational ontology of caring 
theory lead us to the second question, that is, what is the relation and difference between caring 
relations and the interdependent nature and interconnection of personhood and sociopolitical 
activity? Are they compatible with each other? As evident from the above discussion, these two 
characterizations are apparently very different from each other. However, a close examination of 
Noddings, Held, and Tronto and Hankivsky’s writings shows that the affective responsiveness 
and responsibility of caring relations are not only compatible with the 
interconnection/interdependent nature of human life, but also supplement them. The affective 
responsiveness and the responsibility of care describe the subjective experience of caring and an 
intersubjective caring relationship. On the other hand, the interdependent nature and 
interconnection portray the objective factors of social and political interaction and the 
interdependent nature of human existence. Caring relations can be conceived as the micro-aspect 
of human psychological activity, whereas interdependent nature and interconnection of human 
life are the macro-aspects of human social and political interactions and intersections. These two 
characterizations are the two sides of the same caring life. Caring relations are the concrete 
manifestation of caring theory, whereas the interconnected/interdependent nature of personhood 
and sociopolitical life are the underlying relational ground of caring theory. They are 
complementary because these two characterizations reveal different concerns and factors of 
caring theories with regard to human existence. 
However, none of these caring theorists have thus far articulated how these two different 
characterizations of relational ontology can work together. Hence, there is a need to unfold a 
common ground on which these characterizations of the ontological ground can be bridged and 
connected. Therefore, it is the major task of my dissertation to delve further into the major 
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components/features underscored by Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s 
interconnection and interdependent nature in order to uncover the possible similarities between 
them.  
 
Three Factors of Noddings’ Caring Relations 
        There are three features that Noddings’ caring relation aims to articulate, which are 
overlooked by rational moral philosophy. These three are affective feeling or natural caring, the 
centrality of the needs of the cared-for (i.e., moral agent), and the interactive process of seeking a 
solution. First, affective feeling, and natural caring in particular, plays a significant role in human 
ethical life. Yet, more often than not, it is overlooked or entirely omitted by modern rational 
moral philosophy. In order to bridge this gap, Noddings’ caring relations focuses on describing 
the subjective experience of caring and intersubjective caring relations. Noddings (1984, 8) 
indicates that the disposition or attitude of caring can activate a complex structure of memories, 
feelings, and capacities in an ethical act. In the process of moral decision-making, caring would 
concretize, rather than be abstract, the conditions of those who are cared-for. The fact is that 
because of caring, we can recognize and understand the other’s reality as a possibility for us to 
make a difference, such as to eliminate the intolerable, to reduce pain, to fill the need: in caring, 
we actualize their reality. Owing to affective caring, we arouse in us the feeling of “I must do 
something” to enable others to deal with their hardship. In Noddings’ view, to act as someone 
caring means that we pay special attention to the particular person with regard to his/her concrete 
situation. This act is not to earn a good reputation or benefit for ourselves, but to protect and 
enhance the welfare of the cared-for (24). This is because as a caring person, we will try to 
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comprehend the other’s reality and feeling as closely as possible. This is the essential quality that 
enables us to become caring. 
 Noddings further explicates the reason for using caring nature to amend the problem of 
only using rationality to conceptualize a moral theory. She says that there is a danger of using a 
rational-objective mode to make a moral judgment or decision. The danger is that we may jump 
into a presupposition too fast and, thereby, impose our own thoughts on the cared-for’s problem 
before we fully inquire deeply into the conditions of the cared-for. Noddings suggests that it is 
better that we suspend our rational analysis for a while and “in favor of subjective thinking and 
reflection, allowing time and space for seeing and feeling” the reality of others to arise. If we 
switch into objective-analytical mode too early, we would find ourselves “deeply, perhaps 
inextricably, enmeshed in procedures that somehow serve only ourselves.” As such, our thoughts 
are separated, and completely detached from the original objects of caring (26). 
Noddings further spells out that although some scholars may conceive an affective 
receptive mode of reaction, that is, caring, as a degradation of consciousness, a response with 
affective feeling or caring is “qualitatively different from the analytic-objective mode in which 
we impose structure on the world” (34). This is because the affective response is a procreative 
mode characterized by outer quietude and inner voices and images through absorption and 
sensory concentration. The caring one is engrossed in listening, looking at, and feeling the cared-
for’s reality and problem. In caring, we respond, express ourselves, make plans, and execute 
them to solve a problem. We gather what we have received from the cared-for and turn it into a 
problem that needs to be solved. However, in the process of the objective-analytical mode of 
thinking, we move away from the cared-for. We clean up the cared-for’s reality and problem and 
strip them of complex and bothersome qualities in order to think through the problem. 
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Consequently, the cared-for’s reality and problem become lifeless data to be analyzed, studied, 
and interpreted. Then, we infer a situation that may be irrelevant to the cared-for’s reality and 
impose our own assumption and solution on the cared-for (36). Not only does this imposition not 
solve the problem for the cared-for, but also adds to the cared-for’s burdens. The problem is that 
although this objective-analytical mode of thinking aims to solve the cared-for’s hardship, it fails 
to recognize and understand the cared-for’s condition. In contrast to the objective-analytical 
mode of thinking, a caring receptive response would facilitate us to move back to the concrete 
reality of the cared-for. As such, we can recognize and understand the needs and problems of the 
cared-for more adequately.  
The second feature/component of Noddings’ caring relation is that the chief concern of 
caring is centered on the needs of the cared-for, that is, the human agent, rather than an 
impersonal problem or moral principle. The case in point can be illustrated by Noddings’ 
criticism of the rational moral philosophy that focuses on abstraction, principle, and rules of 
morality. Noddings (1984, 36) says that in the process of discussing a moral issue, we have to 
keep our objective thinking tied to a relational stake at our heart. If we fail to do this, “we can 
climb into clouds of abstraction, moving rapidly away from the caring situation into a domain of 
objective and impersonal problems where we are free to impose structure as we will.” This 
indicates that when we conceptualize the needs and problems of the cared-for, we need to be 
aware of the dangers of abstraction. Otherwise, we not only lose sight of the cared-for, but also 
lose sight of ourselves as one caring because in the process of abstraction, we care about the 
principle instead of the person.  
 Noddings indicates that wherever there is a principle, it implies an exception. Hence, it is 
insufficient to only place our focus on moral principle, as more often than not, principles 
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function to separate us from each other. The needs of the cared-for may be devalued and treated 
with a solution that is irrelevant to the cared-for’s problem. Yet, as opposed to paying attention 
only to moral principles and rules, the ethic(s) of care will not permit this to happen because 
caring or affective feeling would lead us to recognize the fear, anger, or hatred of the cared-for. 
We will, thereby, treat them with understanding (5). In the process of solving a moral issue, if we 
do not take the human agent’s feeling regarding the problem into account, and exclusively focus 
on the principles, what we see in others is not their reality. Rather, it is a pre-selected factor in 
relation to our own needs and desires. As such, we are ethically both empty and finished (15), 
because we concentrate on moral rules formulated prior to our understanding of the reality of the 
cared-for. The characteristic variation in response to the needs of the cared-for may fade away. 
Accordingly, Noddings points out that, those who are entrusted with caring may focus on 
satisfying the formulaic requirements for caretaking and fail to be emotionally present in their 
interactions with the cared-for. Thus, caring would disappear and only its illusion would remain 
(25-26). Noddings’ view clearly shows that paying attention to the needs of the cared-for is more 
important than caring only for the moral rule and principle that were established prior to 
understanding the cared-for’s problem.  
 The third feature of caring relations is the interactive process of solving a moral problem. 
This can be illustrated by Noddings’ emphasis on mutual response between the cared-for and the 
caring one. Noddings indicates that a human ethic is a manifestation of one’s social relationships. 
An ideal ethical life is not simply carried out by an individual. Rather, it is the interaction, 
particularly the affective response, which makes one willing to go beyond the confinement of 
being self-enclosed. Noddings (1984, 24) says that “[c]aring involves stepping out of one’s own 
personal frame of reference into the other’s. When we care, we consider the other’s point of 
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view, his objective needs, and what he expects of us.” As such, our attention, our mental 
engrossment is on the cared-for, not on ourselves only. Therefore, our actions are influenced by 
the other’s wants and desires and the objective elements of their problematic situation. Noddings 
uses the example of voluntary euthanasia to illustrate her point. According to her, the decision of 
voluntary euthanasia needs to be decided by a team—medical staff can provide professional 
information and advice and family members can also participate in the discussion; however, the 
primary choice of the patient should be respected. Noddings says that “a stable, well informed 
decision to die, when death is inevitable from the sufferer’s condition, should be respected. Any 
other response bypasses the patient and addresses itself to a rule or principle” (239). 
The example illustrating the interactive process of a caring relation can result in a better 
solution. In other words, an interactive process of solving problems between the caring one and 
the cared-for is a better ethic for solving a problem because both the caring one and the cared-for 
would have an opportunity to step out their frame of reference, that is, their personal pre-
assumption and obsession, and seek a better solution. When the caring one accepts the 
requirement of the cared-for, the cared-for in return accepts to invite doctors, or other 
professional people and family members, to discuss his/her choice, concern, advantages, and 
disadvantages regarding the decision of the cared-for. Thus, both the caring one and the cared-for 
gain a better understanding from the discussion and a more satisfactory solution for both can be 
identified. Both Noddings’ elaboration and example show that the interactive process is the third 
major feature of her caring relation.  
 
Three Features of Tronto-Hankivsky’s Interconnection and Interdependent Nature 
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          Like Noddings’s caring relation, Tronto and Hankivsky’s interdependent nature and 
interconnection also possess three different features. First, defining caring theory from social and 
political perspectives; second, emphasizing the interconnection of an individual’s life and 
sociopolitical factors/activity, and third, elaborating on the interdependent nature of human 
existence. With regard to the first feature, in contrast with Noddings characterization of caring 
through a subjective experience of caring and intersubjective caring relation, Tronto and 
Hankivsky define caring from a social and political perspective as well as an interpersonal 
connection. The case in point can be illustrated by the definition of caring given by Tronto and 
Fisher (1991, 40). They define care as “a species activity that includes everything that we do to 
maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible.” Tronto 
explains that caring consists of taking care of our bodies, ourselves, our environment, and all of 
what we seek to interweave in a complex and life-sustaining web. This definition clearly shows 
that caring is defined as a social and political activity that maintains, continues, and repairs our 
world, rather than describes the mental phenomena of a caring nature and affective feeling, as 
Noddings does. Tronto explicates that the ethic(s) of care involves a process of four phases of 
care, that is, caring about (attentiveness), taking care of (responsibility), care giving 
(competence), and care-receiving (responsiveness). Compared to Noddings’ caring theory 
mentioned previously, these four processes not only leave out the caring nature, but also focus on 
articulating the mechanism and ability of caring, such as attention, capacity, and activity, rather 
than caring affection. These characterizations and emphases clearly differ from those of 
Noddings’ caring nature and caring relation.  
  Tronto mentions the following two reasons for characterizing the ethic of care(s): first, to 
define caring as an activity having the advantage of opening the caring ethic(s) to be analyzed; 
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second, showing that a caring ethic(s) is not necessarily confined to a private or individual 
experience. By doing so, an ethic(s) of care can be proved to be as capable of being a moral 
theory for social and political practice, if not more so, as Kant and Rawls’ rational moral 
philosophy. Thus, it is evident that Tronto’s concern differs from Noddings’ emphasis of 
affective feeling and a caring nature. Therefore, the ontological ground for Tronto and 
Hankivsky is not only limited to the social encounters of human relationships, but also comprises 
the interconnection and interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical activity. Tronto 
points out that in order to investigate the need of an ethic(s) of care, we can analyze the nature 
and factors that constitute human life and sociopolitical activity. Specifically, this analysis begins 
from a different understanding of human nature and human interaction. Instead of seeing people 
as rational actors who pursue their goals and maximize their own interests, we must conceive of 
people as constantly enmeshed in relationships of care. This can be illustrated by the previously 
mentioned example that people act politically, not simply based on their self-interest. Rather, 
people act as a result of the particular constellation of caring relationships and institutions.  
This indicates that the existence of an individual relies heavily on social and political 
groups and institutions. These groups and institutions are either families, the welfare state, or 
markets that connect to our lives. An individual’s life, including self-identity, social status, and 
economic life, is, accordingly, closely intersected with and dependent upon these groups and 
institutions. Hence, these social and political groups and institutions play a very significant role 
in an individual’s life. Therefore, it can be said that they are one of the most important factors 
that constitute the ontological foundation of human life. Hankivsky clearly is in line with Tronto, 
because she also articulates the way in which social policy, political arrangement, and the like, 
can shape and define an individual’s social identity, status, and welfare. This is because, as 
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Hankivsky points out, the interdependent nature and interconnection of personhood and 
sociopolitical activity are the relational ontology of human existence.  
The second and third features of Tronto and Hankivsky’s ontological relation are the 
interconnection and interdependent nature of human life and sociopolitical activity. In both 
Tronto and Hankivsky’s accounts, interconnection and interdependent nature are placed in the 
same category, that is, interdependent nature. However, if we think carefully in conjunction with 
related philosophy, such as Merleau-Ponty’s intersubjectivity of existential phenomenology, and 
Nāgārjuna’s interdependent nature of dependent co-arising philosophy, it is clear that these are 
two separate concepts and have distinct implications. Hence, in order to differentiate the 
different implications of these two terms and unfold the deeper meaning of interdependent 
nature, my thesis treats them as two different characteristics and discusses them in turn. That is, 
the interconnection of personal life and sociopolitical activity is the second feature, and the 
interdependent nature of human existence is the third feature of Tronto and Hankivsky’s 
relational ontology. 
  The interconnection of human life and sociopolitical activity indicates the connection 
between two or more entities, including humans and things. It is a link of interaction and 
intersection that connects different individuals, including an individual and sociopolitical 
activity/factors. To a certain extent, this interconnection overlaps with Noddings’ caring relation, 
except that, while Noddings’ caring relation emphasizes the subjective experience of human 
caring relations, Tronto-Hankivsky’s interconnection underlines the intersection and 
interconnection between personhood and sociopolitical activity/factors. The example illustrating 
the interconnection presented by Tronto-Hankivsky is that a country that has a social policy of 
healthcare for all citizens is different from a country that does not. The citizens in the former 
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country do not need to worry that their family may suffer from bankruptcy when a family 
member gets severely sick. However, for citizens of the latter country, worry is inevitable 
because of expensive medical costs. This example shows the intersection of social and political 
policy and daily human life. An individual’s life is closely related to a social and political policy 
set up by the country where this individual lives. 
  The third feature of Tronto and Hankivsky relational ontology is the interdependent nature 
of human existence. This does not simply refer to the interconnection or interconnected relation 
between two or more entities, but also to the mutual reliance, co-emergence, and interpenetration 
of human life and sociopolitical activity. It includes the interconnection, but goes further to 
include a deeper meaning. That is, these connections are not the external links that connect 
individuals, things, and sociopolitical factors. Rather, these individuals, things and sociopolitical 
factors are interwoven into the very structure, fabric, and substance of an individual’s 
personhood as well as social, economic, and political life. The interdependent nature implies that 
these social and political factors and activities do not occur in the arena of social and political 
constitutions completely outside of one’s life. Rather, these factors are the substantial sources 
that contribute to forming one’s identity and sociopolitical life. The case in point can be 
illustrated by what Tronto and Hankivsky said about the way in which culture, social policy, 
political groups, and institutions, as well as political arrangement, not only can affect our daily 
lives, but also shape and define our social identity. In this sense, these social and political factors 
are not simply the connection between two or more entities. Rather, they are intrinsic 
components, and part of the very substance of human existence, that form an individual’s 
identity, social status, and sociopolitical life.  
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The Shared and Non-shared Elements of Noddings’ Caring Relation and Tronto-
Hankivsky’s Interdependent Nature and Interconnection 
 
         Comparing the three major features/components of Noddings’ caring relations to those of 
Tronto and Hankivsky’s interconnection and interdependent nature, I have found more non-
shared elements than shared. For example, while Noddings emphasizes caring relations, Tronto 
and Hankivsky highlight the interdependent nature of human and social and political activity. 
Moreover, while Noddings underscores human agents, Tronto and Hankivsky underline social 
and political factors. In addition, although both Noddings and Tronto-Hankivsky conceive that 
there is an interconnected relation between humans’ lives, Noddings fails to mention the 
interdependent nature that is underscored by Tronto and Hankivsky. However, the non-shared 
elements do not necessarily indicate that Noddings’ caring relations is incompatible with Tronto 
and Hankivsky’s interconnection and interdependent nature. In fact, my thesis will contend that 
both caring relations and interconnection and interdependent nature are not only compatible with 
each other, but also represent two sides of the same coin, that is, a caring ethic. In other words, 
while Noddings’ caring relations underscores the subjective caring nature and caring relations 
between two or more individuals in human encounters, Tronto and Hankivsky’s interconnection 
and interdependent nature highlight the social and political interaction and intersection between 
personhood and sociopolitical activity. Since human existence comprises not merely personal 
lives, but also social and political activity, an inclusive caring theory needs to include these two 
dimensions and attitudes. The following are the main reasons for this: 
  First, as my analysis of the different features shows, the first two features of Noddings’s 
caring relation focus on describing the mental phenomena of caring with respect to the carer and 
the needs of the cared-for. In contrast to these mental factors, Tronto and Hankivsky’s 
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interdependent nature concentrates more on articulating the social, economic, and political 
factors related to a caring activity. In this sense, Noddings and Tronto-Hankivsky aim to describe 
different aspects of caring theory. Noddings’ description is the micro-psychological aspect of 
care manifested in a moral agent, whereas Tronto-Hankivsky’s description is the macro and 
sociopolitical aspect of how caring activity should be conducted in a society. These two aspects 
of a caring theory, although different, are not in conflict with each other. In effect, they 
supplement each other and form a more comprehensive and inclusive caring theory. 
 With regard to human life, our existence is not simply informed by personal experience, but 
is also shaped and affected by social and political conditions. The subjective psychological 
aspect of care reveals the affective feeling and quality of loving-kindness that a moral agent 
needs to cultivate. On the other hand, objective social and political conditions reveal the 
framework that a caring theory needs to provide for a social and political structure, arrangement, 
institution, etc. These are two sides of the same caring ethic. In a caring society, both are needed 
in order to actualize a caring practice. That is, one cannot be truly cared for if no sufficient food 
and other daily needs are provided or if all citizens are not treated equally. On the other hand, 
even if a society abounds with food and other material resources, if people do not care for each 
other—for example, if they are frequently abused and treated violently by others—this society 
cannot be characterized as a caring society. Hence, a comprehensive and inclusive caring theory 
needs to include both elements and pay attention to both nurturing a caring agent and developing 
a humane and just sociopolitical society.  
       Second, although both Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interconnection 
emphasize different features of human existence, which a caring theory needs to attend to, their 
examples show that both the subjective experience of caring, and the objective aspect of social 
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and political activity play a significant role in human life. Hence, for a more comprehensive and 
inclusive caring theory, it is necessary to include both components. For example, Tronto 
indicates that care needs both physical materials and psychological care. For physical care, we 
need to have enough food, shelter, clothing, and a rich complex of material resources to provide 
these essentials. In addition, depending on the type and quality of the interaction, care also needs 
to attend to a number of psychological issues, such as rage at the powerful care-giver, fear of the 
care-giver, anger at the care-receiver, or idealization (of either a positive or negative type) of 
others in the care relationships. In other words, care requires that “humans pay attention to one 
another, take responsibility for one another, engage in physical processes of care giving, and 
respond to those who have received care” (1995, 144-145 ). This example clearly illustrates that 
although Tronto’s characterization of relational ontology only emphasizes the relation between 
personhood and sociopolitical activity, she does notice that a comprehensive and inclusive caring 
theory needs to consist of not simply attending to the sociopolitical policy and arrangement to 
secure material needs, but also engaging a caring mind. The engagement of caring activity 
cannot be actualized if no caring mind is involved. Similarly, Noddings tends to focus on 
articulating the human caring relation as the foundation of a caring ethic(s), although she does 
recognize that the needs of the cared-for are more than simply what is desired. Rather, they 
include people, things, and sociopolitical conditions. In discussing the needs of the cared-for, 
Noddings shows how to maintain a balance between the expressed needs of the cared-for and the 
inferred necessity of something that occurs in an educative setting.  According to Noddings, for 
those parents who take education seriously in the home, although they may disapprove of their 
children watching a violent movie, occasionally, they should allow their children to watch it. The 
entire family may watch a deplorably violent movie and then discuss it. Noddings says that the 
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discussion needs not be spoiled by moralizing. Rather, both children and parents can express 
their opinions freely and question one another. Such a discussion can be a way of cultivating 
children’s aesthetic and moral judgment without imposing judgments in an authoritarian manner. 
This example shows that Noddings does notice that there are factors apart from human caring 
relation that can affect a child’s life, such as watching a violent movie, their parents’ discussion 
of the movie with their child, and so on.  
  From these two examples, it is plausible to say that although Noddings and Tronto 
emphasize different aspects of the relational ontology, their examples demonstrate that both the 
subjective experience of caring, and the objective aspects of social and political activity, have a 
significant influence on human existence. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
comprehensive ontological ground has to include both subjective caring experience and objective 
social and political activity. Alternatively put, the gap between Noddings’ caring relation and 
Tronto-Hankivsky’s interconnection of personhood and sociopolitical activity can be bridged. 
The problem is how can this be done?  
 Neither Noddings’ caring relation nor Tronto-Hankivsky’s interconnection answers this 
question satisfactorily. In fact, they theorize only one aspect of the relational ontology of caring 
ethic(s) indicates that Noddings and Tronto may have difficulty in conceptualizing the shared 
ground between the subjective experience of caring and objective factors of social and political 
activity. After all, the traditional dichotomous view that separates mind from body, subjectivity 
from objectivity, and the public from the private, is deeply rooted in our intellectual thought, and 
is conceived as an insurmountable gap. However, this is not necessarily the case because the 
deeper meaning of interdependent nature can solve the problem. Unfortunately, neither Tronto 
nor Hankivsky provides a clear definition of interdependent nature and the way in which it 
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differs from Noddings’ caring relation and their own notion of interconnection. They both seem 
to treat interconnection and interdependent nature interchangeably and overlook the deeper 
implications involved in interdependent nature. Hence, in the next chapter, my thesis will first 
clarify and unfold the different meanings and implications of interdependent nature and 
interconnection. Then, I will apply both Nāgarjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising and 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity to illustrate the way in which the gap between 
Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interconnection and interdependent nature 
can be bridged, and a shared ground between them is established. Lastly, based on Nāgarjuna’s 
and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies, my thesis will reveal the characteristic components that an 
inclusive relational foundation needs to embrace for constructing a moral theory.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
APPLYING MERLEAU-PONTY’S AND NĀGĀRJUNA’S THEORY OF 
INDEPENDENT NATURE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN NODDINGS AND TRONTO-
HANKIVSKY’S RELATIONAL ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
 
        In previous section, my research shows that among the four most essential shared 
components that constitute the conceptual framework of caring theory, the relational ontology or 
ontological foundation has not yet been fully developed. Hence, in order to form a more 
inclusive and comprehensive ontological ground for what I call neocaring theory, the primary 
task of my thesis in this chapter will apply both Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising 
and Merleau-Ponty’s  philosophy of intersubjectivity to bridge the gap between Noddings’ caring 
relation and Tonto-Hankivsky’s interdependent nature.  
         The fact is that although Noddings, Tronto and Hankivsky agree that the relational 
ontology is the fundamental ground that undergirds the caring theory/ethic(s), they characterize 
the relational ontological ground with different concerns and almost in a non-related way. 
Whereas Noddings highlights the subjective experience of caring relation, Tronto and Hankivsky 
underscore the interconnection and interdependent nature of humanhood and sociopolitical 
activity. Accordingly, there is a gap between these two characterizations. Yet, as my thesis 
pointed out in the previous chapter, although these two different characterizations are featured 
with different concerns and emphases, they are not incompatible. The reason is that while 
Noddings’ caring relation describes the micro-aspect of subjective experience of human agent’s 
caring nature and social encounters, Tronto and Hankivsky portray the macro-aspect of the 
interconnection and interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical activity. Since 
human existence is in need of both subjective experience and sociopolitical activity, these two 
different characterizations are the two sides of the same caring coin.  They both are true and 
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needed for human existence. In fact, even though both Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-
Hankivsky’s interconnection and interdependent nature emphasize different characteristics of 
human caring life in their theories, the examples given by them, as my thesis showed in previous 
chapter, reveal that the actualization of a caring theory requires paying attention to both 
subjective experience of caring relation as well as the objective aspect of social and political 
interconnection and interdependency.  
          The real problem in their theories which remains unsolved is how the gap between these 
two different characterizations can be bridged and a shared ground can be established. My 
investigation of both Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interdependent nature 
reveals that neither of their theories can solve this problem satisfactorily. It is, therefore, the 
major task of this chapter to apply both Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising and 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of intersubjectivity to clarify the nature of existence, and bridge the 
gap between these two different characterizations. Thereby, a more comprehensive and inclusive 
ontological foundation can be established. This comprehensive and inclusive foundation, in turn, 
will bring new light to moral education, both in theory and practice. Yet, before my thesis delves 
into the way in which both Nāgārjuna and Merleu-ponty’s philosophies can be applied to bridge 
the gap and form a shared ground between Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s 
interconnection and interdependent nature, it is better to expound the problems that hinder  
Noddings, Tronto and Hankivskty’s theories to have a shared ground. 
         The problems are threefold: first, the two characterizations are made based on the 
separation of the objectivity and subjectivity. Second, these two characterizations imply different 
views of connection between the public and the private. Third, the caring theorists possess 
different views regarding whether the interconnection and interdependent nature is simply an 
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epistemological holding, i.e., different views held by different scholars, or an ontological ground 
which together with other factors constitutes the human reality. Since in both Tronto and 
Hankivsky’s writings, interdependent nature includes the meaning of interconnection, I will use 
interdependent nature to represent both interdependent nature and interconnection in later 
writing. 
         The first problem: (that creates a gap between Noddings’ caring theory and Tronto-
Hankivsky’s interdependent nature) is the separation of subjectivity and objectivity. As my 
previous chapter revealed, in Noddings’ view, the relational foundation is confined to the field of 
human encounters. Neither social factors nor political structures and arrangement are mentioned. 
As such, Noddings’ caring relation seems to suggest that only human agents matter but not other 
factors. Tronto and Hankivsky’s interdependent nature, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the 
social and political factors but fails to articulate the significant influence of the way in which a 
human agent’s care may affect the public wellbeing. Characterizing the relational foundation 
based on these two extreme views, the gap between Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-
Hankivsky’s interdependent nature is inevitably formed.  
            The second problem: is the different implications of the way in which an individual or 
an entity is connected to others. These two different characterizations indicate that they describe 
the relation between the public and the private differently.  For Noddings, the connection is an 
external relation that links two or more atom-like entities or individuals together. The relation is 
simply a loose link that connects two or more individuals or entities. The individual possesses 
the autonomous freedom and right to choose and design what (s)he wants and needs in his/her 
life; the social and political factors, such as policy, organization and so on,  have very little 
influence on an individual’s life. Yet, the interdependent nature described by Tronto and 
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Hankivsky indicates the nature of mutual reliance and interpenetration is not simply an external 
link between two or more individuals or entities. Rather, it is part of the intrinsic components 
that constitutes the fabric and structure of personhood and human social, economic and political 
life. Characterizing the relation as such, an individual’s life is not entirely decided by his/her 
autonomous choice or freedom. Rather, the choice would be conditioned and defined by the 
social and political context that the individual inhabits. 
        Take a group of family members as an example. In Noddings’ description, caring relation 
between the family members refers to the intimate connection between parents and children or 
other close family members. Under their parents’ caring relation, the children can choose what 
they want and need freely even when they are outside the family in a school.  Yet, in view of 
Tronto and Hankivsky’s interdependent nature, the relation between the parents and their 
children is not merely regarding the intimate and loving relation, but also  includes the family’s 
wealth, social policy and the mutual influences that affect and define each member of the family. 
That is, the parents’ marital situation would lead the children to be called a child coming from a 
happy family or a single parent family and the like; or vice versa, a father or mother described as 
having an excellent son/daughter or a dishonest child and so forth. Moreover, the family’s social 
and political condition would determine whether their children have allowances to spend, or if 
they can afford to send their children to a private school.  
            The implication of these two characterizations is distinct. Noddings’ external link implies 
that an individual is an atomic and independent entity that is free from other social members’ and 
factors’ influence except those who are closely related to him/her. Even if in the situation of 
interacting with others, the children can still keep his/her own way of doing things and maintain 
their self-identities. In this sense, the public factors play an insignificant role in an individual’s 
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private life. Yet, in both Tronto and Hankivsky’s view, the connection between an individual, 
other social members and socio-political activity is not simply an external link. Rather, the 
connections would shape one’s identity, define one’s social status, and the way that an individual 
is cared-for under a particular kind of social and political structure, policy, arrangement, and so 
forth. In this way, the public factors play a significant role in conditioning an individual’s private 
life. That is, as Hankivsky (2004, 115) points out, caregiving is affected by changing 
demographics and social trends because decreased family size, increased geographic mobility, 
rising numbers of women entering the workforce, and elevated divorce rates are all factors that 
change the availability or willingness of family members to provide care. Hankivsky’s example 
clearly shows that an individual’s private life is deeply affected by the change of the public 
factors, such as demographical changes and the social trend toward of small-sized families. 
These social factors, therefore, are not simply an outer link that connects two entities, i.e., 
individuals and social factors. Rather, they are part of the intrinsic elements that constitute the 
fabric of an individual’s private life. These two different characterizations of the way  in which 
human life is connected clearly have different ethical implication for the relation between the 
public and the private as well as whether we can establish a more inclusive and comprehensive 
moral theory.  
       The third problem that creates a gap between these two different characterizations of 
relational ontology is the different views of either seeing the interdependent nature as an 
ontological ground or an epistemological holding. The former is the prerequisite condition of 
human life whereas the latter is a belief or view that may or may not be necessary for human 
existence. The ontological problem is related to what are the most fundamental components and 
relations that constitute and condition the way in which an individual’s life and sociopolitical 
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reality work. Narrowly, ontological ground consists of the factors involved in human personal 
life and sociopolitical activity. Broadly, it also includes the economy and natural environment, 
such as plants and inanimate objects and so on. In this thesis, I only focus on considering the 
narrow part of human life, that is, the relation between personhood or human nature, and 
sociopolitical activity.  
           Epistemology, on the other hand, is regarding one’s knowledge, value, viewpoint or 
perspective about the world. It is related to what counts as a valid knowledge and understanding, 
which reveal the situation and component of the world and the factors that affect our action and 
behaviors. Ontological ground is that which we cannot live without, whereas epistemological 
holding may be believed to be true in one society but unknown or believed to be not true in 
another society. Hence, epistemological holdings are not prerequisite factors of human life but 
ontological factors are. For instance, in ancient China, people conceived that July was the month 
that all evil spirits, such as ghosts, would be released from hell to entrap the soul of the living. 
Consequently, a lot of taboos were established to avoid the attack of the evil spirits. Many 
Chinese people avoided swimming, traveling and doing other dangerous things in July just to 
avoid attacks by evil spirits. Yet, this belief does not exist in modern America. This shows that a 
belief or worldview although held as true epistemologically in one society, such as ancient 
China, is not necessarily conceived to be true in another society.  
         The ontological elements, such as air and water, on the other hand, are the very 
substantial factors that make human existence possible.  Chinese could not live without these two 
elements, neither could modern Americans. Universally, we cannot live without air and water 
regardless of different temporal periods and locations. By the same token, if we conceive 
interdependent nature as an ontological ground of human existence, it implies that an 
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individual’s life, social relation and political activity cannot exist and sustain without depending 
upon other people and things. This interdependent nature, therefore, is a prerequisite condition 
for the existence of an individual’s life, let alone the social and political activity. In contrast, if 
the interdependent nature is simply conceived as a different perspective, it implies that a human 
can live isolated from others. In this framework, no family members, friends, other related 
human beings or things are needed for one to have a social life and political activity. Although 
this sounds absurd, it is exactly the way modern neoliberalism defines and characterizes human 
life. That is, an individual becomes a free and autonomous entity who needs not to care for other 
fellow beings with care of any kind. Accordingly, the social and political policy informed by this 
view pays a lot of attentions to an individual’s freedom and rights, but overlooks how to sustain a 
society as a whole with a caring mind. This drawback results from the ignorance of the 
interdependent nature of human life, particularly, in a democratic society that emphasizes the 
social and political policies made by citizens’ participation. If every citizen ignores the common 
good and focuses on his/her self-own interest, the democratic life would turn into political 
battlefield in which everyone fights for his/her interests rather than for the well-being of 
everyone and society as whole. In a worse scenario, the confusion of ontological ground as an 
epistemological holding may lead to dehuminazation.  The case in point can be illustrated by 
issues regarding gender and racial discrimination. We can either simply push these issues away 
as different views or treat them as social and political problems, and improve these problems 
accordingly. If we consider that racial and gender issues are simply different epistemological 
holdings, we may ignore the problems related to those underrepresented groups, and hence, treat 
them unjustly and with inhumane manner.   
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          Among the caring theorists, two different views with respect to whether interdependent 
nature is an ontological foundation or an epistemological holding can be found. Most of the 
caring theorists mentioned above, recognize the interdependent nature of human life and socio-
political activity. Yet, they tend to conceive it simply as a different epistemological holding, i.e. 
different perspectives of different scholars, rather than an ontological reality that constitutes the 
very substance of human existence. The case in point is that all the above caring theorists, except 
Slote, to a certain extent mention the interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical 
activity.  Yet, the majority of scholars from social and political sciences, including Gilligan, 
Tronto and Held, tend to conceive that such interdependence is simply a “different perspective” 
or “a different way” of characterizing and conceptualizing social and political life, but not an 
intrinsic constituent of human existence. Both Gilligan and Tronto explicate that what makes 
caring theory differ from rational moral theory is that caring theorists construct caring ethic(s) 
through a view of interdependency and interconnection. This view differs from rational moral 
philosophy, which formulates a moral theory based upon the concept of an independent and 
atomic individual’s life. Gilligan says that framing the moral problem in different terms suggests 
different ways of organizing the basic elements of moral judgment, self, others and the 
relationship between them. Hence, considering a social or political policy and arrangement 
through an interdependent view would be entirely different from that based on the concept of 
autonomy, independence and freedom. A similar view is shared by Held (2006) because she uses 
the term “value” to characterize caring ethic(s). The term “value” indicates that caring ethic(s) is 
constructed through a particular belief or worldview of caring relation, which may or may not be 
true for human existence.  
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 This epistemological treatment is different from that of Noddings and Hankivsky.  
Noddings claims that caring relations are ontological grounds of caring theory because they are 
the most basic constituent of our existence. Without the relatedness, human life cannot be 
sustained. Alternatively put, a caring relation is the very being of our existence rather than a 
“perspective” or different “value” or belief. Similarly, Hankivsky also conceives that any relation 
is the ontological ground of caring ethic(s) although her relation refers to an interdependent 
nature rather than to a caring relation. Hankivsky explicates that human beings are dependent 
upon each other not simply for social and political interaction but also for survival. The fact is 
that sometimes we may become ill, injured, frustrated or weakened. We need to depend on 
family members, friends or others’ care to recover from illness and get back our physical and 
mental strengths. In this sense, an interdependent nature is not simply a concept presenting 
different views of social relation and interactions. Instead, it is the characterization of human 
reality that describes the way in which an individual’s moral life is interconnected and 
intersected with social and political activity and factors.  A person’s private life cannot be 
entirely separated from his/her social and political realities whereas his/her social and political 
activities cannot exist without the participation of other individuals. Personhood and 
sociopolitical practice, thereby, are interdependent upon each other.                  
  However, Noddings and Hankivsky’s articulations of the ontological characteristics of 
relatedness and interdependence do not attract as much attention as they deserve from other 
caring theorists. Hardly do we see any article or book written by the above scholars tackling the 
different implications of characterizing interdependent nature either as an ontological ground or 
as an epistemological holding. Ironically, the ontological relation is one of the foremost keys that 
can unlock the problem of whether caring theory is compatible with rational moral philosophy by 
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its very nature. If the ontological relation is simply an epistemological holding, there is no need 
to discuss whether or not caring theory is compatible with rational moral philosophy, for this 
conception would simply be a different perspective on a moral theory constructed by different 
scholars. In a diverse society, different people are entitled to have different views. Hence, it is 
insignificant to argue the differences. Yet, if the interdependent nature is an ontological ground, 
it is necessary to examine which moral theory, be it caring theory or rational moral theory, 
provides a more inclusive and comprehensive  moral foundation to characterize human reality. 
   The above three problems that create a gap between the characterization of Noddings’ 
caring relation and  Tronto-Hankivsky’s interdependent nature, apart from the deeply rooted 
dichotomous view of the division of subjectivity and objectivity, which I mentioned in the 
second chapter, another three factors can be illustrated by  Noddings, Gilligan and Tronto’s 
worries. The worries are that first, Noddings does not want to reconcile the unique role of 
individuality, or particularity or autonomy of a person. That is, every individual is unique and 
worth a whole world of attention. If we emphasize too much of the interdependent nature on 
human life, we may arrive at a communitarian view, maintaining that our social, culture and 
political lives constitute personhood and leaving no room for individuality. Second, Tronto 
worries that if caring theory focuses on characterizing the subjective experience of caring nature 
and caring relation, it cannot be openly analyzed. Hence, in order to show that caring theory can 
be openly analyzed and is not necessarily confined to private, or  an individual’s experience, we 
have to emphasize the social, cultural, and political factors.  Third, for Gilligan and Tronto, the 
argument of the interdependent nature of human existence is only partially true, that is, the 
interactions and interdependent nature of human existence are only parts of human life not the 
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whole. Hence, they should be conceived only as an alternative perspective but not an ontological 
ground. 
        These three worries to a certain extent are justifiable, but only partially, because these 
three views fail to see the thorough meaning of this interdependent nature and the different 
implications of treating it as an ontological component or as an epistemological holding. In 
response to Gilligan and Tronto’s view, interaction and interdependence although characterizing 
only a part of human life, does not mean that they are not a reality, or there is no need of them in 
our lives. They are only incomplete. Incompleteness is not equal to non-existence. This is 
analogous to saying that the development of human life does not simply rely upon food, but also 
requires intellectual and spiritual cultivation. This saying does not imply that human 
development has no need of food. What it means to say is that food is not the only thing that 
human development needs. The problem of considering the interdependent nature simply as a 
different perspective may lead to the confusion that it may or may not be necessary for human 
life. The risk of this view is like treating racial and gender discrimination as a different 
epistemological holding and ignoring these issues altogether. In this way, it may lead to 
dehumanization. If the interdependent nature were not an intrinsic component of human 
existence, it would indicate that an individual could survive without depending upon any people 
or things, such as family, friends, and food. Yet, this clearly is a false view. No one can live 
without eating food from originated from externals. This is also true for the clothes, and shoes 
that we wear, the roads we take, the house we live in and the like.  We exist separately from but 
interconnected to them.  
          Tronto’s worry of characterizing the subjective experience of caring nature and caring 
relation reveals that she overlooks the significant influence that an individual’s experience may 
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have on sociopolitical policy making and practice. Many factors, in fact, counter her view. Take 
one of the most challenging problems many school districts face as an example. The case is that 
many school teachers found that they do not know how to handle the demographical change of 
the student body. Many schools are registered with white students but now, because of new 
housing policies, many Latino and other ethnic students are moving into the district. 
Consequently, almost half of the student body is constituted by non-white students. However, the 
teachers found that they have difficulties speaking to these non-white students. The reason is not 
simply because the teachers cannot speak Spanish or other languages. Rather, they lack the 
experience of both teaching and interacting with those students.  Accordingly, those students are 
left without proper care, both in teaching and learning. This case shows the significant role an 
individual’s experience plays in making a proper educational, social and political policy. Thanks 
to the absence of subjective experience in teaching different ethnic groups other than white 
students, the school teachers are unable to alter the school curriculum and find a proper way to 
teach non-white students. This case clear shows that an individual’s subjective experience plays 
a very important role in shaping and defining educational and social policy. This significant role 
is overlooked by Tronto. Accordingly, she fears characterizing caring theory in subjective terms.   
          Noddings’ fear of losing individuality or autonomy of a person reveals another problem. 
That is, Noddings’ fear is a lack of proper understanding of the meaning of interdependent 
nature. Interdependent nature emphasizes the co-emergence and mutual reliance of human beings 
and other factors, but it does not mean that one cannot have freedom and autonomy. In fact, as 
many examples presented by Tronto and Hankivsky show, the interdependent nature not only 
provides a more holistic view for us to consider the various corresponding factors, but also 
unfolds that different components will constitute different realities. As such, one can have more 
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chances to choose how to live a more hopeful and autonomous life. As Hankivsky points out, the 
understanding of interdependent nature provides more chances for an individual to develop 
autonomy and freedom, because the understanding provides us a clear map for designing our 
own lives without upsetting other’s lives.  For instance, Hankivsky says that a proper 
understanding of the interdependent nature will help us to understand that people from different 
cultures or orientations possess different ways of knowing, seeing, and understanding the way in 
which the world operates. Hence, they have different ways of developing their social policies. 
Understanding this interdependence, we can empower the marginalized persons to articulate their 
experiences, needs, and goods by not abstracting and generalizing their realities. As such, the 
marginalized people become more autonomous to in deciding the social policies that work better 
for them.   
        The above misunderstandings of the interdependent nature of human existence, and the 
dichotomous view separating subjectivity from objectivity disclose that there is a need to delve 
more deeply into the implication and constituents of interconnection and interdependent nature. 
The next section of my thesis, therefore, will apply Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of 
intersubjectivity and Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of interdependent nature to clarify the meaning of 
interdependent nature and to illustrate the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, the 
public and the private as well as epistemological holding and ontological foundation. 
 
   
 
Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy of Dependent Co-arising Theory and Merleau-Ponty’s 
Philosophy of Intersubjectivity 
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         The reason for me to use Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s  philosophies to bridge the 
gap between Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interdependent nature is not 
simply because the non-dual, interrelated and interdependent nature of an individual’s experience 
and sociopolitical reality is the primary themes of their philosophies, and they explain these 
themes in a very systematic and thorough way. Rather, it is because their philosophies come 
closest to the characterizations what Noddings, Tronto and Hankivsky intend to articulate but 
have not yet fully spelled out. The fact is that the term “interdependent nature” utilized directly 
by Tronto and Hankivsky is the core element that Nāgārjuna’s dependent co-arising philosophy 
illustrates. The caring relation of existential phenomenology presented by Noddings, on the other 
hand, is the major theory revealed in Merleau-Ponty’s intersubjectivity although Noddings does 
not explicitly mention his name. Furthermore, never have I seen a philosophical theory that 
expounds the interdependent nature and inter-relation between human subject and external world 
in such a clear and thorough way. Neither John Dewey nor the deliberative philosophies have 
shown such profound insight as Nāgārjuna and Merleau-Ponty regarding interdependent nature. 
These two philosophical theories, therefore, are most suitable to interrogate in what way caring 
theory and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interdependent nature fall short, and in what way these two 
relational ontological theories can be bridged, particularly, in terms of the relation between 
subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the private, as well as epistemological holding and 
ontological foundation. 
 
Nāgājurna’s Philosophy of Dependent Co-arising 
Nāgājurna is one of the most influential Indian Buddhist philosophers in Asian 
philosophy. His position in Asian philosophy has been compared to that of Kant, analytical 
86 
 
philosophy and Wittgenstein by scholars from comparative philosophy.
28
 In particular, both his 
dialectic reasoning method and philosophy are frequently compared to those of Kant. Nāgājurna 
philosophy of dependent co-arising not only channels ancient Indian Buddhist philosophy, but 
also serves as one of the most fundamental components of modern Asian philosophy that are 
deeply rooted in Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan thought. Specifically, the two major 
theories of his philosophy, i.e. dependent co-arising and the absence of self-created nature 
(theory of śūnyatā), are the core constituents of Madhymika (school of Middle Way) and Zen 
Buddhist philosophy, that prevail and undergird the philosophy of East Asia and Tibet.  Most 
scholars who study Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, such as Robinson, Yinshun, Bulgault, and 
Huntington, agree that philosophy of dependent co-arising allows Nāgārjuna to deconstruct and 
reconstruct ontology and epistemology at the same time. What Nāgājurna aims to deconstruct is 
the empiricism (or realism) and intellectualism (or idealism) in his time.
29
  
The realists maintained a sort of radical pluralism, analyzing all mundane experiences 
into a precisely determined number of ultimately real, discrete atomic constituents, called 
dharmas. Idealists, on the other hand, reduce not only the individual “I” to a reified concept, but 
all aspects of every day experience, both subjective and objective, are emptied of any ontological 
content (17-18).  Nāgājurna intends to bridge the gap between empiricism and idealism through 
the philosophy of dependent co-arising by means of re-interrogating the nature, structure, 
                                                 
28
 According to Andrew Tuck (1990), Nāgārjuna’s philosophy has been compared to that of several western 
philosophers’. In brief, it consists of three phrases. The first phrase is the Kantian phrase, then is analytic phrase and 
third, a post-Wittgensteinian phrase. The first example is that Theodore Stcherbatsky interprets Nāgārjuna’s 
philosophy as dividing the world into appearance and reality as Kant does in his Critique of Pure Reason. This view 
is further interpreted by T.R. V. Murti (1955) as the Absolute and the world of phenomena. In the second phrase, 
Richard Robinson’s article “Some logic aspects of Nāgārjuna’s system” (1957) analyzes and compares Nāgārjuna’s 
dialectic argument (catuskoti, the four alternative positions of reasoning, or tetralemma) to the modern symbolic 
logic. The third phrase can be seen in Frederick Streng’s Emptiness and Chris Gudmunsen’s Wittgenstein and 
Buddhism. These two underscores the similarities between Nāgārjuna and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
 
29
See Waldo (1975) and Huntington (1989). 
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constituents and relations between individuals, individuals and society, as well as individuals and 
the world. The major tenet of Nāgājurna’s dependent co-arising theory is presented in his 
masterpiece, Mūlamadhymika Kārikā (hereafter MKK), and other treatises30 . Some scholars 
compare dependent co-arising to the theory of relativity and quantum theory
31
 but perhaps, 
Michael Berman’s (2004) comparison of it to Merleau-Ponty’s relational social ontology and 
theory of intersubjectivity comes closest to the essence of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent 
co-arising.  Berman points out that both Merleau-Ponty and Nāgārjuna concern themselves with 
the nature of existence, and underscore the significance of experience and perception which are 
in and of the world. In a sense, these two philosophers “rely on existential analysis of our lives as 
situated beings in the phenomenal world.” Nāgārjuna’s relational origination, i.e. dependent co-
arising, and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity delineate the immediate “mutual 
relations between us situated beings and the experienced world”. 
            Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising (pratītyasamūtpada) primarily consists 
of three major components, that is, two theories and a dialectical interrogation of four alternative 
positions of reasoning (i.e., tetralemma). The two major theories are the theory of śūnyatā (the 
absence of self-created nature) and dependent co-arising (pratītyasamūtpada), whereas the four 
alternative positions of reasoning indicate affirmation, negation, both affirmation and negation 
and neither affirmative nor negation. Nāgārjuna’s use of four alternative positions of reasoning is 
inseparable from his philosophical theories of śūnyatā and dependent co-arising. Through the 
                                                 
 
30
 Such as Vigrahavyavartan, Shunyatasaptati and so on. 
 
31
 See L. M. Roth, “Buddhist Madyamika Philosophy as Therapy Realistic views” Fundamental Questions in 
Quantum Mechanics: Selected Papers from the Symposium, (Albany, New York, April 12-14, 1984); and Robert 
Allen Paul. “Spacetime Ontology: Kant, Einstein and Nagarjuna,” accessed April, 2010, http://robertpaul.name/wp-
content/uploads/2007/02/r-a-paul-spacetime-ontology-2006.pdf.  Also, see Christian Thomas Kohl.  “Buddhism and 
Quantum Physics: A Strange Parallelism of Two Concepts of Reality,” accessed April, 2010, 
http://www.worldprayerfoundation.com/Buddhism%20and%20Quantum%20Physics.pdf 
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four alternative positions of reasoning, Nāgārjurna shows that no entity in the world, including 
human, animate, and inanimate objects, can simply  be defined by a dichotomous formulation of 
“yes” versus “no” or “this is” vis-à-vis “this is not”. That is, an entity cannot be defined simply 
as arising or ceasing, permanent or impermanent, identical or non-identical, coming or going, 
and the like. The nature of human existence or any given entity, in Nāgārjurna’s view, is an 
ongoing process within which a major cause depends upon many related factors to make the life 
of an individual, or an entity, operate properly. Hence, the definition of the nature of an existing 
entity needs to be characterized in relation to the major cause and its related conditions that work 
together in the life process of the entity. For instance, the existence of an apple tree that we see 
now is a consequence of an apple seed and other related conditions, such as good soil, water, 
light and the like. It is, therefore, unreasonable to characterize the existence of an apple tree 
simply based upon a static picture or fragmentary period of its life. Rather, the nature of the 
existence of an apple tree has to be characterized in relation to its developmental process and the 
related conditions, such as soil, water, sunlight and so forth. 
In other words, for Nāgārjuna, the nature of human existence or an entity consists of three 
characteristics: first, it is an ongoing process rather than a static state of life, and second, it 
depends upon not merely a major cause but also other related factors. Third, the development of 
major cause (such as an apple seed), although it is the factor that decides the manifest form of an 
existing entity (apple tree), is conditioned and defined by its related factors. Also, the major 
factor and corresponding conditions are mutually supplementary to each other. These three 
features are presented through two major theories of Nāgārjuna philosophy, i.e., theory of 
dependent co-arising, and theory of śūnyatā.   
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       The theory of dependent co-arising and theory of śūnyatā are two sides of the same coin. 
Whereas the former reveals the manifestation of the phenomena in the world, the latter indicates 
the absence of a self-sufficient and self-created nature of all the existences, be it a human, 
animal, thing or an event. These two theories aim to reveal that the very existence of an 
individual (or entity and event) depends on the co-emergence of a particular major cause and its 
related conditions, but the major cause and related conditions also mutually define and 
supplementary to each other. In MKK, Nāgārjuna utilizes twenty-seven subjects to interrogate the 
nature of all existence and to show the interrelated relation and interdependent nature of 
humanhood and natural, social and political world.  The subjects interrogated consist of the 
nature of existence, cause and effect, time, space, movement, selfhood or self-identity, mental 
activity, behavior and other social and political activity. For instance, Nāgārjuna interrogates the 
nature of existence through the concept of cause and effect. Nāgārjuna discloses that the nature 
of an existing entity is neither constituted by itself alone, nor created by non-related factors, such 
as gods, or the combination of two independent entities, or made from nothingness. Rather, the 
emergence and existence of an entity relies upon the cooperation of a major cause and its related 
conditions.  
      In the first chapter of MKK, Nāgārjuna first agrees with the view that the substance-
svabhāva (or self-created nature) exists in both cause and effect. That means, cause and effect 
are both independent entities which can create themselves and exist autonomously without 
depending upon other factors.  Nāgārjuna, then, interrogates whether or not a cause is identical to 
its effect. Nāgārjuna asks if the cause is identical to its effect, why it is named cause rather than 
effect? On the other hand, if the cause is not identical to its effect, what kind of relation exists 
between them? Does the effect exist prior to the cause or after the cause (i.e. when the cause 
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disappears)? Or do both the cause and effect co-exist as two independent entities? Nāgārjurna 
found that no positive answer can be given to any of these interrogations satisfactorily, because 
there is an interdependent and mutually defining relation between cause and effect. The relation 
is analogous to the relation between a fire made by a piece of wood.  The wooden fire (effect) is 
not identical to its causal factor, i.e. the wood. Nor does the fire exist entirely independent from 
the wood. If the fire and the wood exist as two independent and unrelated entities, Nāgārjuna 
asks, what makes the burning of a wooden fire possible, and why do we need the wood to make a 
wooden fire? Moreover, the wooden fire does not exist prior to the wood, because before the 
burning of the wood, not a trace of fire can be seen. Nor can a wooden fire come into being after 
the wood is burned out, because if not a piece of wood exists, what provides the material sources 
for the burning fire? Through these interrogations, Nāgārjuna shows that cause and effect, or 
wood and wooden fire cannot exist independently. Rather, they exist interdependent upon each 
other. This philosophy, ontologically, is called the theory of śūnyatā, and phenomenally, is 
named theory of dependent co-arising.  
      The theory of śūnyatā (theory of absence of svabhāva or theory of the absence of self-
created nature, or the theory of emptiness) articulates that the nature of existence is not formed 
by a single, unchangeable factor. Thanks to English using the word of emptiness to translate the 
word śūnyata, sometimes, it is misunderstood as a theory positing that nothing exists in the 
world. This is an entirely false view. For Nāgārjuna, svabhāva (self-created nature or own 
nature) consists of three meanings: essence-svabhāva, substance-svabhāva and absolute-
svabhāva (Westerhoff, 20). The first two meanings of svabhāva are the primary focus of 
Nāgārjuna’s discussion, and the third one is defined as the true nature of an existence, which in 
MKK is dependent co-arising. Since the third view is covered by my introduction of Nāgārjuna’s 
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philosophy of dependent co-arising, in this part, I will only discuss essence-svabhāva and 
substance-svabhāva. Essence-svabhāva indicates a specific quality or property of an object by 
which an individual or entity is individuated, thereby rendering it recognizable and nameable. 
This specific property or quality of an entity is the unique factor that distinguishes the entity 
from all others. It is the essential property that an entity cannot lose without ceasing to be what 
the entity is. It is analogous to the heat of fire, the fluidity of water and the openness of space or 
the personality or individuality of a man or woman.   
         Nāgārjuna does not deny the existence of this essence-svabhāva. What Nāgārjuna rejects 
is the second svabhāva, i.e., substance-svabhāva.  Substance-svabhāva is defined as the solo 
factor that exists objectively, and its existence and qualities are independent of other objects, 
human concepts or interests. The Sanskrit commentator, Candrakirti, characterizes substance-
svabhāva as changeless, not originated from and not dependent on something else. In other 
words, substance-svabhāva is a factor that is neither produced by causes and conditions, nor is 
changeable. Rather, it comes into being without relying upon any other factors (Westerhoff, 41).  
In Nāgārjuna’s view, this substance-svabhāva does not exist in reality, because all existences 
come to exist dependent upon causes and conditions. If an entity, including an individual, is 
produced from conditions and causes, it would be something artificially created. Then how could 
we say that the svabhāva does not depend upon anything else? (MKK, chapter 15).  
        In contrast to theory of śūnyatā is theory of dependent co-arising which explains the way 
in which an individual, or an entity is formed. This theory consists of two kinds of dependent 
relation and four fundamental components---physicality (or space), temporality (time), 
becoming/changing (movement), and essence-svabhāva (agenthood or essence of a thing). The 
two dependent relations characterize the relation between an entity and other entities or 
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individuals as well as to its related conditions or factors. These two dependent relations are 
existential dependence and epistemic dependence. The existential dependent relation refers to a 
necessary prerequisite factor for an entity to exist, such as the apple seed to its apple tree. 
Without the apple seed, there would never have an apple tree. Yet, the relation of an apple tree to 
an apple seed is epistemic dependence. Epistemic existence indicates the relation between A and 
B, although B does not affect A’s existence like an apple tree to an apple seed, the reference of A 
and B cannot be understood without the existence of both A and B. For instance, the term “a 
cause” cannot be understood if there is not a concept of “effect”.  So do the concept of “father” 
and “son”. The father is named because his son was born. If no child was born because of the 
man, he would not be called as “a father”.  Similarly, the term of “the past” is understandable 
because of the concepts of the present and the future. If both terms of the future and the present 
refer to nothing, then the reference of “the past” is unrecognizable. Hence, there is a relation of 
epistemic or conceptual dependence between these terms. These two dependent relations are 
equally important to human life. The existential dependence is the prerequisite factor that is 
interwoven into the fabric of human existence whereas the epistemic dependent relation is the 
reality reference or conceptual designation that we conventionally use in our daily social and 
political activity.  
        According to Nāgārjuna’s investigation of the nature of human existence, at least, one 
kind of these two dependent relations has to exist between an entity and its related factor 
whatever the entity is a person, an animal, a thing or an event. In fact, for the empirical reality, 
two kinds of relational dependencies are always involved although through an objective 
observation, no visible connection can be found between two entities. This is because existential 
dependent relation is an intrinsic factor that together with other components constitute the fabric 
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(or foundation) of the existent entity. On the other hand, the epistemic dependence exists 
conceptually which may or may not have empirical reference. Its relational connection cannot be 
found physically, and yet, without the epistemic dependence, our language will lose its function 
as a reality-reference or conceptual designation. As such, we would be unable to communicate 
with each other, let alone to establish a social network and political community.  Hence, these 
two dependent relations are the basic threads that interweave all the entities together in the world 
and make the social and political activity possible. It is because of these two dependent relations 
that the nature of human existence is conceived as interdependent in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy.  
Apart from the two dependent relations, according to Nāgārjuna’s investigation, the 
emergence and existence of every entity in the world also relies upon at least four factors--
temporality, spatiality, becoming (the dynamic and on-going process of becoming, moving and 
the like), and being in itself (the agenthood or essence-svabhāva or major cause of an entity).  
These four factors depend upon each other to make the emergence and existence of a particular 
entity possible. The relation between the major cause and the other factors are not simply 
interdependent but also mutually defining each other. Nāgārjuna uses the movement of gone as 
an example to illustrate the case. Nāgārjuna asks: if we say someone is gone, where is the 
movement of gone? In the place prior to someone’s leaving, or in the movement of her/his 
leaving or after her/his leaving? These questions cannot be satisfactorily answered simply by the 
“it is” or “it is not” dichotomous formulation, for several factors are involved in the movement of 
gone. These factors consist of an agent who moves, a series of moving actions, temporal concept 
of the past, present and future, as well as the space of here and there and so on. The fact is that if 
no agent moves, how can we say someone is gone. In addition, if there is not a successive series 
of moving actions from here to there, how can we detect the movement of gone. Lastly, if no 
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concept of the past, present and future exits, in what way we can say that someone is gone, 
because “gone” in this sentence implies someone was here previously but now is no longer here.    
To sum up Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising, it consists of two relational 
dependences (existential dependence and epidemic dependence) and four basic components of 
existence (temporality, spatiality, becoming and agenthood or being in itself) as well as three 
characteristics. In other words, Nāgārjuna’s theory of interdependent nature is not simply a linear 
link between two or more entities. Rather, it is a relational network constituted by multiple layers 
of connection and interdependencies. Within an individual entity, various components and 
conditions comes together to make the being of an entity possible. External to the entity, there 
also connections link the entity to other entities.  Lastly, since the life of an entity is an ongoing 
process, various conditions also assist the life process working properly.  The diagram of the 
nature of human existence with respects to Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising 
would look like the following social network posted in the Facebook,
32
 which portrays the way 
in which an individual connects to others.  
 
       In fact, all twenty-seven chapters of MKK aim to illustrate the two interrelated 
relations, four interdependent constituents and three characteristics of human existence, 
                                                 
32
 See “Facebook.” Accessed June 2010, http://www.facebook.com/. Facebook is one of the largest social network 
online. 
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including the nature of autonomy, personhood, and the relation between personhood and the 
social, political and natural world. Take autonomy, selfhood and epistemology for example. 
In chapter Fifteen of MKK, Nāgārjuna interrogates the nature of autonomy and points out  
that “[t]he occurrence of self-nature through causes and conditions is not proper, [for] self-nature 
that has occurred as a result of causes and conditions would be something that is made.” This 
means that for a self-created entity who claims to be autonomous, emergence or existence should 
not be contingent upon other factors. If his/her emergence and existence depends upon other 
factors, it is unreasonable to say that the entity is autonomous. This is analogous to a person who 
claims to be an autonomous self, but in reality, his/her existence cannot be maintained or 
separated from social, cultural, political and natural conditions. (S)he not only needs food and 
clothes made by others, but also needs family, friends, education and other social and political 
activities to develop his/her personality, intelligence, mentality and the like. Hence, the so-called 
autonomous self is a concept that overlooks the interrelated and interdependent nature of human 
personhood and the social, political and natural world.  
          In Nāgārjuna’s view, the nature of autonomy is formed as dependent upon a relational 
foundation. The concept of autonomy, hence, needs to be defined based on relational grounds 
rather than as an isolated entity who is not related to any family, friends and things made by 
others. That is, autonomy is defined as an individual who has the autonomous right to make 
choices with an awareness of related conditions. Here awareness means that choices are made by 
free will rather than by others or external forces. Also, the individual is conscious of the 
corresponding responsibilities and possible consequences related to a choice. Alternatively put, 
the concept of autonomy, for Nāgārjuna, includes two kinds: essential-svābhava and substance-
svābhava. He accepts the first, but rejects the second one. Specifically, Nāgārjuna agrees that 
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every individual has the right to choose and create his/her life as far as (s)he is able to take on the 
responsibility of fulfilling tasks and facing consequences. Yet, he rejects the definition that the 
autonomous individual is one who can do whatever (s)he wants, or can have whatever (s)he 
desires without taking into consideration the related responsibilities and consequences. The 
reason, as mentioned previously, is that in Nāgārjuna’s interrogation of the nature of autonomy,  
no entity can be isolated from others and not related to anyone or anything, be it existentially or 
conceptually. An individual is always related to others. Since one is always related to others, the 
change of one’s position or condition certainly will result in the change of other affiliated factors, 
be they great or small. One cannot do whatever (s)he wants because of these  related conditions. 
An individual’s free will or rationality, though it plays a leading role, is not the only set of 
factors that composes the world of an existent entity. These are corresponding factors. The 
existence and becoming of an entity and its corresponding factors are mutually conditioned, 
shaped and defined by each other.  
 Let us take the structure of an individual’s selfhood as an example. A self, for 
Nāgārjuna, is constituted not by one single component alone. Rather, it is constituted by mind 
and body, affectivity and rationality as well as subjectivity and objectivity. The components of a 
self, Nāgārjuna asserts, consist of at least five components: physical body, feeling (or 
affectivity), intelligence (or rationality), volition and consciousness. These five components form 
a dynamic life process of physical and mental activities. Hence, the self cannot be identified only 
with one of the five components, be it physical body, affectivity, rationality, volition or 
consciousness. Nor can it be separated from any of them. This is because human life is a process 
of emerging and becoming, both of which require a sequence of mental and physical activities 
working together. In this life process, both body and mind, and affectivity and rationality as well 
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as volition and consciousness, depend upon each other to make one’s life operate properly. In 
addition, these physical and mental activities are characterized as having a particular trait that 
makes an individual’s life coherent as a whole and distinct from that of other individuals.  
Apparently, an individual is an atomic-life entity that is not physically related to others. 
Yet, by its very nature, (s)he cannot exist and perform any activity if the basic five components 
of selfhood do not work together. This is like an individual who is very good at mountain 
climbing but is weak physically. (S)he cannot go too far no matter how strong a will the 
individual has or how rational (s)he is. This is because the fulfillment of a wish or desire needs 
the cooperation of physical strength and mental capacity as well as rationality and affectivity.  
           Similarly, the world we live in cannot be entirely controlled by an individual, because our 
experienced world does not simply exist for any particular individual. Nor does the world exist 
objectively in the outside world, waiting for the human agent to take advantage of it. Rather, the 
experienced world that we live in and live by is formed by an agent’s subjective experience, 
sensing faculty and external objects. The experienced world includes subjectivity and objectivity 
as well as public and the private life. A case in point can be illustrated by Nāgārjuna’s 
examination of sense faculty and the prior entities in chapters three and nine of MKK 
respectively. Nāgārjuna found the functions of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and 
feeling (i.e., the six faculties) cannot be separated from the objects perceived and the one who 
perceives them. Nāgārjuna (Kalupahana 1986, 137) explains that “[a] seer does not exist either 
separated or not separated from seeing. When a seer does not exist, whence can there be seeing 
and the object of seeing?” This means that the action of seeing involves at least three factors: an 
agent who sees, an object perceived and the sensing faculties. If no agent can see, such as in the 
case of someone who is blind, or someone who does not exist, where is the function of seeing 
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coming from? Similarly, if no object can be perceived, such as in an empty room, in what sense 
can we say that a chair is seen? Also, if a seer does not possess a healthy sense faculty, such as a 
color-blind person, how could (s)he perceive colors correctly? These examples show that an 
interrelated and interdependent relationship between an individual and his/her surrounding world 
exists. A man with six healthy faculties cannot see, hear, smell, taste, touch or feel anything, if 
there are no objects to be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched and felt. Hence, the apparently 
unrelated external world existing outside an individual’s body, in reality, is one of the intrinsic 
components of human existence.  
            The above connection also related to the way in which our worldview or the knowledge 
of our world is established. The knowledge of our world is also an important issue for Nāgārjuna 
because the objects perceived and our means of accessing them form an essential part of our 
conceptualization of the world and our place in it. Means of knowledge are instruments used by 
the self in order to apprehend objects perceived. They connect our inner would with that of the 
outside world. Our knowledge of the world and perceived objects, according to a science 
textbook, can exist objectively, independent from subjective experience. This view is very 
different from Nāgārjuna’s epistemology. For Nāgārjuna, objects perceived, in general, and the 
formation of our knowledge of the world, in particular, cannot be separated from an individual’s 
subjective experience. The fact is that our recognition and understanding of the world and 
objects perceived always depend on at least four means of knowledge. These four means of 
knowledge not only make the objects perceivable and understandable to us but also synthesize 
the objects perceived into our knowledge system, and thereby, allow us to make use of them. 
These four means are: perception, inference, recognition of likeness and testimony.   
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           The first means, perception, attends to objects, presenting a mental image of the objects 
perceived. Through inference, we then figure out the possible relationship between the objects 
perceived and their function in our lives. After perceiving this object, we further make a 
connection between it, and those we have known by identifying the likeness between them. 
Lastly, we testify to the object recently perceived, and synthesize it into our knowledge system.  
These are the four means of knowledge that we depend upon in our cognitive process of 
formatting knowledge of the world. In this way, our knowledge of the world is impossible to 
separate from an individual’s subjective experience. This is because although perceiving an 
object is purely a sensing process, the object perceived has to go through three further 
processes—inference, recognition of likeness and testimony. These three processes are done in 
relation to the knowledge system that we have already established in memory. For instance, a 
new mathematics problem for a child in grade school, may not be a new problem for a high 
school student. This is because the knowledge foundations of these two students are different. 
Since the acquisition of knowledge of the world always proceeds in contrast to an individual’s 
knowledge system, one’s knowledge of the world is impossible to be separated from one’s 
subjective experience. 
          However, in appearance, no objective connection between two objects can be seen by 
observing their physical bodies. This is because, as philosopher David Hume points out, no 
connection can be seen between a cause and its effect, such as the smoke and fire, or the first 
billiard ball and the second billiard ball. Although Nāgārjuna is aware of the invisible physical 
connection between a cause and its effect, he does not deny the inference of a connection 
between a cause and its effect, such as smoke and fire or how a billiard ball may hit another ball.  
Conversely, Nāgārjuna conceives that the mental inference of a cause and its effect is one of the 
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most fundamental ways we interweave fragmentary objects perceived to form a knowledge 
system. Without mental connections such as inference, recognition of likeness and testimony, 
objects perceived would play a very insignificant role in human life. If we see smoke but never 
further infer that there will be a fire, we will never take precautions to prevent smoke from 
turning into a fire. If this was truly the case, daily life would be a disaster. In fact, without the 
mental connections made by inference, recognition of likeness and identification, the 
development of scientific research and civilizations would be impossible, for everything that we 
perceive would not be seen as related to anything else.  
          This is clearly not the case in reality. No matter in our daily activities, a research lab, or 
in making a social and political policy, we always make inferences about and connections 
between things. For instance, in a lab experiment, when a researcher observes a data change in 
his/her experiment, (s)he needs to infer the meaning of this change, and further to identify the 
value of making another experiment or concluding this research. Similarly, lawmakers need to 
evaluate old policies in comparison to new suggestions through a process of inference in order to 
judge whether the older policy or the new one will work better for the public. Through the above 
examples, it is clear that our acquisition of knowledge of the world cannot be separated from 
subjective experience. In this sense, the fabric of human existence is characterized by the 
interweaving of subjectivity and objectivity, as well as the public and the private.      
 Merleau-Ponty’s Intersubjectivity 
    Similar to Nāgārjuna’s critique of intellectualism and empiricism in his time, Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity grounded upon existential phenomenology also intends to 
bridge the gap between intellectualism and empiricism. Merleau-Ponty (2004, 33) points out that 
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whereas empiricism is deficient in explaining the internal connection between an object and the 
action it triggers, intellectualism is lack of contingency in occasions of thought. Alternatively 
put, while empiricism focuses on the perceivable part of a particular event or entity and 
overlooks the corresponding factors and relationships that undergird the emergence of an entity 
or event, intellectualism pays too much attention to conceptualizing not-yet-fully formed factors, 
and ignores the contingency between the perceivable and a not-yet-fully formed reality.  Hence, 
both empiricism and intellectualism are in accordance with each other in that “neither of them 
can grasp consciousness in the act of learning, and that neither attaches due importance to that 
circumscribed ignorance, that still ‘empty’ but already determinate intention” (33).  This means 
that whereas empiricism refers to the perceivable side of a particular event or entity, such as 
learning as activity or result, intellectualism sticks to the invisible side, such as the idea or 
concept of learning and the like. They both lose sight of the shared ground of the ongoing 
process of learning, which interconnects and synthesizes both perceivable factors and a not-yet-
fully formed conceptual reality.   
This ongoing process of interconnecting and synthesizing, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
can be illustrated by our sensations, which are a state of consciousness, and a consciousness of a 
state of existence. As a state of consciousness, this presents the object perceived to our minds, 
and meanwhile, as the consciousness of a state, it attends to the ongoing events of our lives.  In 
this way, although sensation is still empty in its tangible reality, it is determinate and possesses 
the power to create a reality or event. Since existence is an ongoing process of emerging and 
becoming, the concrete part of it synthesizes with newly emerging factors and becomes a new 
perceivable entity. As such, the existence of any concrete entity or perceivable reality interrelates 
with the invisible, but ongoing emerging factors to form a new reality. The visible and the 
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invisible factors, hence, work together to make the emergence of an existent entity possible, be it 
an event, a thing, or an individual. This is very similar to Nāgārjuna’s view of the interrelated 
and interdependent nature of cause and its effect.   
         Yet, different from Nāgārjuna’s application of an alternative reasoning method to contend 
and unfold the interrelated nature of human existence, Merleau-Ponty utilizes a gestalt 
psychological method to reveal the interrelated relationship between human life and the natural 
and sociopolitical world. The interrelatedness of human personhood and the natural and 
sociopolitical world is presented via several important themes. My thesis chooses four of the 
most important ones to illustrate Merleau-Ponty’s tenets. These four are: first, the lived body as 
the intermediary or interconnected ground for individuals and things in the external world; 
second, that sense experience functions as a synthesized horizon of humanhood and the 
perceived; third, life processes integrate the perceived object into personhood as a whole; and 
fourth, the interrelated nature of personhood and the sociopolitical world.  
        First, the lived body as an interconnected field of personhood and the world: in Merleau-
Ponty’s view, the body of an individual should not be compared to a physical object, but rather 
to a work of art. This is analogous to a picture, a poem or a novel, whose ideas and beauty are 
communicable by means of the display of colors, sounds and other artistic factors. Merleau-
Ponty points out that when we analyze Cezanne’s paintings, if one particular painting is chosen 
and displayed in front of us, the sight of this painting provides us with the specific presence of 
Cezanne’s painting, and therein our analyses find their full meaning within this painting. 
Similarly, although a poem is made up of words, the metaphors, meter and rhythm conveyed by 
this poem also play a crucial role in our understanding of the reference and meaning of the poem. 
This is just as how spoken words are significant not only through the medium of individual 
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words, but also through that of accent, intonation, gesture and facial expression. These additional 
aids and meanings can reveal the source of the speaker’s thoughts and his/her fundamental 
manner of being. So does a poem whose underlying meaning and reference are revealed not 
simply by words but also by the meter, rhythm and imagery utilized in the poem. In the same 
manner, the task of writing a novel is not solely to explain ideas or even to analyze the main 
character, but rather to depict an inter-human event, revealing it to us without making ideological 
commentary. Making any change in the order of the narration or choice of viewpoint would alter 
the literary meaning of the novel.  
         All these examples refer to individuals, or beings for whom expression is inseparable 
from the thing expressed. Their meaning is accessible only through direct contact, radiating from 
a particular artistic form, language, description or even temporal and spatial narration and 
depiction. It is in this sense that our bodies are comparable to works of art, for the lived body is a 
nexus of living organisms that make the invisible a living meaning, and subjective experience 
manifest to the public and to the outside world, like the artistic form and narration of a poem, a 
novel or a painting. Without the lived body, our thoughts, feelings, even our being, would have 
no means to unfold and be known to the world. Neither would we have an avenue to connect and 
interact with people in social settings. With a lived body not only can we reveal our being to the 
world and interact with others, we can also connect to things in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 174-
175). It is in this sense that the lived body is an intermediary that connects our inner experience 
and the outside world. 
       Merleau-Ponty points out that the intermediary function of our bodies can be illustrated by 
the way in which our perception interprets the size or shape of an object in the world. Our view 
of the size or shape of an object is affected deeply by the location and orientation of our bodies. 
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If an object is kept at a distance from our bodies, it is different from an object presented before 
our eyes.  The fact is that when I perceive before me the furniture in my room, the desk, with its 
shape and size, is not a law or rule governing the parade of phenomena for me. Neither does it 
possess an invariable relationship with other furniture in my room. Rather, it is because I 
perceive the desk with its definite shape and size that I presume it to be at a certain distance and 
orientation. Every change in the distance or orientation of my body is followed by a 
corresponding in shape and size. Far from it being the case that the desk is reducible to constant 
relationships with other furniture in any determinate size, the constancy of relationships 
regarding its size always has the location and orientation of our bodies as its basis in any 
distance.  
         The implication of this finding is very different from what science and objective thinking 
usually assume. Science and objective thinking conceive that an apparently small object, 
perceived from a hundred yards away, is the same size as the object seen at ten yards’ distance. 
But, in reality, for a perceiver, the size of a perceived object at a hundred yards away is much 
smaller than that which is perceived at ten yards’ distance. I can identify all of the object’s 
positions, distances, and appearances at ten yards but not at a hundred yards (351-353). This 
example shows that our lived body plays an intermediary role in the way that we perceive an 
object in the world. Similarly, our perception also plays a significant role in recognizing the 
quality of a thing. For example, qualities such as color, hardness or weight, through the sense 
organs of our body, teach us much more about an object than its geometrical properties (354). 
The smooth texture of a table remains smooth throughout despite the varied play of natural or 
artificial lighting. This is because smoothness is felt by hands, and lighting does not inform me 
of the quality of smoothness.   
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        Our bodies don’t only plays an significant intermediary role in the way we perceive the 
size, shape and the quality of things in the world, but they also play role in our understanding of 
other people in the world. This is because the anatomical organization of our bodies can function 
as a natural sign which produces “a correspondence between specific gestures and given states of 
mind”.  The fact is that the behaviors associated with anger or love are not the same in a 
Japanese as they are in an American; more specifically, the different behaviors correspond to 
different emotions. It is not only gestures that are contingent to the body’s organization, but also 
the manner itself in which we meet and live in a particular situation. An angry Japanese may 
smile, but a westerner may go red and stamp his foot or hiss his/her words. These social 
expressions and human social interactions cannot be understood if we assume that a human is 
simply constituted of the mechanisms of organs and nervous system (219). The above examples 
show that objects in the world, do not appear to us as composed only of shape, size and quality. 
Rather, they are recognizable and cognized in a particular way. This is because humans have a 
body and perception as the intermediary and transactional synthesized field that makes objects 
recognizable and understood by us.  
    Second, sense experiences function as a synthesized and transactional field of subjectivity 
and objectivity.  In Merleau-Ponty’s account, similar to Nāgārjuna’s view, our sense experiences 
are not an independent, subjective mental state that is separated from the outside world. In fact, 
the world, one’s body and one’s empirical (psychological) self together constitute the whole 
system of our experiential world. That is, there is an interconnected relationship or 
interdependence between oneself, the natural world and sociopolitical practice. A case in point 
can be illustrated by the effects of our sense experiences, i.e., sensation. Merleau-Ponty (242) 
expounds that, according to inductive psychology, the effect of sense experiences, i.e. sensation, 
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is neither a state or a quality, nor the consciousness of a state or of a quality, which stands in 
opposition to the world with no connection at all.  Rather, sensation is a perceptual field, and a 
surface in contact with the world that is permanently rooted in the world. The fact is that the 
world ceaselessly discloses itself and surrounds our subjectivity as waves wash around a wreck 
on the shore. As a result, all knowledge takes place within the horizons opened up by our 
perception (245-246). The relationship of a sentient being to sensation, according to Merleau-
Pointy, is analogous to that of the sleeper to his/her slumber, for sleep comes when a certain 
voluntary attitude received from outside is in accordance with the being of the sleeper. For 
instance, the sleeper breathes deeply and slowly in order to summon sleep, and then a certain 
rhythm of respiration, which a moment ago the sleeper voluntarily maintained, becomes his very 
being and then, a sleepy sense sneaks into the sleeper’s consciousness. In the same way, the 
sensation is not only of vital significance, but also a way of being acted upon by our bodies. 
Sensation, hence, is literally a form of communion or “a power which is born into, and 
simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or is synchronized with it” (245-246).  
      Yet, traditionally, Merleau-Ponty spells out, sensation is conceived of or defined as either 
a stimuli by physics or as a state of qualities that we are conscious of by intellectualism. In these 
two definitions, sensation is detached from subjectivity and purely characterized either in 
material terms or in conceptual terms. Merleau-Ponty says that both are mistaken, for if the 
sensation of seeing and hearing is involved in extricating oneself from the impression in order to 
grasp it, and stopping perception in order to know, then it is illogical to say that “I see with my 
eyes” or “I hear it with my ears.” This is because in these definitions, eyes and ears are 
themselves entities in the world outside subjectivity. They are incapable of remaining on the side 
of the subjectivity from which they see or hear (246-247). When I say that my eyes see, that my 
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hand touches, that my foot is aching, my subjectivity is already included in these expressions. In 
fact, my subjectivity is the very thing that does the seeing and hearing. So do the expressions, “I 
know that the light strikes my eyes, that my shoe hurts my foot.” In these expressions, I 
distribute through my body perceptions which really belong to my subjectivity, and put 
perception into the thing perceived (247).  Hence, Merleau-Ponty maintains  (247-248) that “we 
must re-examine the dilemma of for itself and in itself, which involved putting ‘significances’ 
back into the world of objects and freeing subjectivity, as absolute non-being, of any kind of 
inherence in the body.” Also, this is the reason for Merleau-Ponty to define sensation as co-
existence or communion, because the sensation of blue is not simply the knowledge or 
assumption of a certain identifiable quale throughout all the experiences of it which I have made, 
as the geometer’s circle of geometry. Rather, it is an interaction and transaction between the 
perceiver and the perceived object.  Merleau-Ponty (148) points out that “[t]he sensor and the 
sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually external terms, and sensation is 
not an invasion of the sensor by the sensible.”  Rather, there is a transaction between the subject 
who senses and the perceived. It is false to hold that one acts while the other suffers the action, 
or that one confers significance on the other. The perceiver and the perceived are interrelated 
with each other to form the being of our existence. The experience of an I is not in the sense of 
absolute subjectivity, but rather it cannot be separated by the course of time in relation to its 
relational factors. Merleau-Ponty says that the unity of either the subject outside or the object-to- 
be is not a real entity, but a presumptive unity on the horizon of experience (255). 
      Third, our life process integrates things in the world into our humanhood as a coherent 
whole: in Merleau-Ponty’s view, our life process is a temporal process or ongoing process of 
synthesizing the horizons of human life and existing objects of the world. At any moment, the 
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synthesis of our life process takes place as we take in the related factors, which come close to our 
bodies and merge them into our life process. For instance, through our perceptive field, there is a 
spatial horizon, and we are present to our surroundings and co-exist with all the other landscapes 
which stretch out beyond it. All these perspectives together form a single temporal wave, one of 
the world’s instants. Although the landscape before our eyes may only show the features of the 
one which is hidden behind the hill, it does so only subject to certain degree of indeterminacy 
and in a particular temporal spot. We may now only see that here are meadows, over there are 
woods, or see here is land or sea. Yet, when I move forward across the land in different times, I 
see either open sea or frozen sea, and beyond that either earth or sky and so forth. This is because 
along with my life process, and my change of movement, my view of the landscape discloses and 
merges into my perceptual and synthesized horizons (385-386). In the same vein, the past of my 
life although progressively enclosed in its entirety within the past, because of the interlocking of 
intentionalities and consciousnesses, the past degenerates, and the earliest years of my life are 
lost in the general existence of my body. Yet, a nature similar to the one which I saw previously 
is now in my presence (386). This shows that human life is an ongoing temporal process whether 
or not we are aware of it. It ceaselessly moves forward from the past to the present, from the 
present to the future. Along with this process, our life process takes in the related factors of 
perceived objects and synthesizes them into our life process as a whole. This view, in fact, is 
similar to Nāgārjuna’s view that the nature of human existence is an on-going process and 
dependent upon major causes and related factors to make an entity’s life function properly.  
         Fourth, the interrelated nature of personhood and the sociopolitical world: in Merleau-
Ponty’s view, the social world is “not as an object or sum of objects, but as a permanent field or 
dimension of existence”. Merleau-Ponty says that even if we may be able to turn away from the 
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social world, we cannot cease to be situated relative to it. Our relationship to the social world is 
deeper than we really thought. To place ourselves in society as an object among other objects, or 
to place society within ourselves as an object among other objects (i.e., as an object of thought), 
is a false view. They both are mistaken in treating the social and ourselves as an object. Merleau-
Ponty explains that we have to “return to the social with which we are in contact by the mere fact 
of existing, and which we carry about inseparably with us before any objectification.” The fact is 
that objective and scientific consciousness of the past and of civilizations would be impossible 
had we not learned them through the intermediary of our society, our cultural world and their 
horizons (422).  In addition, if they are not there to be known, indeterminate but pre-existing, and 
if we did not find in our own lives the basic structures of history related to our society, our 
cultural world and their horizons, there would be no way for us to know them (422).  This is 
because we experience a certain cultural environment along with behaviors corresponding to it, 
and we interpret these behaviors by analogy with our own, and through our inner experience. 
This inner experience teaches us the significance and intention of perceived gestures and the 
actions of others because they are always understood through our own interpretations. This is the 
way our social understanding works. In addition, between my consciousness and my body as I 
experience it, between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from the 
outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the completion of the 
system. The fact is that the social and political world which we inhabit is not simply constituted 
by myself or one individual alone. Rather, it is because others exist. Merleau-Ponty (410) points 
out that in so far as others reside in the world, and are perceivable to us, they form a part of our 
perceptual field. The perceived other is never an Ego who is independent from my existence and 
I myself alone am the whole world for myself. 
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       Furthermore, a society is not simply an existence involving two or more independent 
individuals. It is rather constituted by the co-existence that involves an indefinite number of 
consciousnesses who dialogue and communicate with each other for a common goal (406). 
Merleau-Ponty says that in the experience of dialogue, there is a constituted and shared ground 
between the other person and myself. My thought and his/her thought are inter-woven into a 
single fabric, and my words and those of the people with whom I communicate are called forth 
by the state of our discussion. These words and thoughts are inserted into a shared operation of 
which neither of us is the sole creator. “We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no 
longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for 
each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist 
through a common world” (406). 
         Both Nāgārjuna’s dependent co-arising theory and Merleau-Ponty’s existential 
phenomenology disclose that individual life and subjective experience are closely related to the 
social and political environment in which an individual lives. In appearance, we are not 
connected to other individuals and the social and political factors physically; in reality, it is 
because the human possesses a body, can speak a language and is endowed with perception and 
other conditions that enable an individual to understand the world, perceive objects and interact 
with others in the world. Alternatively put, it is because the individual’s body, perception, 
subjective experience, and language serve as intermediaries to connect our inner subjective 
world and outer objective sociopolitical reality that human’s existence becomes possible and 
sociopolitical activity become meaningful.  
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 Bridging the Gap Between Noddings’ Relational Ontology and Tonto-Hankivsky’s 
Interconnection and Interdependent Nature 
      In light of Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of interdependent nature and 
interconnection between personhood and sociopolitical activity, we can see the deficiencies of 
Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interdependent nature. The core issue of these 
theories lies in that Noddings, Tronto and Hankivsky define and characterize their ontological 
relations based upon a traditional dichotomous view that separates subjectivity from objectivity, 
rationality from affectivity and the public from the private. Their theories fail to consider that 
subjective experiences or mental presentations are grounded in the external perceivable objects 
that constitute the foundation of our daily reality-reference. On the other hand, objects perceived 
in the outer world are recognizable and accessible because they are interpreted through our 
subjective experience.  
 
Applying Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophies to Bridge the Gap between 
Noddings’ and Tronto-Hankivsky’s Relational Ground 
 
     Based on the above discussion of Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s clarification of the 
interdependent nature of and connection between personhood and sociopolitical activity, it is 
plausible to suggest that there are four factors which can not only bridge the gap between 
Noddings’ caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s interdependence, but also can solve the three 
problems hidden in these theories. These three problems are: first, the separation of subjectivity 
from objectivity; second, the division between the public and the private, and third, seeing the 
interdependent nature of human existence as simply an epistemological holding, i.e. a different 
perspective, rather than an ontological foundation, i.e. human reality.  The four factors that can 
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solve these three problems, revealed by Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies, are: first, 
the nature of human existence is constituted of a synthesized field of mind and body, subjectivity 
and objectivity, as well as the public and the private. Second, human life is an on-going process 
of the synthesizing and becoming. Third, human agents and sociopolitical practices are mutually 
defined and conditioned by each other. Their relationship is interdependent. Fourth, the 
interdependent nature of human existence is both an ontological ground and an epistemological 
holding.  
   First, the nature of existence is constituted of the synthesized field of mind and body, 
subjectivity and objectivity, as well as the public and the private. As Nāgājuna points out, a self 
is constituted of at least five components, which include both mind and body, rationality and 
affectivity, as well as subjectivity and objectivity. These factors are physical body, feeling 
(affectivity), intelligence (rationality), volition and consciousness. Furthermore, the lived, 
experienced world is perceivable because of the synthesized field formed by an object 
(objectivity, or the public), our sensing faculties, and subjective experience (subjectivity, the 
private). In any absence of these three conditions, perception cannot be formed. That is, the 
recognition of a chair is composed of a seer’s healthy sensing faculty, his/her experience of 
recognizing this chair and a chair that really exists. If one is blind, or the chair does not exist, or 
the seer cannot recognize the object as a chair, the formation of a recognition of the chair would 
be impossible. Similarly,  Merleau-Ponty (2004, 412) also asserts that, in so far as we have 
sensory functions, be it visual, auditory or tactile fields, we are already in communication with 
others and interact with them. No sooner have we perceived a living body in the process of 
acting than the objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of significance. They are 
no longer simply what we ourselves make of them. Rather, they are the synthesized fabric made 
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of both others and ourselves. As such, perceived objects and their surroundings become parts of 
my existence. That is, through our sensing faculties, subjective experience, and the perceived 
object, our experienced world is formed. Hence, the relation between subjectivity and objectivity 
is not separated but rather interrelated and interdependent. Specifically, they are not incompatible 
factors so that while one exists, another has to be canceled.  They are supplementary components 
that depend upon each other to constitute a whole. The relationship between them is 
interdependent and dialectical. That is, sometimes, affective components may be more 
perceivable than rational factors, whereas at other times, rational components take first priority 
and affective factors sink to the background. Yet, no matter what the situation is, both affective 
and rational components co-exist and never disappear from one’s life.   
  Second, human life is an on-going process of synthesis and becoming. In both 
Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-pointy’s view, the nature of human existence is not static. Rather, it is 
a dynamic process of synthesis and mutual interpenetration of subjective experience and 
objective factors. A case in point can be illustrated by Nāgārjuna’s example of “someone is 
gone,” which consists of four fundamental components: temporality, spatiality, becoming and 
essence-svabhāva. If there is not a series of moving actions, or a temporal course through which 
a human agent can move from here to there, then we cannot say someone is gone. The word 
“gone” implies someone was here but (s)he is not here right now. In fact, if no temporal factor 
was involved human life, an individual would never grow up to be a teenager or an adult, but 
rather (s)he would stay as a new born baby forever.  This is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s 
articulation of the vision of a landscape which will unfold gradually as a whole also because of 
the temporal process. This is because when a car moves forward, to a different location, a 
different landscape is seen.  In this sense, the temporal process plays a very significant role for 
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our lives in merging new elements with an already existing system. Sometimes, this emergence 
can goes as far as to put apparently opposite components together, such as the public and the 
private, as well as subjectivity and objectivity. The fact is that the public and the private are two 
sides of one coin rather than incompatible factors. This is because of the multiple roles that an 
individual plays in his/her life. Sometimes, we are our children’s parents whereas at other times, 
we are schoolteachers or administrators of organizations.  Within our families, we have a private 
life, but in school or an organization, we live a public life. Yet, all of these are components of 
one’s life process. 
         Hence, in both Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies not only the components 
of the public and objectivity (such as space and time) are important, but also the private and 
subjective factors of the lived body and subjective experience are crucial. The implication is that 
it is incomplete to characterize human reality solely based upon one aspect of human life, be it 
subjectivity, objectivity, the public or the private. The fact is that human existence is a 
synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, as well as the public and the private. They both 
depend upon each other to form the experienced world.  Also, since human life is an on-going 
process, it needs both subjective and objective factors as well as the public and the private if our 
lives are to work properly.  
           Both Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies reveal that temporal factors are one 
of the most essential components for the emergence and becoming of an entity. Without these 
components, an entity would never develop or grow. Nor would the entity change from one thing 
to another, such as from water to ice or from a child to an adult. More importantly, the entity 
would exist fragmentarily and never form as a whole from momentary life states. Hence, 
temporal factors play a very significant role in characterizing human reality. Without this 
115 
 
component, we can only form an incomplete picture of human life. Both Nāgārjuna and Merleau-
Ponty clearly see the significant role temporal processes play in human life, for within them 
opposing factors, such as subjectivity and objectivity, and public and the private life, can co-exist 
and even be synthesized into a whole. However, this temporal condition clearly is not seen in 
both Noddings and Tronto-Hankivsky’s relational ontology. Accordingly, this is one of the 
essential factors that make both Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s interdependent nature more 
thorough and closer to human reality.  
Third, human agents, and our cultural, sociopolitical environment are interdependent and 
mutually conditioned and supplementary. For Nāgārjuna, the existence of any entity, whether 
human, animal, or inanimate object, is constituted by a major cause and its affiliated 
environmental conditions. The growth of an apple tree doesn’t only require a cause, i.e. an apple 
seed, but also the related conditions, such as good soil, sunlight, water and the like. Hence, the 
living entity is always conditioned by its related environmental factors. For example, whether an 
apple seed can grow into an apple tree depends upon there being enough sunlight, water, good 
soil and the like. So does human identity and perspective. One is called a ‘doer’ because (s)he is 
doing something. One’s vision of the world always depends upon what has been presented to 
one’s perception, subjective experience and the kind of social and cultural environment that one 
inhabits. An individual who lived five decades ago would not possess the same perspective on 
race, gender or sexuality that we have in the twenty-first century.  Even in the same era, people 
in different places, such as America and China, also possess different views on the concept of 
democracy.  Merleau-Ponty explains that one’s vision of the world is situated by the angle and 
location of one’s physical body. Any perception of the shape and size of a thing is inseparable 
from the location and direction of our bodies. The understanding of a social gesture or a 
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scientific or historical event is dependent upon the knowledge system that one has built up 
previously. The shaking head gesture in America may signify “no” whereas it means “yes” in 
India. Without background knowledge, one may interpret the same gesture in the wrong way. 
This shows that related elements have power to condition a particular thing. In fact, there are 
many modern scientific theories that reveal a similar message. Take quantum theory as an 
example. Quantum mechanics indicate that, in different spots of time, the physical systems of an 
entity are altered. In other words, the quantum state of an entity can be represented as a wave of 
arbitrary shape and extending through space as a wave function. The shape of the quantum will 
alter its position according to the different momentums.
33
 This is also similar to the case in which 
water, when placed where the temperature is lowered than zero degrees Celsius, becomes ice. On 
the other hand, when it is placed in a pot whose temperature is higher than 100 degrees Celsius, 
the water becomes vapor.  However, these social and political factors are not absolute but 
conditioned. For instance, the concept of computer literacy twenty years ago would not have 
been an issue, but now because of the digital divide, it is an important issue which any modern 
society cannot ignore. Otherwise, those citizens who do not know how to use a computer will 
have difficulty filling in a form on an online application, let alone using the Internet to gain 
information for job-searching.  This shows that although the major cause is the leading factor in 
deciding the form reality takes, related elements also possess the power to shape and define the 
manifestation of a reality.  
       The above three factors undoubtedly solve the problem that divides subjectivity from 
objectivity, affectivity from rationality, and the private from the public. The fact is that since the 
existence of an entity is constituted by a process of emerging and becoming, involved factors 
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always interact with each other, and depend upon each other to make the operation of existence 
work properly.  In this process, one’s life is not confined to a fixed role as a student forever; 
neither does it use one single intellectual capacity, such as rational reasoning. Rather, in different 
times, one plays different roles and uses different intellectual capabilities.  When doing a math 
assignment, we may rely more on our capacity for rational reasoning, but for a social worker 
who works as a consultant, effective feelings are more relevant to provide sympathetic 
understanding, which can lead a suffering client to speak without fear. Therefore, it is improper 
to say rationality belongs only to public affairs, whereas effective caring is limited to private life. 
A holistic and more complete view of human life should include both rationality and affectivity, 
as well as subjectivity and objectivity. 
         The deficiency of both Noddings’ and Tronto-Hankivsky’s account of their relational 
ontology is that they only articulate and define the interconnection and interdependent nature of 
human existence based upon a partial, incomplete characterization of human life, be it Noddings’ 
subjective experience or Tronto-Hankivsky’s objectified social and political activity. Their 
characterizations fail to see that human existence is an on-going and synthesized process of 
emerging and becoming. As such, the process of life depends upon not only subjective 
experiences, but also objective factors. Hence, their characterizations cannot tell the whole story 
of human life and our moral reality. 
         Lastly, the interdependent nature of human existence in both Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy is not simply an epistemological holding which shows the different opinions 
of various scholars. Rather, it is both an epistemic holding and an ontological ground for 
empirical reality. For instance, Nāgājuna points out that human existence cannot be separated 
from two kinds of dependent relations: existential dependence and epistemic dependence. The 
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first dependent relation is analogous to the relationship of an apple seed to its apple tree, whereas 
the latter indicates mutually defined concepts, such as the terms “long” and “short”, “son” and 
“father”, “cause” and “effect”. These two dependent relations are the two fundamental threads 
that interweave one entity with another, and make sociopolitical activities possible. They are the 
connections that undergird the fabric of human existence. Hence, human life cannot exist without 
these two dependent relations.  Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of the way in which our body is the 
intermediary that connects our inner world with surrounding objects also reveals that 
interdependence is both ontological and epistemological. The fact is that the location and vantage 
point of our bodies would affect our vision of the objects perceived, such as the shape and size of 
a desk. A chair from ten yards away looks very different from that is perceived when I stand one 
hundred yards away.  This is because the location of one’s body has an interdependent relation 
with the object, i.e., the chair, perceived. Furthermore, as Leonard Lawlor Barbaras points out, 
vision or touching in Merleau-Ponty’s writing reveals “a corporeal reflexivity that is essentially 
incomplete.” This is because a seer cannot perceive himself without becoming the object of 
vision, and consequently not a perceiver anymore. This is because the structure of a vision 
indicates “an inseparability from or ontological kinship with the world.” In other words, the 
reflexivity of sensibility shows the intertwining of subject and world. Merleau-Ponty’s usage of 
the terms “the visible” and “the invisible” reveals that “fact” and “essence” are chiasmatically 
intertwined. The chiasm of fact and essence, of sense and sensible shows that, in Merlaeu-
Ponty’s view, being is as its own negation and existence. That is, visibility is an unconcealment 
of the invisible.
34
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        If we apply both Nāgārjuna’s dependent co-arising theory and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
intersubjectivity to interrogate the view that conceives of the interrelated connection and 
interdependent nature of human existence as an epistemological holding, which may or may not 
be true, several questions can be raised. First, in terms of view, when we said that “someone is 
gone,” does this mean that a mover may or may not be involved in the movement of “gone?” 
Also, does this imply that the temporal concept of the past and the present may or may not be 
included in a series of movements? If these two assumptions are true, then we can name a 
movement to be “someone is gone.” If a single movement alone can be considered to be the 
event “someone is gone”, then it is also reasonable to say that a mover alone can be conceived as 
“someone is gone”. Clearly, the answers are both absurd and confusing. The factual reality is 
entirely distorted.  
        This is because we think that some of the intrinsic components of the event “someone is 
gone” are only different views that need or do not need to exist, such as the mover, the temporal 
concept of the past, and so forth.  Similarly, if interdependence is only a different way to 
organize and characterize our knowledge, and it may or may be not true, as Gilligan’s and 
Tronto’s views imply, the example presented by Merleau-Ponty regarding the sight of a table 
that stands hundred yards away being the same as that of ten yards away should be true. If we 
interrogate further, we can say that the knowledge of geometry that a normal (non-genius) 
elementary school student possesses would be the same as that of a professor of geometry. This 
is because the interrelated connections between and interdependent nature of related factors, such 
as ten yards distance versus one hundred yards distance, and a professional’s knowledge of 
geometry versus a novice’s knowledge, are not necessarily to be connected to the comparison 
mentioned above. After all, the interconnection and interdependent nature of human existence is 
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only a different perspective on human reality that may or may not be true. Again, this is absurd 
and confusing. If we characterize and construct a moral theory based upon this confusing view, 
deficiencies are inevitable. However, mainstream thought privileges modern rational moral 
theory, such as Ayer’s ethical theory, which is based upon mathematical logic, and Rawls’ social 
justice, which exclusively focuses on the fair procedure.  The view of interdepencence as simply 
an epistemological holding is complex and influential with respect to the way in which a moral 
theory is characterized. My thesis will discuss this issue in detail in the next chapter. In 
particular, I will use the notion of autonomy as an example to illustrate the way in which my 
unified neocaring theory is not only compatible with Kant’s rational moral autonomy, but also 
more capable of facing problems emerging from the digital age.   
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CHAPTER 4: 
FORMING A THEORY OF AUTONOMY BASED UPON THE UNIFIED NEOCARING 
THEORY 
 
In the previous three chapters, my thesis argued that a unified caring theory with an 
enhanced relational ontology (or relational foundation) not only is compatible with rational 
moral philosophy, but also more comprehensive and inclusive than previously. I have called this 
newly integrated caring theory “Neocaring Theory”. The new theory consists of four 
fundamental components and embraces three characteristics of human existence derived from 
Nāgārjuna’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. The four components are: caring nature, caring 
as an activity, contextuality (or motivation replacement), and relational ontology. The three 
characteristics are: (a) human existence as a synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, the 
private and the public, and affectivity and rationality; (b) human life is an ongoing process of 
becoming and synthesizing; and (c) human agents and social, cultural and political environment 
as mutually conditioned, supplementary. They are interconnected and interdependent. 
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that (and how) neocaring theory is not merely 
compatible with rational moral philosophy, but also more inclusive than it. I will focus on one of 
the most important aspects of social and political theory—autonomy—in order to discuss the 
differences made by neocaring theory. This is because autonomy is one of the most essential 
cornerstones upon which rational moral philosophy and neoliberalism justify their social and 
political policy. In this chapter, my discussion will focus on, first, the way in which caring 
theorists criticize the meaning of autonomy as defined by rational moral philosophers, such as 
Kant, Rawls and the neoliberals. Second, I will explain the shortcomings of the notion of 
autonomy as presented by caring theorists; third, I will construct a more inclusive theory of 
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autonomy, which is not only based on the core components of Kant moral autonomy, but also the 
three characteristics of human existence and four major components of unified neocaring theory 
mentioned above. 
 
Caring Theorists’ Criticisms of the Kant, Rawls, and Neoliberals’ Notions of Autonomy 
 
         Autonomy is a core element to not only Immanuel Kant’s rational moral philosophy, but 
also John Rawls’s liberal political theory and the theory of neoliberalism. It is also one of the 
major factors criticized by caring theorists, such as Noddings, Tronto,  Held, and Hankivsky. 
This is because autonomy plays a key role both in social and political philosophy, and in liberal 
educational theory. Broadly, autonomy is related to the extent to which a student or citizen 
possesses rights and freedom in either educational or sociopolitical arenas. For some scholars, 
autonomy is related to moral and legal responsibility, whereas for others, it concerns a criterion 
of political status, in which autonomous agency is necessary for the condition of equal political 
standing, and as a protection to unchecked paternalism, including to prevent paternalistic 
interventions in people’s lives in the personal and informal spheres as well as in the legal arena. 
Moreover, from the perspective of social and political policy, autonomy is related to the social 
and political conditions that victimize women and other potentially vulnerable people (Christman 
2009).
35
 
The modern concept of autonomy is generally defined as the capacity to be one’s own 
person, and to live a life one’s own freely chosen ethical principles, not principles manipulated 
or distorted by external forces. It stands in opposition to external control or coercion, which it 
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marks as a sign of oppression, coercion, or manipulation. Hence, autonomy is an indispensable 
element in a democratic society (ibid.). Autonomy is at the core of Kant’s rational moral 
philosophy and Rawls’s liberal political theory. It is also a foundation-base of neoliberalism, 
which dominates the modern American social, political, and economic arenas, as well as the 
educational field. In reality, the meaning of autonomy has been interpreted in a very different 
ways in the course of the concept’s development. Yet, its most influential forms in terms of its 
effect on social, political, economic, and educational policy are: (a) Kant’s moral or 
transcendental autonomy; (b) Rawls’ liberal political autonomy; and (c) the neoliberals’ personal 
autonomy. 
Caring theorists including Noddings (2002, 109-112), Held (2006), Tronto (1993, 9) and 
Hankivsky (2004, 22-24) have criticized the concept, primarily focusing on three issues: first, the 
abstraction of human relations it assumes is not identical with empirical reality; second, the 
universalization of social and political activity and needs is inappropriate to solve real social and 
political problems; and third, defining the meaning of autonomy as the personal desires of an 
independent self is oversimplified and fails to capture the interconnection between a social self 
and political activity. 
          First: Noddings (2002, 109-112) points out that the autonomy presented by Kant is related 
to a “transcendental subject,” and does not map perfectly onto the everyday freedom that we 
usually think of. Rather, it indicates “freedom from the authority of church and state.” This 
seems a reasonable construction. Yet, the locus of authority presented by Kant was not shifted to 
“an empirical, individual self but to a stern and abstract self,” that is, a universal law or pure 
practical reason. Noddings questions it by saying that all that were involved make a free and 
well-considered choice, but the will is grounded upon a transcendental pure reason that ignores 
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the needs and desires of ordinary people. If this is the case, autonomy cannot possibly form a 
foundation for morals, because the will is cut off from the real world (ibid.). 
Similarly, Tronto (1993, 10) criticizes as problematic Kant and Rawls’ use of abstraction 
and universalized principles as the foundation of moral judgment. Tronto says that moral 
judgments made from a standpoint that is distant and disinterested with regard to social and 
political reality cannot accurately represent empirically moral life. This is because, first, under 
this approach morality becomes a realm beyond the world of emotions and feelings, limited to 
that of reason. Second, if morality is disinterested in this way, it is not related to local 
sociopolitical activity, customs, or habits but is as universal as the capacity of humans to reason. 
Third, it implies that moral philosophers only need to concentrate on the nature of moral thought, 
not how to make certain that human agents act morally. If these three rules really are the way to 
construct a moral theory, then “any account of morality that draws upon emotion, daily life, and 
political circumstance, will necessarily seem corrupted by non-rational and idiosyncratic 
incursions within this world” (ibid.). In this sense, moral theory has nothing to do with our daily 
life and empirical, social, or political reality. Rather, it is a universal law constructed by pure 
thought and exists only in the rationally constructed mind. 
In a similar vein, Hankivsky (2004, 22) criticizes this kind of abstract, transcendental 
autonomy for overlooking three factors: first, humans are, by nature, connected to one another; 
and second, humans are embedded in a range of involuntary and voluntary social relations 
through which their identity is defined, structured, sustained, and limited; third, an abstract 
autonomy overlooks care, which is a core element of the human condition—alternatively put, a 
core manifestation of the basic truth that all people are vulnerable, dependent, and finite. 
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Therefore, we all have to “find ways of dealing with [care] in our daily existence and in the 
values which guide our individual and collective behaviour” (ibid.). 
Hankivsky’s (23-24) criticism of Rawls’ theory of justice is a case in point. She points 
out that Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness contains several limitations from the perspective of 
an ethic of care. For instance, abstract rules and rights that assume equality and sameness would 
obscure human differences and their significance to the legitimacy of moral claims because “the 
outcome of impartial reasoning congruent with objective fairness can lead to indifference 
towards others’ needs.” Hence, our political obligations and expectations towards others should 
not always be reduced to abstract rules and rights. Instead, we should understand people’s lives, 
and recognize the conditions of inequality, disadvantage, and discrimination, awareness of which 
is particularly essential to respond adequately and responsively to gender, racial, ethnic, cultural, 
and class differences and oppression. Hankivsky (24) says that she shares Iris Marion Young’s 
view, which maintains that it is insufficient to use a traditional liberal model of distributive 
justice to respond to issues of violence, discrimination, racism and sexism, “because beyond 
rights are the caring responsibilities that arise between human beings in the course of their lives” 
(ibid.). 
The third criticism of the rational notion of autonomy is regarding personal choice and 
self-determination. Caring theorists say that there are two problems with this definition: first, the 
identity of a self must include both the self-concept and other factors, because self-identity is 
constructed through education and socialization. In this sense, the authentic self is a social self 
that is deeply shaped and rooted in a particular social and cultural milieu rather than living in 
isolation. Second, the relation between personal choice and autonomy does not always go hand 
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in hand. Personal choice does not necessarily mean that one has more autonomy. Likewise, 
autonomous states do not necessarily come from self-choice or self-decision. 
Noddings (109-117) says that the most contentious issue regarding the concept of 
autonomy at this point is about decision-making. That is, an autonomous person is conceived as 
be able to make a choice about what (s)he really wants to do, regardless of whether the decision 
is good or evil. Noddings questions this definition of autonomy and says that everyone wants to 
make his/her own decisions and be free of coercion. Yet, even in daily life, our power of control 
is limited. For instance, Noddings says that when she was a dean of a department and 
simultaneously responsible for household duties, she had to make decisions based on factors 
other than her heart’s desire. As a homemaker, she could live in a more autonomous life because 
she could schedule things to suit herself, and she found joy in taking care of her loved ones. 
Conversely, as a dean, her schedule was planned by others, and she disliked many of these tasks. 
But, if she had been asked to choose one or the other exclusively, she would probably have 
chosen being a dean, she said, because the tasks of the dean were closer to and advanced her 
ability to perform the academic work that she really wanted to do. Noddings therefore concludes 
that it is unclear which choice can be counted as more autonomous, for we make decisions and 
choose our needs and demands in relation to the condition or circumstance of the moment, and 
rationalize a plan only in retrospect (ibid.). 
Noddings’ example reveals that what we genuinely need and what we truly want are not 
always compatible. Sometimes, they may conflict with each other, as with Noddings’ situation. 
Moreover, the choice that we make is not necessarily the one we plan to make or the one we 
truly desire. Hence, a definition of autonomy as the ability to choose what one desires or decide 
on one’s own is over-simple and not aligned with the human reality. An adherent to this 
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inadequate concept of autonomy is either misled into making a wrong decision or becomes 
frustrated and disappointed by their failure to have complete control over their choices. Noddings 
(109-112) says that this definition of autonomy becomes even more questionable if we 
interrogate it with regard to our relational self, because then the distinction between autonomy 
and heteronomy becomes increasingly blurred. If a self is related to a family and also connected 
to a professional identity, it is difficult to tell how autonomy and heteronomy can be said to 
differ here. We are influenced by encounters with others who provide the building blocks for our 
personhood. Even if we prefer not to be “led around by the nose” and resist manipulation, 
sometimes, we still need to listen to advice and guidance. More importantly, we have to allow 
ourselves to be emotionally affected by the needs and predicaments of others in order to care for 
them. In this sense, the “independent self” meanings of autonomy defined by Kant and by the 
neoliberals are riddled “with paradoxes.” Noddings (116-117) hence concludes that the self is a 
relation, constructed in connection to other selves, objects, and events in the world. Neither the 
constructing subject nor the fully constituted self is capable only of subjective feeling in the 
immediate moment; the self has attributes, and it has a substantial continuity. Defining the self’s 
autonomy as independent from other people and from sociopolitical realism is riddled with 
difficulties. In order to avoid these difficulties, “we need to explore more fully how this 
relational self develops and what norms we want to establish for it.” Noddings (117) thereby 
maintains that reflective thinking is perhaps the most important and useful element of autonomy. 
Held’s critique of rational autonomy is in line with that of Noddings, and focuses on articulating 
the reality of the relational self. Held (2006, 12-14) points out that moral theories “built on the 
image of the independent, autonomous, rational individual largely overlook the reality of human 
dependence and the morality for which it calls.” In the caring theorists’ view, as expressed by 
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Held, humans are considered to be relational rather than self-sufficient and independent, in both 
the moral and the epistemological senses. As children, we depend on others to provide us care, 
and even when we grow up, we still remain interdependent with others throughout our lives. This 
is because everyone is particularly tied to a family or friends. These social relations, in turn, 
constitute part of our identity. In addition, our responsibility is also manifested through our 
embeddedness in familial, historical, and sociopolitical contexts. Hence, the independent, self-
sufficient, autonomous individual pictured by rational and neoliberal theory fails to accurately 
represent the reality of the interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical activity. 
 
The Shortcomings of the Caring Theorists’ Notions of Autonomy 
The caring theorists’ criticisms of the definitions of Kant, Rawls, and the neoliberals, 
although justifiable, do not compensate for the fact that they fail to either present a complete 
theory of autonomy or demonstrate in what way their theories of autonomy are compatible with 
those of rational moral philosophy. Noddings, Tronto, Hankivsky, and Held were inclined to 
criticize the deficiencies of rational notions of autonomy perhaps at the expense of their own 
complete theory of autonomy. Clement, Meyers, and Slote are the three major scholars who 
tackle the task of defining an autonomy based upon caring theory; yet Clement’s and Meyers’s 
theories of autonomy focus on articulating how a caring person or a feminist can be autonomous, 
and they do not really come to grips with the (in)compatibility of caring with the notions of 
autonomy presented by Kant, Rawls, and the neoliberals. Slote (2007), however, tackles the issue 
of compatibility between caring theory and rational autonomy, but substitutes for the major tenet 
of relational autonomy his empathetic caring theory. 
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In other words, Slote (2007), although he articulates a relationship between caring theory 
and autonomy (particularly in Kant’s concept of respect; Slote, 55-65), also maintains that a 
caring interference can be conceived of as respecting the interfered-with agent’s autonomy only 
if it is based on empathy, not on any relational ontology/foundation (57). In fact, in several 
passages, Slote questions the compatibility of the caring theorists’ notion of autonomy (which is 
based on “sentiments”) and Kant’s notion of respecting an agent’s autonomy. Slote (2007) says 
that “[t]he notions of caring about and concern for (the welfare of) others are widely regarded as 
different from that of respect” (55), because “[c]are ethics is a form of moral sentimentalism, and 
it is difficult to see how respect for others can be grounded in (mere) sentiments, emotions, or 
feelings” (ibid.). Then he points out that “if we enrich the notion of caring so as to make it 
include empathy, then the ethics of caring will be in a position to account for respect” (57). From 
these passages, it is clear that Slote rejects the compatibility of the caring relation presented by 
other caring theorists with the rational notion of autonomy. For him, it is in the domain of 
empathy, which “is typically regarded as not involving the merging of two souls or 
personalities”(57), that the caring and the rational notions of autonomy are compatible. 
Among the caring theorists, Meyers and Clement (1998, 22-44) present the most 
complete theory of autonomy based on caring. Yet they both alter the normative meaning of 
autonomy presented by rational philosophy instead using the concept of autonomous thinking 
capacity to interpret autonomy. Although Meyers may be the first to use autonomous reflective 
competence as a lens through which to interpret autonomy, her theory focuses more on the 
feminist view rather than on caring theory. It is Clement who takes Meyers’s view further to 
demonstrate the way in which a caring person can also be autonomous. Hence, I will focus on 
articulating Clement’s theory. 
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Clement’s book, Care, Autonomy and Justice (1998), not only expands the meaning of 
autonomy from an individualistic psychological viewpoint, but also tackles the problem intrinsic 
to the notion of the autonomy of a socially constructed self. Clement (22) argues that autonomy 
is “not merely an internal, or psychological characteristic, but also an external, or social” 
characteristic. This is because autonomy requires that one be free of coercion in one’s decision-
making process, and this coercion may come from either one’s own principles or perceptions or 
from social norms. The fact is that the freedom to make decisions for oneself does not mean that 
these decisions are not motivated by (e.g.) ignorance, inner compulsion, or alienation. Clement 
(22-44), therefore, maintains that how to think reflectively or critically about one’s choices is an 
important factor in determining whether a choice is really autonomously made. Whereas the 
ability to make decisions by one’s free will is the internal factor of autonomy, critical reflection 
on one’s choice is related to external factors. This is because critical reflection is shaped by a 
social norm, belief or value—in other words, by the process of socialization. 
For the individualistic approach, which conceives of the human being as an isolated and 
independent entity, Clement suggests that we are not only defined by our relationships to other 
but also socially constituted: “[w]e can only make sense of our own experiences through 
concepts which themselves make sense only in a social framework.” In this sense, autonomy 
cannot ignore the social factors that shape and define one’s life. For those who adopt a social 
approach, emphasizing the maintenance of caring relations is the first priority; Clement suggests 
that they need to be aware that the caring relation has to be a healthy relation rather than a self-
sacrificing one. Clement (44) says that “reconciling care and autonomy requires moving beyond 
these ideal types and finding the right balance between the connections and separations between 
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individuals.” Clement uses Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey’s (1993) work to illustrate this 
view. Frazer and Lacey (178) say that 
[t]he notion of the relational self, in contrast to both atomistic and inter-subjective selves, nicely  
captures our empirical and logical interdependence and the centrality to our identity of our  
relations with others and with practices and institutions, whilst retaining an idea of human  
uniqueness and discreteness as central to our sense of ourselves. It entails the collapse of any 
 self/other or individual/community dichotomy without abandoning the idea of genuine  
agency and subjectivity.
36
 
 
Clement’s theory of autonomy has done a great job of addressing the need for a 
formulation of autonomy in relation to caring and the carer. Accordingly, her theory contributes 
greatly to demonstrating that one can care for others while keeping one’s autonomy. If we accept 
this argument, we can conclude that caring theory does not conflict with the notion of autonomy, 
as some scholars have thought. 
However, Clement fails to articulate whether her notion of autonomy is compatible with 
the rational notion of autonomy, or whether her theory can provide a better model than those of 
Kant, Rawls, or the neoliberals for modern education. The major reason that this point is missed 
is because caring theorists, including Clement, overlook the differences and implications that 
Kant’s moral autonomy, Rawls’s political autonomy, and the neoliberals’ personal autonomy 
make to social and political practice. Neither Clement nor other caring theorists mention about 
these differences between the scholars they critique, let alone the different implications these 
three rational notions of autonomy may have for social and political activity  
 
The Different Meanings and Implications of Kant’s, Rawls’s, and the Neoliberals’ Theories 
of Autonomy 
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The difference between Kant’s moral autonomy, Rawls political autonomy, and the 
neoliberals’ personal autonomy can be briefly described as follows. Kant’s definition of 
autonomy (1785) consists of two levels and three major components. The two levels of 
autonomy are: (a) autonomy in the negative sense (or “basic autonomy”); and (b) autonomy in 
the positive sense (or “advanced autonomy”). The three major components are freedom (or free 
will) to choose or make a decision, universal law, and rationality. The difference between basic 
autonomy and advanced autonomy depends upon whether one’s choice or decision is in harmony 
with the universal law. In addition, free will is neither influenced by one’s own desire or impulse 
nor is it coerced by external factors, be they personal, legal, political, or whatever. If one’s 
choice is under the influence of personal inclination, impulse, or state law, this is a situation of 
“heteronomy.” The Kantian notions of autonomy, heteronomy, and the difference between basic 
autonomy and advanced autonomy can be explicated as follows: 
 Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of duties in keeping with  
them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only does not ground any obligation  
at all but is instead opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will.  
That is to say, the sole principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of  
the law (namely, from a desired object) and at the same time in the determination of  
choice through the mere form of giving universal law that a maxim must be capable of.  
That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, whereas this lawgiving of  
its own on the part of pure and, as such, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense.  
Thus moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure practical reason, that  
is, freedom and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they  
can accord with the supreme practical law. If, therefore, the matter of volition, which can  
nothing other than the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the  
practical law as a condition of its possibility, there results heteronomy of choice, namely  
dependence upon the natural law of following some impulse or inclination, and the will  
does not give itself the law but only the precept for rationally following pathological law  
(30). 
 
In this passage, we can see not only Kant’s definitions of autonomy as a whole, heteronomy, and 
the two kinds of autonomy, but also detect the key component that makes one autonomous, that 
is, “pure practical reason.” In other words, the factor that decides whether one’s choice or 
decision is based in autonomy or heteronomy is the pure practical reason that motivates one’s 
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free will to make a choice or decision. If one’s free will is moved by one’s inclination or desire, 
it is heteronomous. Conversely, if it is motivated by pure practical reason, (including rational 
thinking and universal law), it is autonomous. Thus, Kant makes it clear that “[t]he ideas of 
reason, freedom and autonomy are tightly connected” (16). 
Neither Rawls’s liberal political autonomy nor the neoliberals’ personal autonomy is 
identical to Kant’s moral autonomy. Superficially, both Rawls’s and the neoliberal’s autonomy 
are similar to different parts of Kant’s moral autonomy. That is, whereas Rawls’s autonomy 
focuses on the objective factor of political autonomy, the neoliberals’ personal autonomy pays 
attention to personal freedom of choice. Yet a close examination shows that by removing one of 
the core components, pure practical reason, from the equation of basic and advanced autonomy, 
The Rawlsian and neoliberal notions of autonomy lose the essence of Kant’s moral autonomy. 
The fact is that Kant’s theory requires an individual independent or transcendent from all kinds 
of influences, be they personal desires, state law, or anything else. It is simply constructed from 
pure practical reason—in other words, rational thinking based upon the universal law. Only 
when an individual can do so, can (s)he ensure political autonomy. Yet, Rawls’s political 
autonomy brackets personal values and beliefs, and replaces them with constitutional procedure. 
As such, Rawls’s political autonomy removes not merely personal belief, but also the moral, 
self-reflective foundation, which serves as a yardstick to keep political practice in check. 
Consequently, the foundation of Rawls’s political autonomy becomes unclear, with rules entirely 
defined and decided by those in power. The aforementioned criticisms made of Rawls’s theory 
by the caring theorists and Amartya Sen. That is, first, an individual’s rights are reduced to very 
little because the significant actors who have the ability to change the constitutional law under 
Rawls’s political autonomy are politicians in different parties, not free-acting individual. Second, 
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constitutional procedure cannot be warranted to be fair, because it is set up by the party in power, 
not other parties or underrepresented groups. Hence, the nature of Rawls’s political autonomy is 
different from that of Kant’s moral autonomy, which emphasizes the connection between 
freedom of choice, pure practical reason (rational thinking and universal law), and autonomy. 
The difference between Kant’s and Rawls’s notions of autonomy, in essence, is qualitative: 
Kant’s moral autonomy requires going beyond personal desires whereas Rawls’s political 
autonomy does not warrant this quality. 
In the same veil, neoliberal personal autonomy based upon personal freedom of choice is 
almost diametrically different from Kant’s moral autonomy. Kant’s moral autonomy emphasizes 
transcendence of one’s desires in harmony with the universal law. Personal autonomy, 
conversely, emphasizes following one’s wants and interests, without mentioning the universal 
law. The case in point can be illustrated by the neoliberal Hodgson’s (2005) claim that 
individuals are the best judges of their own economic interests and that these interests are most 
effectively accomplished though a market system involving private ownership (126). In this 
definition, the moral agent is not concerned with personal morality, public virtue, or 
government’s role, because in unison with Hodgson’s statement, Friedman maintains that 
“morality is […] an individual matter […] not the responsibility of one class (the present 
generation) to another class (the earlier generation)” (Friedman 1972, 39-40). 
Friedman’s statement is in the way of trying to set up a policy for “Social Security” (see 
below). His definition of personal autonomy not only expands an individual’s freedom to the 
greatest degree, but it also restrains the government’s right to fulfill its social and political 
responsibilities. This notion of autonomy implies that the government should abstain from 
intervention and does not engage with the power struggle between the rich and poor. The 
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neoliberals’ notion of autonomy and its implications is different from Kant’s moral autonomy, 
which emphasizes one’s free will, based upon rationality, and the use of pure practical reason to 
form the foundation of the universal law—a rule for social and political activity. As Allen Wood 
points out, for Kant, “the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to [the practical rule] 
as a condition” (Wood, 2002) 
If we compare the caring theorists’ views of autonomy to the above three rational notions 
of autonomy presented by Kant, Rawls, and the neoliberals, we can see that it falls between 
personal autonomy and Kant’s moral autonomy, but closer to Kant. This is because Kant’s moral 
autonomy consists of three components—freedom of choice, rational thinking, and universal 
law. Similarly, the caring theorists’ notions of autonomy include two noticeable components 
(personal choice and interconnected relationships between the self and sociopolitical factors) and 
one implicit factor (reflection or reflective thinking). Take Clement’s theory of autonomy as an 
example. Clement suggests that the individual’s concept of autonomy need to expand to include 
social factors, whereas the notion of the socially constituted self has to take into account the 
well-being of a carer. In this sense, the notion of autonomy consists of both an individual’s 
choices and interconnected social and political factors. Noddings, Tronto, and Hankivsky, 
although they do not make this view as explicit as Clement does, suggest that an individual needs 
to expand his or her identity-concept to include defining social and political factors. The 
individual will need to do this to make a choice from a caring perspective, to ensure that the 
choice is not harmful to the interconnected and interdependent society as a whole. Hence, it is 
reasonable to say that in most caring theorists’ view, the notion of autonomy needs to include 
both a moral agent’s choice and sociopolitical factors. Apart from these two components, a third 
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component, i.e. reflection or reflective thinking,
37
 is mentioned by Noddings (2002) and Meyers 
(1989).
38
 The most obvious utilization of this component is in Meyers (1989), who focuses 
exclusively on articulating how to develop autonomous capacity (or autonomous competency in 
Meyers’s term) in general and reflective thinking skills in particular. The component’s 
importance in Noddings’s (2002) works is less evident, but after criticizing the Kantian notion of 
autonomy and interrogating the definition of autonomy as “making a choice by oneself,” she 
concludes that the most important factor in being an autonomous person is perhaps reflection. 
If we use diagrams to represent the core elements of autonomy presented by Kant, Rawls, 
the neoliberals, and caring theorists, they may appear as follows: 
 Rawls Neoliberals              Kant     Caring theorists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Focus on  
political 
procedure 
Emphasizing  
freedom of  
personal choice 
Underscoring the  
connection between 
freedom of choice, 
rationality, and 
universal law 
       Personal choice 
       and sociopolitical           
         connection 
 
Constructing a More Inclusive Theory for Autonomy 
                                                 
37
 Originally, Noddings uses the word reflection, but I treat it as an exchangeable word of reflective thinking.  
 
38
 Diana Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (New York : Columbia University Press, 1989). 
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In the previous section, I mentioned that caring theorists’ criticisms of the notions of 
autonomy presented by Kant, Rawls, and the neoliberals can be justified, at least in three aspects. 
First, Kant’s abstract, transcendental, or moral autonomy is insufficient to represent empirical 
moral reality and beyond the reach of the ordinary majority. Second, although Rawls’s political 
autonomy replaces Kant’s universal law with an empirical political procedure of fairness, his 
universalization of constitutional procedure overlooks the differences between various social and 
political groups as well as between the rich and the poor. Third, the neoliberals’ personal 
autonomy, which aims to maximize personal freedom, fails to perceive that selfhood is not 
simply constituted and defined by oneself but also by social and political activity. However, 
caring theorists fail to see the differences between Kant’s moral autonomy, Rawls’s political 
autonomy, and the neoliberals’ personal autonomy. Accordingly, the caring theorists are not 
adequately able to see the different implications that these three rational notions of autonomy 
may have to social and political practice, and therefore, are unable to configure a more inclusive 
theory of autonomy that not only is compatible with that of rational moral philosophers but also 
transcends it. Hence, in this section, I will propose to construct a more inclusive and 
comprehensive theory of autonomy that does not merely embrace the good elements of both the 
rational and the caring theorists’ views of autonomy, but is founded as well on the three 
mentioned characteristics of human existence and the four major components of the integrated 
neocaring theory. 
I will utilize the three characteristics of the enhanced relational ontology/ foundation as 
my conceptual framework. The enhanced relational foundation is constituted by the caring 
theorists’ relational ontology, Merleau-Ponty’s (1965) theory of intersubjectivity, and 
Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising (see MKK). It consists of: (1) the fabric of 
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human life as a synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the private, and 
rationality and affectivity; (2) human life is an ongoing process of synthesizing and becoming, 
and (3) human agents and social and political activity, mutually defined and conditioned as well 
as interdependent upon each other. Specifically, in this section, I will focus on using the first 
characteristic, human life is a field of subjectivity and objectivity, to interrogate, analyze, and 
clarify the components that need to be included in  the neo-caring–based theory of autonomy 
with reference to the issues raised by the aforementioned theorists (both rational theorists and 
caring theorists). After this clarification, I will integrate and add the component that is still 
missing from the schema of caring theory mentioned above (caring nature, caring as an activity, 
and contextuality). The missing component is a caring mind of loving-kindness. 
The major reason to employ the three characteristics of the enhanced relational 
foundation as a conceptual framework to examine the theories of autonomy presented by Kant, 
Rawls, and the neoliberals is because the enhanced relational ontology is the foundational ground 
of human reality. It is also the ground on which integrated neocaring theory is formed. In other 
words, it is a fabric of horizontal and vertical linking threads that interweave and prevail in every 
part of human activity and life. These threads penetrate through the other three aspects of 
integrated neocaring theory—contextuality, caring as an activity, and caring nature. 
Contextuality is a substantial locator, which facilitates the use of neocaring theory to identify and 
concretize the conditions related to an agent and to social and political practice. Caring as an 
activity is the actualization or embodiment of a caring mind in an individual’s life and in social 
and political practice, whereas caring nature, in my terms, is a caring mind of loving-kindness, 
which is the heart of neocaring theory. I contend that it has to be nurtured in an agent’s life (in all 
our lives) if we really want to have a better quality of life or build a caring society. Whereas the 
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relational foundation is the backbone of neocaring theory, contextuality, caring as an activity, 
and caring nature are the flesh and blood. Together these four components actualize an integrated 
neocaring theory. In the following, I will use the first characteristic of the enhanced relational 
ontology to show the different components of the theory of autonomy that have to be embraced 
according to the integrated neocaring theory in contrast to those of rational moral philosophy and 
caring theory. 
 
Why Do We Need Both Subjectivity and Objectivity to Define a Theory of Autonomy? 
 
The first characteristic of human reality unveiled by the enhanced relational foundation is 
that the fabric of human existence is a synthesized field constituted by subjectivity and 
objectivity, the public and the private, and rationality and affectivity. If we use this characteristic 
to interrogate the four theories of autonomy (those configured by Kant, Rawls, the neoliberals, 
and caring theorists), only Kant’s and the caring theorists’ notions of autonomy include the 
components of subjectivity (or the private) and objectivity (the public; rationality and objectivity 
will be discussed later)
.
 Hence, a question that can be raised is why it is insufficient to construct 
a theory of autonomy through either objective factors or subjective experience alone? 
This question can be answered both philosophically and practically. Philosophically, it 
requires us to consider the nature of human life, or alternatively put, what constitutes the fabric 
of human existence and what components are at the core of selfhood or personhood. In concrete 
terms, can an individual’s life operate well without the participation of family, friends, 
education, and sociopolitical activity? Although the answer can be a yes, this cannot occur in 
modern democratic society. In fact, even in the Stone Age or in ancient agricultural societies, 
family, friends and other social, cultural, and environmental factors still played a significant role 
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in one’s life. If no family, society or political activity had existed in the Stone Age or ancient 
times, not only would the progress of civilization have been impossible, but human survival 
would also have been questionable, because no offspring would have been produced. Hence, it is 
unrealistic to say that one can live without other people or social and political activity. Therefore, 
defining the notion of autonomy simply based on personal freedom of choice, as in the neoliberal 
conception of personal autonomy, is incomplete and one-sided. Similarly, if we define a theory 
of autonomy as grounded on political procedure alone, as in Rawls’s theory, this approach is also 
incomplete and impractical, because without human agents, social and political activity is empty 
and meaningless. In fact, social and political activity cannot even exist without human agents. 
Using the one-sided theory of autonomy, whether personal autonomy or political 
autonomy, to characterize human life is analogous to using a black pen to draw scenery. It differs 
greatly from utilizing multiple colors, colors representing both subjectivity and objectivity, to 
paint it. The picture drawn by the black pen, no matter how detailed it is, cannot reveal as many 
qualities as multiple colors do, regardless of its validity and verisimilitude. The one-sided 
autonomous theory presented by Rawls and the neoliberals is like the one-color picture, which 
cannot catch and characterize the human reality to an adequate extent. Hence, it is necessary to 
include both subjectivity and objectivity in a theory of autonomy. 
In reality, the relation between subjectivity (human agents’ beliefs, knowledge, capacity, 
and experiences) and objectivity (social and political practice) is more closely tied than is usually 
thought, because they both are part of the intrinsic components of human life. That is, the fabric 
of human existence is constituted by both subjectivity and objectivity. This nature is clearly 
articulated in both Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s philosophies, as presented in the previous 
chapter. Briefly, according to Nāgārjuna, neither human life and human existence is constituted 
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by a single factor. Rather, they are constituted by time, space, subjectivity, and other 
corresponding elements. An individual’s agency is not formed solo, but is also nurtured by 
social, cultural, and educational factors. A child born and educated in America speaks English 
and receives an American-specific curriculum at the K-12 level, whereas a child born in Taiwan 
speaks and is educated in Chinese. These two examples show that the agency of a child is 
shaped, defined, and nurtured by the social, cultural, and political environment that (s)he was 
born into. It is impossible to discuss different behaviors and thinking without considering 
different cultures, educational experiences, and sociopolitical environments. Merleau-Ponty’s 
explanation of the way in which one’s physical orientation to a picture or object such as a table 
affects one’s perception of what it looks like also demonstrates that the external location of one’s 
body would intrinsically affect one’s vision of the world. Hence, in order to form a more 
complete and inclusive theory of autonomy embracing both subjective (an agent’s values, 
knowledge, capacity, and experiences) and objective (social and political) factors is prerequisite. 
Practically, in defining the theory of autonomy, we need to include both subjectivity and 
objectivity, because as the caring theorists’ previous criticisms have demonstrated, selfhood is 
not constituted by an individual alone rather, it is influenced and shaped by social, cultural, and 
political environments. Sen points out further that although Rawls suggests that one refrain from 
the free application of one’s personal beliefs and values to the construction of political 
autonomy, in practice, one’s understanding of (e.g.) law and policy is deeply affected by one’s 
experience. A white male politician born into the middle class possesses a very different view of 
the concept of freedom from an African American female born into poverty. This example shows 
a close relation between one’s subjective experience and objective social and political activity. 
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The Deficiency of Defining the Notion of Autonomy Through Non-Intervention in Personal 
Choice (Concentrating on Subjective Choice) 
 
 
Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize winner in economic sciences and a philosopher of 
economic ethics, has written several books and articles interrogating and criticizing both the 
Rawlsian and neoliberals’ notions of freedom with regard to political procedure and personal 
choice. Sen (1985)
39
 provides practical evidence that the notion of autonomy needs to include 
both subjective and objective factors. He says that the neoliberal definition of personal autonomy 
focuses on a very negative and narrow sense of freedom, because it emphasizes non-interference 
and self-decision regarding one’s own welfare. Non-interference, according to Sen, is a negative 
sense of freedom that does not allow a responsible adult to do what (s)he thinks is significant and 
meaningful in his/her life and the society as a whole. In addition, Sen notes that personal 
freedom of choice does not warrant that the result is actually the best for the choose, because the 
notion of “freedom to choose” involves several complex concepts. For instance, the goal of 
freedom consists of at least two kinds of freedom: “well-being freedom” and “agency freedom.” 
The former refers to “a person’s capability to have various functioning vectors and to enjoy the 
corresponding well-being achievements.” The latter indicates that an individual “is free to do and 
achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important” (203). Well-being 
freedom assumes that well-being is the only goal that an agent pursues, whereas agency freedom 
suggests that the agent’s freedom has to include not solely one’s own well-being but also one’s 
goals, objectives, allegiances, obligations, and concept of the good (ibid.). In this sense, well-
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 Amartya Sen, “Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,” The Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 4 
(1985):169-221. 
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being freedom captures only one choice among many. Yet, in neoliberal theory, human freedom 
is measured solely through the terms of well-being, especially economic well-being. 
Friedman and Hodgson’s “Social Security” policy mentioned above can illustrate Sen’s 
point.  The policy defines the significance of an individual’s existence and social relation to 
parents, friends, and fellow citizens purely in economic terms, because (the policy maintains) 
that a younger generation does not have responsibility for older generations; likewise, the upper 
socioeconomic class is not responsible for the middle or lower classes. Friedman and Hodgson 
propose that the younger generation and the rich need not be responsible for paying for Social 
Security through taxes, since Social Security is depended on by older citizens and those with 
fewer financial resources. 
However, human relations and social responsibility are not as simple and narrow as 
Friedman and Hodgson assume. If their assumption is right, then it is reasonable to say that the 
parents’ generation does not need to care for their children, and the taxes paid by the middle and 
lower classes should not be used to help the big corporations owned and controlled by the rich in 
economic recession when they are at the edge of bankruptcy; or, more fundamentally, no 
infrastructure such as the public school system or other public facilities should be open to the 
wealthy. If a society really operated in this way, its civilization and development would be at 
risk, because no one would care for others  or support the public infrastructure. On the other 
hand, if Friedman and Hodgson reject the theory that older or poorer groups have no 
responsibility for younger or richer groups, then one can ask why there are double standards for 
treating these different groups? Does this mean that their policy takes advantage of older and 
poorer people? This is by no means a justifiable policy, also, it reveals the unjustifiable logic of 
defining the meaning of human existence, social relationships, and public responsibility solely in 
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economic terms. I think that this is why Sen says that defining freedom of personal choice in 
merely economic or well-being terms is a negative and narrow way to conceptualize the notion 
of liberty and freedom (209). 
Another criticism of freedom of personal choice is that personal choice is not necessary 
in the individual’s best interests. The reason is that the action of choice involves an individual’s 
knowledge and capacity to exercise that choice. In Hodgson and Friedman’s conception, an 
individual is the best one to make decisions about his or her own Social Security. Yet in reality, 
this is not true. Rojhat B. Avsar (2008)
40
 explains that many older citizens do not understand the 
complex operation of the economic system, nor do they have enough knowledge to figure out the 
best plan for themselves. In addition, I would argue, as indicated by the above discussion, that 
personal choice is conditioned by social, economic, and political policy. Even if one works hard 
and wants to save money for his/her later life, the policy does not exempt him/her from paying 
taxes. In addition, a big corporation where the middle and lower classes work may at some point 
enter bankruptcy, when in consequence, those middle-class and poor people’s 401K savings 
tended by the corporation will be gone with little or no compensation. The famous Enron scandal 
of 2001 is a case in point.
41
 Hence, freedom of personal choice, though good in theory, cannot be 
carried out fully in practice unless personal capacity and knowledge as well as social, economic, 
and political policy are all designed to support it. Otherwise, the hidden factors mentioned above 
not only do not benefit the individual, but in fact hurt him or her deeply. Government 
administrators, on the other hand, are experts selected to take care of the public good. They 
should have the right to design a better policy for elder citizens under the supervision of the 
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public. In this context, limiting the goal of autonomy to personal interest and non-interference is 
a narrow and negative way to define autonomy. 
 
The Shortcomings of Defining Autonomy Through the Freedom of Procedure Alone (Focus 
Only on Objectivity) 
 
 
Another one-sided theory of autonomy criticized by Sen as narrow and negative is 
freedom of procedure control as presented by Rawls. Sen says that the means (or “power” in 
Sen’s term) to achieve freedom is not confined to constitutional procedure. Rather, legitimate 
ways to exercise freedom of choice include both an agent’s effective power of choice and lawful 
regulation to ensure these rights. The agent’s effective power refers to the fact that the agent “is 
free to achieve one outcome or another” and “his or her choices will be respected and the 
corresponding things will happen,” while lawful procedure indicates that the law protects the 
agent’s power of choice. The agent is actively “doing the choosing in the procedure of decision 
and execution” (208-209). In other words, freedom of procedure control indicates that one 
follows a procedure to make a choice that has already been set up by a state constitution. The 
agent’s effective power, on the other hand, means that an agent has the power to achieve 
whatever (s)he thinks is meaningful and significant. Rawls’s political autonomy is in favor of the 
procedure of control freedom. I am in agreement with Sen when he says that an agent’s effective 
power to exercise freedom of choice is more important than procedure control, because 
procedure control entails a negative sense of freedom that highlights that “one’s obligations 
should take the form of not interfering with other people’s control over spheres of their lives 
rather than the form of duties to help positively.” In particular, if procedure control is combined 
with a constraint-based approach of “do not interfere with other people’s control over some 
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specific business,” the adequacy of the freedom entailed is questionable, because it excludes 
other choices and restricts freedom to non-interference only (209). Hence, Rawls’s political 
autonomy is also a narrow, negative conceptualization of autonomy and freedom, because an 
agent does not have the freedom to decide the content of the choice. 
Through the above discussion and through attention to Sen’s criticisms and clarifications 
of the components involved in defining the theory of autonomy, such as freedom of choice, the 
goal of freedom of choice, and the method to achieve freedom of choice, it is clear that the 
notion of autonomy is not merely related to social and political policy but also to an individual’s 
value, knowledge, capacity, and power to exercise freedom of choice. In particular, the positive 
sense of freedom of choice always involves a human agent’s knowledge, capacity and power. In 
other words, it is the human agent rather than the political procedure alone that lets real 
autonomy flourish. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that given Sen’s criticisms and 
clarifications of freedom of choice and the observations of Merleau-Ponty and Nāgārjuna, a more 
complete way to define the notion of autonomy has to include a subjective component (the 
human agent) and objective social and political factors. Specifically, the human agent’s 
knowledge, capacity and power play a key role in determining whether freedom of choice is 
defined in a positive or negative sense. 
 
Combining the Three Key Components of Kant’s Moral Autonomy with the Three Core 
Factors of the Caring Theorists’ Notion of Autonomy 
 
The above discussion shows that neither Rawls’s political autonomy, which is based 
upon the objective factor of political procedure, nor the neoliberals’ personal autonomy of 
subjective choice is capable of providing a complete theory of autonomy. This finding leads us to 
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ask another question—what about the Kantian and the caring theorists’ concepts of autonomy, 
which consist of both subjectivity and objectivity? Which theory is most appropriate for modern 
education? 
In light of the above discussion and Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s philosophies, 
which underscore the point that the fabric of human life is a synthesized field of subjectivity and 
objectivity as well as affectivity and rationality, I propose that we should include both rather than 
choose only one of these. The fact is that in human life we sometimes need to think rationally in 
order to solve a sophisticated social and political problem, whereas another time, rational 
thinking alone may not be sufficient to tackle a social or educational issue such as how to nurture 
a child to become a prosocial and well-balanced adult who is not merely intelligent but also has 
the empathetic capacity to understand and communicate effectively with other people. If we take 
a close look and ponder through the elements in the caring theorists’ and Kant’s notions of 
autonomy, we can combine them into a more comprehensive and inclusive theory of autonomy, 
because they cover different areas of significance for an individual to be autonomous. 
Inspired by Kant’s moral autonomy, which forms a connection between personal choice, 
rationality, and universal law, I ponder the three components (personal choice, reflection and 
interconnection between individuals, and sociopolitical activity) suggested by different caring 
theorists, such as Noddings, Tronto and Clement, and the relationships between these 
components. I propose to combine the three components put forward by the caring theorists to 
form a more complete theory of autonomy, and then use these three components as a conceptual 
framework to integrate the good parts of the Kant’s, Rawlsian and neoliberals’ theories of 
autonomy. After integrating these good components, I will examine the theory of autonomy that 
results using the four components of the integrated neocaringtheory: relational ontology, caring 
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as an activity, contextuality, and a caring nature. I will then add the missing, implicit component: 
a caring mind of loving-kindness. Hence, four components will be included in my theory of 
autonomy. 
The reason that I have adopted the three components of autonomy presented by caring 
theorists instead of those presented by Kant relates to the evolution of human perception of 
reality and the three characteristics of human existence in neocaring theory. The evolving trend 
in question moves from abstraction and universal principles to empirical and personal practice. 
The fact is that from the previous discussion of the three rational notions of autonomy and caring 
theorists’ criticisms, we can detect at least two evolving features: first, the core element of 
autonomy moves from the abstract, transcendental, and universal toward social and political 
policy, as well as personal freedom in social and political context; second, Kant’s definition of 
autonomy involves subjectivity and objectivity, while subjectivity is separated from objectivity 
in Rawls’s political autonomy (objective political procedure) and the neoliberals’ personal 
autonomy (subjective personal freedom). In caring theory, the combination of subjectivity and 
objectivity re-emerges, because caring theorists’ concept of autonomy requires personal choice 
and the interdependent relation between an individual and sociopolitical practice to be taken into 
account. 
The first point shows that modern theories of autonomy require attention to both 
empirical reality and individual freedom. The second reveals that both subjectivity and 
objectivity are necessary to define the concept of autonomy. I have discussed the second issue 
above;  From the perspective of the first point, the caring theorists’ construction of autonomy 
does better than the Kantian and the other views, because its major tenets focus on calling 
attention to empirical social and political lives as well as the individual’s needs and wants. 
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Actually, this is the major reason for them to criticize the Kantian and Rawlsian notions of 
autonomy, which use abstraction and universalization to flesh out the concept. Thus, caring 
theory becomes more capable to face and tackle the challenges of the modern world and liberal 
democratic society. Yet, there are also some good elements of the Kantian and Rawlsian notions 
of autonomy that we can adopt to enhance the caring theorists’ view. In what follows, I will use 
Kantian moral autonomy as an example, integrating its good components into an integrated 
neocaring theory of autonomy. 
The three components included in Kant’s and the caring theorists’ notions of autonomy, 
though different, are not incompatible; in fact, they share several broadly similar points. First, 
Kant’s freedom to choose and the caring theorists’ personal choice both emphasize the 
individual’s right to choice. Yet, whilst Kant underlines the freedom of choice made by one’s 
rational free will, the caring theorists highlight the choice of personal needs and wants. Kant’s 
claim of freedom to choose connotes a normative tone, which requires lawful protection. In 
particular, when freedom of choice is defined in a positive sense, it is expected to be in 
accordance with universal law. That is, it is capable of acting as social and political law. 
Presumably, this is the reason Rawls uses constitutional law to replace and concretize Kant’s 
universal law. Hence, Kant’s freedom of choice and Rawls’s political autonomy remind us that a 
normative freedom is important to personal freedom. 
The caring theorists’ notion of personal needs and wants, on the other hand, encompasses 
many things, such as personal values, knowledge, capacity, interests, and material substance. In a 
sense, it emphasizes the agent’s effective power of freedom, as Sen mentioned previously. 
Personal needs and wants may not necessarily have a lawful claim, but needs like that for basic 
material goods for survival, or the opportunity to develop one’s capacity and knowledge in order 
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to live with basic dignity, are legitimate moral needs that deserve policy-makers’ attention. 
Hence, I agree with Sen, Dr ze, and Smith42, all of whom suggest the expansion of the concept 
of freedom of choice to include human capacity, political freedom of choice, and economic 
choices. Both Sen and Dr ze suggest that we should expand basic freedoms to include “the 
ability to live long, read and write, to escape preventable illnesses, to work outside the family 
irrespective of gender, and to participate in collaborative as well as adversarial politics,” because 
this capacity not only affects “the quality of life that the people can enjoy, but also effect[s] the 
real opportunities they have to participate in economic expansion.” Smith also suggests that the 
concept of freedoms needs to encompass both political and economic freedoms. Political 
freedoms here mean the opportunity for people to decide who should govern and on what 
principles, and also “include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have 
freedom of political expression and an uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom to choose between 
different political parties, and so on.” They also include “opportunities of political dialogue, 
dissent and critique as well as voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and 
executives” (Smith, ibid.) The concept of “economic freedoms” here indicates that an individual 
has the right “to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or 
exchange”(ibid.). Apart from these factors, I suggest that the law needs to attend to the 
distribution of resources in a society, which ensures individual accessibility to basic financial 
needs in the face of the corporate free market, which maximizes competition and free trade 
achieved “through economic de-regulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and 
social policies favorable to business and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural 
                                                 
42
 Justin Smith, “Civic Capabilities.”  Public sphere Project, accessed December, 2011,  
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decimation, long term resource depletion and environmental destruction” (Brown 2010, 2). This 
is the normative right of freedom, which constitutes one of the core elements of autonomy. This 
enhancement of economic access and development of capacity and knowledge means that there 
should be room for the individual to express personal needs and wants, and pursue them if the 
individual can find resources to do so not at the public expense. In other words, personal needs 
and wants would have political and psychological support from constitutional law. Yet, financial 
support is dependent on to what extent personal needs and wants, including corporate needs and 
wants, are related to the public good and to underserved people. The higher the relevance of the 
connection is, the higher opportunity to obtain the financial support. 
In other words, the first components of Kant’s freedom of choice and caring theorists’ 
personal choice of needs and wants show that we need to expand the meaning of freedom of 
choice to include political freedom, personal capacity development, and economic access. 
Political freedom allows a responsible individual to do and speak whatever (s)he thinks 
meaningful and significant to his/her life; further, however, it needs to address the basic financial 
needs of all citizens and secure their capacity to live a good life. If there is a conflict between a 
big corporation’s freedom to pursue excessive wants and the majority’s daily material needs, the 
principle of political freedom should place majority necessity over corporate needs. 
I suggest this on the basis of Sen’s On Ethics and Economics (1987), which shows that 
the maximization of a nation’s or a corporation’s long-term financial plan must focus on the 
public benefit as well as profits, since ignoring the public good will inevitable backfire. I think 
that the current global economic crisis can illustrate Sen’s view. The recession shows the 
deficiency of the neoliberal view, which concentrates exclusively on the free market without 
considering the establishment of a solid foundation for human, social, and cultural development. 
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As Wendy Brown (2005) demonstrates, neoliberal economics is indifferent to poverty and leads 
to the decimation of culture, the deracination of people from their society, and neglect of the 
destruction of the environment. Consequently, it leaves no resources of any kind for society’s 
future development, and may also result in social and political upheaval that aims to overturn 
oppressive institutions, as the recent Occupy Wall Street protest demonstrates. Moreover, as I 
have argued, the significance of human life and social relationships cannot be reduced to that of 
a “social capital.” This is because although human agents are conditioned by their social and 
political environment, they also possess the power to shape and define social, political, and 
economic practice. Unfortunately, the interdependent nature of and mutual influence between 
economic development and human agents are overlooked by the neoliberals, because their role 
and ideology is to advocate from the economic perspective alone, neglecting human capacity and 
social and cultural capital. If the concept of freedom of choice is enhanced to encompass political 
freedom, capacity development, and people’s basic access to economic facilities, then care for 
the majority’s well-being should come first, before the benefit of a few big corporations. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the caring theorists’ notion of personal choice 
of needs and wants needs from a moral perspective to be enhanced to include political freedom 
of choice, basic financial accessibility, and the development of human capacity. Alternatively 
put, autonomy should consist of two levels of freedom: personal freedom of choice and political 
freedom. Personal freedom allows an individual to speak and do whatever (s)he thinks is 
meaningful and useful to his or her life and to society as a whole without causing any harm to 
him or herself or to others. Political freedom, on the other hand, protects the legal rights of 
personal freedom, political freedom as conceived by Sen and Smith, basic accessibility to 
financial resources, and the development of human capacity. Thus, I rename the first component 
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of my theory of autonomy to “an agent’s effective power of personal and political freedom.” 
“Effective power” means that freedom here is defined in a positive sense, and since it is not 
limited to making choices, I use “freedom” instead of  “choice.” 
Second, on the issue of Kant’s rational thinking vis-à-vis the caring theorists’ reflective 
thinking: Kant does not specify the exact meaning of rational thinking, and sometimes the term is 
used as a synonym for rationality or reason. The term can be interpreted conceptually if not 
grammatically as either a “verb” or a “noun”. The former denotes the process of reasoning 
according to the maxim, “[a]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it becomes a universal law” (xviii). The latter is the pure practical reason, the 
maxim itself. In Kant’s view, rational thinking is an intrinsic component of human nature. 
Human goodwill or human dignity, in fact, are rooted in natural processes of rational thinking to 
formulate a moral judgment by following either duty or a maxim. 
Yet, this way of defining rationality is too vague. Later scholars apply mathematical logic 
to replace the Kantian maxim. Alfred Ayer (1952 [1936])
43
 is a leading figures in applying logic 
to ethical judgment. Nowadays, training students to think logically has become the major way to 
develop their rational thinking. However, Wittgenstein(1958),
44
 William James (1971 [1909]),
45
 
and Noddings (1982) all criticize as deficient the use of logical reasoning to tackle moral issues 
or characterize human reality. 
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 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,  trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, ( NJ: Preatice hall, 1958). 
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Let take Noddings’ criticism as an example. Noddings’ (1982) critique of the moral 
reasoning model by the purely logical reasoning model or mathematical reasoning logic focuses 
on three problems:  
Noddings’ critique of the mathematical moral reasoning model focuses on three 
problems: (1) The mathematical moral reasoning model uses only normative symbols to interpret 
its proposition and ignores psychological terms and descriptions of moral experiences that are 
closely associated with daily life, ethical feelings, and practices. (2) The mathematical moral 
reasoning model concentrates on making its moral reasoning argument fit into the logical 
reasoning formula rather than accounting for the human factor and living occurrences of ethical 
reality. (3) The mathematical moral reasoning model prioritizes the mathematical reasoning rule 
as the highest and universal law by which to select, organize, and represent all kinds of human 
activities, but ignores the diversity of moral experiences in relation to the human condition. 
Consequently, Noddings opines that that the mathematical moral reasoning model is insufficient 
and not inclusive enough to articulate ethical philosophy fully. 
Both Wittgenstein’s (1958) and Nelson Goodman’s (1968)46  philosophy of language 
support Noddings’ critique because they reveal that the meaning or reality-reference of a word is 
multiple and contextualized. Sometimes words can be interpreted as a normative symbol whereas 
other times they are the descriptions of human experiences and feelings. Both normative and 
descriptive symbols are equally qualified to define human activity and living experiences with 
regard to ethical life. For example, the word “mouse” can indicate an animal or metaphorically 
refer to the timid character of a man. In light of this view, mathematical reasoning model that 
claims only a normative term is acceptable to define ethics and construct moral philosophy, such 
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 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: an Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis : Hackett, 1976). 
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as the model presented by Ayer, is too narrow and too limited to construct a complete ethical 
philosophy. 
Second, according to Wittgenstein and Goodman, the mathematical reasoning model 
carries different linguistic property and reality-references from daily language used in living 
ethical practices. Mathematical or pure logical reasoning model accepts a single, fixed rule to 
govern everything, and contends that the meaning of any given X and X’ is clear-cut, e.g., 3 is 
distinct from 4. Yet, this is not the cases of everyday speech used in human empirical ethical life. 
Both Wittgenstein and Goodman discover that multiple ways and various notational systems 
have been used in daily language to select, organize and arrange social reality and human life, 
such as the way to compose a musical score is different from the way to draw a picture or write a 
poem. Using normative meaning alone to define and conceptualize human moral reality, as Ayer 
suggests, clearly overlooks the complexity of human reality and moral life. This is similar to use 
an electrocardiogram to represent a picture. The representation undoubtedly reduces all the 
different properties and qualities of the picture. Only the black and white syntactical or semantic 
diagrammatic lines are seen; no color other than black and white, nor are any detailed syntactical 
and semantic shapes, sizes, and subtle differences of multiple colors in the picture disclosed. 
Likewise, the moral reasoning model which uses mathematical reasoning formula alone to 
present ethical philosophy reduces both the quality and quantity of human ethical life to the 
extent that it only reveals a small portion of moral reality. 
Third, logical reasoning formula assumes that logic is the highest principle, which can 
govern all the humanity. By imposing one single, fixed rule (i.e., principle of logic) to order, 
organize and categorize our ethical activities, the mathematical moral reasoning model fails to 
see and tackle the real problem of ethical practices. The case can be illustrated by using logical 
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proposition “this is true/false.” to interpret the phrase “this is how things are.” If the phrase “this 
is how things are” is read in relation to its context, it means things have different ways of being 
the ways they are. Yet, when the pure logical reasoning imposes the statement “this is true/false” 
to interpret it, this phrase becomes that there is only one “correct” way to do things, that is, the 
way justified by mathematical reasoning logic. Imposing the mathematical reasoning rule as the 
universal law to present all kinds of human reality is similar to say that in a chess game only the 
king’s movement is right and, hence, every other chess piece, whether queen or pawn or the like, 
must follow the way the king moves. The imposition of mathematical reasoning rule alone to 
interpret and formulate ethical/moral philosophy can also cause such a false view in our daily 
understanding of ethical practice, namely, only a logically acceptable rule is the “correct” rule to 
define, judge and guide ethical behaviors. Any rule other than a logically acceptable one is not a 
right way; for example, a rule to love your neighbor even if (s)he is unfriendly to you is wrong 
because it is illogical. 
The caring theorists’ concept of reflective thinking or reflection, on the other hand, can 
avoid the inadequacies of following logical reasoning alone to justify a moral issue. I define 
reflective thinking as the process of reasoning that a moral agent goes through in relation to a 
particular situation in which (s)he thinks contextually about connected and interconnected points 
including (but not limited to) personal relationships, sociopolitical factors, and so on. For 
instance, Noddings says, if a child wants to watch a violent movie, his or her parents can watch 
and then discuss the film with him or her. The discussion, Noddings says, does not need to be a 
moral lecture, but should rather focus on asking open-ended questions or letting the child see that 
different perspectives exist. By creating this situation, the parents have allowed the child to exert 
his or her freedom of choice but also get a chance to reflect on the movie and grow. 
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Meyers also provides an example to illustrate her view of reflective thinking. She says 
that an autonomous person needs to possess autonomy competency (or reflective thinking), 
which is “the repertory of coordinated skills that makes self-discovery, self-definition, and self-
direction possible.” The repertory of coordinated skills is an individual’s capacity to ask and 
answer such questions—“[w]hat do I really want, need, care about, believe, value, etcetera?” 
47
Further, the individual can act on the answer and correct themselves when they get the answer 
wrong (Meyers 1989, 77). Meyers uses the desire of one of her interviewees, “Ellen,” to become 
a surgical nurse as an example to illustrate the concept of autonomy competency. Ellen has 
decided to become a nurse and enrolled in a medical school. Yet she found that she was more 
squeamish about gore than the other students. In order to fulfill her goal, Ellen therefore needs to 
reflect on her own weakness and choose either to overcome it or change her career. In this sense, 
Ellen is conceived as possessing autonomous competence. Similarly, the girl interviewed by 
Gillian was also trying to decide whether to have an abortion and striving to take all related 
factors, such as personal relationships, financial situation, moral beliefs, and so on, into account. 
This is also a method of reflection. The shared factor between these three examples is that the 
child, the student nurse, and the pregnant girl think through the related factors before making a 
choice. 
My theory of reflective thinking is intended to build on the groundwork of Noddings’s, 
Meyers’s and Gilligan’s theories to include not just thinking about conditions in which one has a 
direct interest, but also the interconnection and interdependent nature of one’s self and one’s 
sociopolitical environment, and the three characteristics of the enhanced relational foundation. In 
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addition, I argue that collective, constructive reflection is important to help an individual to 
clarify an issue, as long as it does not coerce the individual to follow an outside suggestion. In 
other words, reflective thinking does not include one’s own thinking alone, but may and should 
also include the participation of other people, who can be family members, friends, teachers, or 
professional experts, dependent upon the nature of the issue. 
Analyzing and thinking through an issue in relation to its corresponding factors differs 
greatly from reasoning a case using the formulas of mathematic logic. This is particularly true if 
we treat the logical reasoning principle as the highest rule governing all realities and use it to 
make moral judgments. The deficiency of using logical reasoning as the highest principle by 
which to make moral judgments can be illustrated by the following discussion. 
Next, we consider Kant’s universal law vis-à-vis the caring theorists’ idea of 
interconnected relationships and interdependent natures: Kant himself does not explicitly provide 
a clear definition of universal law, which he sometimes calls pure reason but in moral philosophy 
names “pure practical reason.” This pure practical reason is equivalent to the maxim or 
injunction to “[a]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it becomes a universal law” (xviii). This maxim is practical because in Kant’s view, 
humans are a rational beings with dignity. Hence, we can assume a base of human goodwill; in 
other words, people will follow the maxim or principle to act in accordance with the universal 
law. Kant’s assumption of a positive human nature, though morally good, is too vague, and 
overlooks the powerful influence of social and political environment. Hence, later rational 
philosophers, such as Rawls and Ayer, bring in concrete content to interpret the universal law of 
pure reason. In Rawls’s theory of political autonomy, he conceives that Kant’s pure reason is 
similar to constitutional law, which requires a politician to bracket his/her original position, (i.e., 
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his/her personal bias) and focuses on establishing fair procedure. For Rawls, since the fair 
procedure is preserved from the encroachment of personal interests, it is identical to Kant’s pure 
reason, which is free from personal desire. 
Ayer, on the other hand, uses mathematical logic to interpret Kant’s pure reason, because 
similar to pure reason, mathematical logic only concentrates on the logical relationship between 
different objects, not the empirical social and political conditions of the objects. Ayer believes 
that reasoning in such a way, an individual’s thought will be purified from personal interests. 
However, both Ayer’s and Rawls’s views have received a lot of criticism. The major deficiencies 
of these two views, which apply to both, are at least twofold. First, they separate subjectivity 
from objectivity, and assume that the constitutional procedure or logical reasoning is like a 
mechanical rule, which would work as the rule prescribes regardless of who applies it—when in 
reality, of course human agents are fallible. Second, the emphasis on using abstraction and 
universalization to characterize human reality not only is insufficient to fully represent it, but 
also may muddle the knowledge and verification of ethical practice. Accordingly, it may cause 
problems, both epistemologically and practically. 
    Epistemologically, the single, fixed rule employed in mathematical/pure logical reasoning 
model confines students’ views only to a very narrow kind, i.e. the logical consistency and a 
clear-cut normative true or false judgment. As such, each student’s worldview is developed in a 
very narrow way, which does not have the capacity and flexibility to accept the complexity, 
diversity and plurality of social realities and human empirical conditions. In a society that 
emphasizes liberal democracy, multi-cultures and globalization as the inevitable trend, people’s 
lives are diversified. We need to adopt an ethical philosophy that is both more inclusive and 
flexible than the model constructed by the mathematical reasoning to articulate the human ethical 
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life. Both Wittgenstein and Goodman say that words, sentences and language-game of defining, 
labeling, naming, description, depiction and the like, are linguistic instruments or verbal 
notational systems employed to describe, categorize, organize, judge and represent human reality 
and experiences. Different ways of naming, defining, ordering, categorizing, judging and so 
forth, will construct different worldviews. Hence, reflective thinking which teaches students to 
ponder an issue in relation to a particular problem contextually is a better way to prepare students 
to live in a diversified world, and face different kinds of challenges. 
Empirically, if the view of logical reasoning goes too far, it will result not merely in anti-
human nature but also in de-humanization. For this mathematical reasoning model is extracted 
out of a particular context. As Kant indicates, the pure logical reasoning is a pure speculation 
isolated from a particular temporal, spatial and physical condition. Specifically, the purely moral 
reasoning formula based on the rule of mathematical reasoning is different from human 
empirical life, and the diverse, relational social network of human reality. Originally, the goal of 
such pure logical reasoning aims to help human being to think and see things beyond the 
confinement of a particular event or daily empirical life. However, its application goes so far, as 
Wittgenstein points out, that it becomes the only exclusive rule to select, organize, arrange and 
determine the complex reality of human existence. As such, the mathematical reasoning is 
believed to be the exclusive rule that can direct and justify human ethical life. The paradoxical 
problem of this belief is that it is a rule taken out of the conditions of temporality, spaciality and 
physicality. Yet, being a human, our existence by its very nature is conditioned by temporality, 
spaciality, and physicality, because we have a particular body, mind-set and social relational 
network. Applying a formula without temporality, spaciality and physicality to order, arrange, 
organize and represent a human’s life is equivalent to treating a human being as a being who 
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lives in a society where there are no other human beings around and whose life has no physical 
contact with and no sensible feeling toward his/her environing world and fellow beings. This 
obviously is not the case of human life. When we walk out of an apartment, we need to go 
through a door in order not to bump into a wall physically and thus suffer from physical pain. 
Also, when we encounter a happy, smiling face, we feel more pleasant compared to meeting an 
angry face. These cases show that the temporality, spaciality and physicality are all essential 
factual components of human life. One cannot live without these components. Although finding 
a way to transcend the limitation of particularity and empirical confinement provisionally is a 
noble goal everyone may think to fulfill, we should not entirely ignore these constitutive 
components and apply a rule to design a life that does not exist in the human realm. In particular, 
the modern education has to adopt a moral theory which is more capable of nourishing and 
educating our citizens to face the complex social reality in which the diverse cultures, pluralistic 
racial, sexual and other social realities as well as globalized factors of human reality, all come 
together in the same space and at the same period of time. 
After comparing and examining the meanings of the three key components of Kant’s 
vision of moral autonomy and those of the caring theorists, I here propose three tasks for 
constructing a neocaring theory of autonomy. The first is combining the three components of 
autonomy mentioned by Noddings, Meyers, Clement, and other caring theorists to form a 
comprehensive conceptual framework for the theory of autonomy. The three components are 
personal choice, reflective thinking and interconnection between individuals, and sociopolitical 
activity. The next task is using this conceptual framework to integrate Kant’s three components 
of autonomy (freedom of choice, rational thinking, and universal law). This would be done by 
first expanding the scale of freedom of choice to include both personal and political freedom, the 
162 
 
latter including not just the political structures that protect personal right of choice but also the 
political freedom, the right to capacity, including the capacity for reflective thinking and 
contextualizing a particular issue in relation to social and political factors, and the right to access 
to basic material utilities. To put this in a different way, constitutional law should not only 
protect a citizen’s political rights of freedom to speak and act responsibly but also ensure that the 
goal of freedom is not merely defined in economic terms, as by neoliberalism. At this point, I 
rename the first factor to “an agent’s effective power of personal and political freedom.”  
For its part, reflective thinking should also embrace logical reasoning to contextualize 
issues in relation to other corresponding factors, such as in the case of Ellen’s choice of career, 
where she needs to ponder whether her fear of blood can be overcome. Finally, the universal law 
should not be fixed and without grounding in any empirical reality, which is a problem with 
logical reasoning. Rather, it should be founded on an enhanced relational ontology that uses not 
only the focus on interconnection and interdependence nature to contextualize an issue with 
respect to its social, political and other empirical conditions, but also embraces the three 
elements of human existence as presented by Merleau-Ponty and Nāgārjuna. 
Hence, my theory of autonomy consists of three primary components: an agent’s 
effective power of personal and political freedom, reflective thinking, and the three elements of 
human existence. We see that these do not match the four components of the integrated 
neocaring theory— relational ontology, contextuality, caring as an activity, and a caring nature, 
Contextual thinking can be achieved by an autonomous agent engaging in reflective thinking 
with an awareness of interdependence, as discussed above. Yet the components of a caring 
nature and caring as an activity are still missing. 
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Hence, I propose to add one more component to my theory of autonomy, that is, a caring 
mind of loving-kindness. I use this term rather than “a caring nature,” as in Noddings, in order to 
avoid two sorts of confusion. The first is that traditionally, scholars, including educators and 
philosophers, have tended to believe that human nature is either rational or caring, not both. For 
instance, whereas Kant and Rawls assume that human nature is rational, Noddings and Held hold 
that human nature is caring. However, many empirical studies show that human nature 
incorporates both rational and empathetic elements, and can be influenced and shaped by social 
and educational environment to become pro- or anti-social
.
 Kohlberg’s work on moral 
development is a case in point. Hence, I deliberately choose the term to emphasize that a caring 
mind of loving-kindness needs to be nurtured by parents’ love and a caring social and 
educational environment. It is not an in-born feature that an individual naturally possesses. By 
taking this approach, I want to avoid the error that both rational philosophy and caring theory 
often commit when discussing moral issues, that is, they take either a rational or caring mind for 
granted without considering how to nurture and cultivate it. 
The second confusion that I intend to avoid involves the meaning of the term “caring”. In 
my view, “caring” indicates a caring mind based upon loving-kindness, or the will to respond to, 
attend to, and care for others as well as engage in social and political activities. It shares the basic 
meaning of Noddings’s vision of care, encompassing responsiveness, relatedness, and 
responsibility. Yet the caring mind is grounded upon loving-kindness rather than any kind of 
emotion. Hence, my theory of autonomy consists of four components:  an agent’s effective 
power of personal and political freedom, reflective thinking, interconnection and 
interdependence, and a caring mind. 
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One may ask why the theory of autonomy needs to encompass a caring mind? After all, 
autonomy is a personal matter, not a public affair. I add this component, not only because the 
fabric of human reality is a synthesized field of affectivity and rationality, but also because if we 
really care about our quality of life and establishing a caring society, a caring and kind heart is a 
prerequisite component that our citizens will have to cultivate. On this issue and the differences 
that neocaring theory of autonomy will make compared to rational moral philosophy will be 
discussed further in next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
CONCLUSION—DIFFERENCES, RECAP, CONTRIBUTION, AND FUTURE 
STUDY 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the way to form a theory of autonomy based on the 
unified neocaring theory and Kant’s moral autonomy. I used the three characteristics of the 
enhanced relational ontology (or relational foundation) evident in human existence as presented 
by Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s philosophies as a conceptual framework to advance my 
discussion. Using the first characteristic, the concept that the fabric of human existence is a 
synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, the private and the public, as well as affectivity 
and rationality, my thesis proposes a new theory of autonomy with four major components. They 
are: effective power of personal and political freedom, reflective thinking, relational ontology 
and a caring mind of lovingkindness.   
In this chapter, I will conclude my thesis by showing the differences that my theory of 
autonomy will make, compared to that of Kant with respect to the problems emerging from the 
modern information technologies age (or digital age). I will also demonstrate the difference th 
neocaring theory of autonomy will make compared to that of neoliberalism regarding 
administrating higher education. First, I will use the other two characteristics of human 
existence: life is an ongoing process of synthesizing and becoming, and that human agent and 
sociopolitical activity are mutually conditioned and interdependent on each other, as the 
conceptual frameworks to discuss these two issues. Then, I will summarize the gist of my thesis. 
Lastly, I will briefly articulate the contributions of my thesis, and my future plan of study. 
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Human life is an Ongoing Process of Synthesizing and Becoming 
The second characteristic of human existence is that human life is an ongoing process of 
synthesizing and becoming. This means that an individual is moving forward as (s)he ages. 
Similarly, the society we inhabit is forever changing. Accordingly, we will face different 
challenges in different phases of life. Nowadays the most noticeable challenge comes from the 
utilization of information technologies, including computers, cell phones, and other digital 
devices. Kate Williams and Abdul Alkalimat’s48 research shows that in 1993, the percentage of 
students between ages 3-18 using computers at school was only 60.6%, but in 1997, it increased 
to 70.8%. Now almost every student uses computers at home or school or both.  
As sociology professor Manuel Castells (1999) notices, the material foundations of 
human life, time, and space are altered by information technologies.
49
 These changes mentioned 
by Castells can be detected in our daily life. For instance, very few people now still use 
traditional mail to send a letter to a friend. Instead, they use email, which is faster and cheaper. 
Also, people do not just go to the mall to buy clothes and other things. They do online shopping. 
For our research, we use more and more electronic resources, such as e-books, e-journals, online 
databases and so forth. People even make friends through chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter, 
MySpace and other online social networks. The far reaching influence of information 
technologies is, as Williams and Alkalimat point out, that now if one can’t send an email or 
browse the web, (s)he is like “the person in the age of print who had to sign their name with an 
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information created by digital technology (such as computer, or electronic database and repertoire), not only can 
shape and define the development of an individual’s life and career, but also affect the creation and distribution of 
resources.  
167 
 
X.” 50  Moreover, a lot of new terminology has created thanks to the popularity of using 
information technologies in our daily life. This terminology consists of words like “cyberspace,” 
“cyberpower,” “cyberbully,” “cyber-cafe,” “e-school,” “e-learning,” “e-banking” and more. We 
even have a new word for citizens who go online frequently, that is, “netizens”.  
 Sending email, shopping online, and making friends through Facebook not only save 
time, but also take place in a new space that goes beyond geographical boundaries, and spans 
across nations and the globe. This space is either called “cyberspace” or “space of flows” 
(Castells’ term).  “Cyberspace" indicates “the global network of interdependent information 
technology infrastructures, telecommunications networks and computer processing systems.”51 It 
is called space because it provides a place for individuals “to interact, exchange ideas, share 
information, provide social support, conduct business, direct actions, create artistic media, play 
games, engage in political discussion, and so on”(ibid.).  With the emergence of cyberspace, a 
new form of power named cyberpower is born. Cyberpower, according to Williams and 
Alkalimat,
52
 is similar to e-commerce, which indicates what businesses, coders and consumers 
are doing online, and the way in which many more people are directed to go online to shop or do 
business. Accordingly, “millions are now buying and selling online, with the goods delivered in 
the real world” (ibid.). Williams and Alkalimat say that the online power that directs and 
mobilizes us to shop online is called cyberpower, which is analogous to e-commerce, because 
“when we wield cyberpower, the ‘goods,’ i.e., ‘powers’, are delivered in the real world, in a 
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 See Kate Williams, Alkalmat and Abdul Alkalimat, “Cyberpower.” Public Sphere Project, accessed November 
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cycle from actual to virtual to actual” (ibid.). This shows that although cyberspace is a virtual 
space, it has the power to move people to act, to do business, express political opinion, build 
social networks and so forth. Consequently, many new social and political problems appear, such 
as the digital divide, computer illiteracy and so on; and particularly, freedom of autonomous 
expression on the Internet.       
 As Castells (1999, 364) observes, the emergence of the space of flows (cyberspace is one 
of the elements) give more spaces, tools and powers to an individual and people in general for 
autonomous expression.
53
 This autonomous expression can be seen in five dimensions. First, 
people use the net for personal interaction via electronic mail, joining chat groups, participating 
in multidimensional communication, delivering cultural expressions of all kinds, or building 
their own websites. Second, people go online for purposive and horizontal communication, 
which is not just for the casual expression of personal feelings and communication as the first 
expression. Rather, this communication occurs “among people and across countries, and 
establishes information systems.” This type of expression also includes gossiping and spreading 
irresponsible information. Third, people bring together their resources to live and to survive. 
Castells says that the senior net in the United States does not merely gather information (e.g., 
medical information to counter the monopoly of medical information by doctors) and resources 
for senior citizens, it also develops ties between seniors, and reinforces a group to which all of us 
belong or will belong. Fourth, people use the net to rally social movements.  Occupy Wall Street 
                                                 
53
 The space of flows is defined as the material arrangements which “allow for simultaneity of social practices 
without territorial contiguity.”  It is made up of not only “a technological infrastructure of information systems, 
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is a case in point.
54
 This movement gathered people from across America to spread the news, 
thanks to the use of the Internet, media, cell phones and the like. Fifth, people use the net to 
create a connection between citizens and an institution. The example given by Castells is the 
1986 Santa Monica’s PEN (the Public Electronic Network)55 program, which allowed public 
debate between citizens; the debates usually focus on major issues, such as homelessness, in 
Santa Monica (366-389).   
  However, these autonomous expressions posted on the Internet are not always positive. 
Sometimes irresponsible posting may cause social problems or crime. The instance that catches a 
lot of attention is teenagers’ cyberbullying because it takes bullying to a new level, one that has 
never before occurred in history.
56
  The cases are many, so I will present just one. Several years 
ago, a group of teenagers posted a violent video on YouTube, which in turn, caused other 
teenagers to violently bully their classmates simply for the sake of videotaping the scene and 
post it on YouTube.
57
 Another problem is the posting of irresponsible messages. A website 
named “Campus juice”, “urges college students nationwide to ‘give us the juice.’"58  This caused 
a lot of problems because of irresponsible rumors started by anonymous authors who gossiped 
about classmates’ sexual lives. Later, this website was closed down. Child pornography is 
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another controversial issue. Some people suggest shutting it down, whereas others say that it is 
not a crime. These are some of the social and political problems that have emerged in the digital 
age regarding the issue of autonomy, including autonomous expression, and the problems that 
come along accordingly.  
 
The Difference the Neocaring Theory of Autonomy Can Make on Both the Personal and 
the Community Level 
 
  How should we face these challenges, and what difference will the neocaring theory of 
autonomy make in solving problems compared to rational notions of autonomy?  Should we just 
do as neoliberals say and withhold interference, or, as Rawls’ autonomy of procedure implies, 
control the web, or, as Kant’s moral autonomy proposes—let the human agents think rationally 
and follow universal law? Both neoliberalism and Rawls’ web-control are out of question, 
because the former maintains that we should turn a blind eye to emerging social problems by 
non-interference; whereas the latter proposes to stop an unstoppable trend, i.e., the development 
of technologies. Nor does Kant’s moral autonomy effectively solve the problem. I would contend 
that nurturing a caring mind and reflective thinking, grounded in the interconnected and 
interdependent nature of human existence, is a more effective approach than Kant’s moral 
autonomy as we face challenges and turn technology into a positive resource for human 
development. 
 
Differences compared to Kant’s rational philosophy 
A person using reflective thinking with a caring mind approaches a problem differently 
than someone with a rational mind simply based on logical reasoning. Although in ordinary 
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language, people may use reflective thinking as an interchangeable term for rational thinking, 
according to my study, these two terms connote different meanings. Reflective thinking indicates 
a reasoning process that contextualizes a particular issue according to personal conditions as well 
as the interconnection and interdependent relations between an individual and surrounding social 
and political activity. Kant’s rational thinking, on the other hand, refers to a reasoning process 
that follows a rule or principle set up by practical pure reason, which “[a]cts only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law” 
(xviii). These two are different in terms of practical implications for our daily practice. For 
example, Noddings indicates that if a student complains that learning mathematics is boring and 
difficult, a teacher might take notice and ask what makes it boring, helping the student to learn in 
a different way. The teacher’s reaction to the student’s complaint is a process of a reflective 
thinking with a caring mind. A teacher who takes the rational thinking approach would follow  
pre-set rules or principles to tackle the problem, and would most likely ignore the student’s 
complaint by asking the student to work harder to make him/herself familiar with the subject.  
From the above example, we can see a teacher thinking reflectively with a caring mind acts 
differently from a teacher who simply thinks rationally and acts on a pre-set rule.   
 These different ways of solving a problem are particularly relevant to the age of 
information technologies. In this digital age, information can be out of the state or government 
control because different places possess different rules to supervise the web. Take child 
pornography as an example. As Castells points out, in many countries, posting child pornography 
on the web may be illegal, but this is not the case in Spain and France. Also, many scholars are 
inclined to propose a loose policy for supervising information posted online. These scholars, 
including Castells, conceive that what needs to be done is to control one’s self rather than control 
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the net. The question is, then, in what way people can control themselves? Reflective thinking 
with a caring mind could provide a solution if students have developed an ability to reflect on the 
interconnected and interdependent nature of human existence with a caring mind, they will be 
more careful about the messages and images that they post online. Yet, this is not the case with 
Kant’s maxim of logical reasoning, because the opponent can argue that this is not a logical 
problem but a human need. The opponent may also contend that he posts pornography because 
he thinks that someone like him may also enjoy watching it. That is, posting a pornographic 
picture aligns with Kant’s law of doing things that can make it universal. However, in view of 
neocaring theory, this argument is paradoxical and avoids the question, because this is not simply 
an issue of whether one thinks that something can be a universal law. Rather, it is related to the 
effect that websites may have on many people’s lives. Hence, Kant’s theory has difficulty  
solving the problem with logical reasoning. On the other hand, reflective thinking grounded in 
neocaring theory has to take relational ontology (or relational foundation) into account, and 
ponder the fact that the fabric of human existence is a synthesized field of subjectivity and 
objectivity, as well as the public and the private. By so doing, one will become more conscious 
of this effect, and will be self-guarded and not to display images or messages that may cause a 
negative effect on others. Consequently, many educational and social problems would be 
improved. This is because those who think reflectively with a caring mind about the 
interdependent nature of human existence will understand that the social networking effect is as 
Nan Lin explicates—even if one sits in a private room alone to design a website, post a picture or 
a message on the Internet, (s)he is not computing alone. Hundreds and thousands of people are 
on the web at the same time and may be affected by his/her posting.
59
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Alternatively put, the usage of information technologies enables individuals who know 
how to utilize it to possess more power, spaces, and resources with which to wield their freedom 
of choice. People’s autonomy, thereby, is increased greatly. However, accompanying this 
increase in power and resources, the boundary between the public and the private, as well as 
subjectivity and objectivity, has become very thin. One can sit in his/her private room and 
support a reformative social and political event happening in another country. Or when one goes 
online shopping, and sends out his/her credit card number through the web, the card number may 
secretly be stolen by a credit card thief. So what should we do to maintain our autonomy and not  
be overwhelmed by the information posted online? Self-awareness and self-guardedness are two 
of the most important keys to solve this problem. Yet, as my thesis demonstrated before, 
rationality based upon logical reasoning is insufficient to make one conscious enough and 
willing enough to self-guard. Rather, it is a caring mind with reflective thinking, grounded in the 
interconnected and interdependent nature of human life that can provide a better solution. Why? 
Is there any evidence that supports this theory?  
Many empirical researchers who study the development of children’s prosocial 
personalities support my view, although they do not provide the direct evidence. These studies 
found that parents’ and teachers’ warm support and care can help a student to develop a prosocial 
personality. This personality, including a caring mind, will lead to prosocial behaviors, such as 
being friendly, willing to help others, and acting as a volunteer or giving donations to a charity. 
Alternatively put, a child who has been nurtured in a caring environment, be it a family or a 
school, will also grow up with a caring mind and do good things for society. A collective 
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research paper entitled “Effects of a Social-Emotional and Character Development Program on 
the Trajectory of Behaviors Associated with Social-Emotional and Character Development: 
Findings from Three Randomized Trials”  reveals that the positive action (PA) program provides 
new insights on preventive interventions that can affect  “the development of positive cognitive, 
emotional and behavioral characteristic in school-aged children.” The PA program is a school-
based social-emotional and character development program, which indicates that “[c]hildren 
begin a cycle of reinforcement in which positive thoughts lead to positive behaviors that generate 
positive feelings about self, which, in turn, lead to more positive thoughts and behaviors.”  The 
study is used to evaluate effects on the developmental trajectory of social-emotional and 
character-related behaviors by using data from three school-based randomized trials in 
elementary schools. The data consist of: (1) 4 years of data from students in 20 Hawai’i schools; 
(2) 3 years of data from students in 14 schools in Chicago; and (3) 3 years of data from students 
in 8 schools in a southeastern state. The results are derived from the analysis of random intercept, 
multilevel, and growth-curve analyses. They show that although students in both control and PA 
schools exhibited a general decline in the number of positive behaviors associated with social-
emotional and character development that were endorsed, schools using the PA intervention 
significantly reduced these declines in all three trials.
60
  Moreover, the decrease in positive 
behaviors, according to the researchers’ observation, may be caused by the fact that these schools 
are located in a high risk area (a poverty zone). These findings indicate that the positive action of 
intervention, at the very least, helps to reduce negative behaviors in those PA program schools. 
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At best, this may show positive intervention improving students’ behavior, pro-social character 
and academic achievement, as other empirical studies reveal (ibid.).  
       Another article entitled “Turning It Around for All Youth; From Risk to Resilience” 
presented by ERIC Development Team
61
 also presents similar positive evidence regarding those 
students who grow up in a disadvantaged family or social environment. This article summarizes 
a growing body of international, cross-cultural, and longitudinal studies (some of these studies 
follow individuals over the course of a lifespan), finding that “between half and two-thirds of 
children growing up in families with mentally ill, alcoholic, abusive, or criminally involved 
parents or in poverty-stricken or war-torn communities can overcome their hardship and manifest 
“resilience” 62  through the support of proper positive, interactive factors, such as caring 
relationships, expectations, and opportunities for participation. The resilience of these children 
indicates competence, problem-solving skills, a critical consciousness, autonomy, and a sense of 
purpose (2). This example shows that even children who grow up in a disadvantaged family or 
social environment can be nurtured by loving care to become good citizens because of their 
development of a prosocial personality.  
        From the above empirical studies, we can observe similar findings. That is, a child 
nurtured by loving care to possess a prosocial personality will care for people and society rather 
than doing things that have a negative impact on others. It is based on these and other similar 
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evidence
63
 that my thesis argues that an individual with a caring mind when thinking reflectively 
about the interconnected nature of their behaviors, including how posting a message or image 
online may influence others, (s)he will be less likely to post violent videos or improper sexual 
images on the web. In fact, this positive aspect of the neocaring theory of autonomy is not 
limited to an individual. Rather, it becomes even stronger when the theory is used on the level of 
community or a society.  
         Take the influence of community informatics in the digital age as an example. As I 
mentioned in the previous section, information technologies provide more space, power, tools 
and resources for citizens to exercise autonomous freedom. Yet, this is only true when social and 
political policies develop citizens’ knowledge and capability to use them. Otherwise, powerful 
tools and resources not only do not improve citizens’ lives but also deepen the gap between the 
powerful and the powerless as well as the rich and the poor.    
       Michael Gurtein
64
 observes that community informatics (CI) aims to enable disadvantaged 
communities to have the advantage of access to the same computing power that a government, 
military, or big cooperation has in the digital age. Thereby, hundreds and thousands of 
Community Information Centers (CTCs or Tele Centers) have be established for delivering 
government services, healthcare services, banking services and so on, to marginalized 
populations. This aims to empower local community information, communication and 
technology to go beyond the digital divide and to improve civic participation, social economic 
development and other social provisions. Yet, Gurstein found that although the primary 
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provision of Internet access, information management and resources on a grassroots level is very 
good for local development and enablement, sometimes, it goes the other way around, because 
those who provide open data resources never ask “who is this data for?” or “how this data be 
used?” For a technology expert, the use of data may be easy, but it is not so for those citizens 
who are unfamiliar with technology. Accordingly, open resources are used by the rich to create a 
bigger gap between the poor and the rich, or between those who have information and those who 
have not. Gurstein illustrates this point by saying that the process of digitalizing the land data in 
India became a process of land grasping for the rich. This is because the rich understand 
technology, or have the money to hire experts to improve their position, but the poor don’t. The 
result of this divide could be very severe and further widen the gap of the digital divide. In other 
words, this may lead to what Castell calls a “dual city,” a city where people in the business 
district take advantage of digital resources and create prosperity, while people in rural areas still 
live in the poverty and are unaware of these resources. This situation could also lead to what 
William and Alkalimat point out when they say that digital inequality can affect people as older 
inequalities have, such as poverty, oppression, discrimination, and exclusion. In fact, “the new 
tools are so powerful that not using them sets individuals, groups and communities even further 
back.”65  
      On the other hand, if a government or those who provide open resources can carry out their 
projects with a caring mind of lovingkindness, and think reflectively about how to help these 
who are unfamiliar with technologies, the open resources they provide can help the 
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disadvantaged people greatly. The UCLA Center for Health Policy Research
66
  mentioned by 
Gurstein is a case in point. This center not only provides resources on asthma, but also posts how 
to use the factors and statistics that cause asthma in low-income areas. People who live in these 
areas, therefore, can use these resources to ask for compensation and the improvement of their 
environment. This example clearly illustrates that a human with a caring mind and ability to 
reflect will think contextually to provide information technologies resources. By so doing, these 
resources are more helpful for people using them, particularly for those who are underserved.  In 
this way, the gap between the poor and the rich, or those who have and who have-not, is 
improved, because open resources can really be used by the public, and technology is used to 
perform social justice. The core factors that make these differences again are a caring mind and 
reflective thinking on the interconnected and interdependent nature of human existence, that is, 
the core components of the neocaring theory of autonomy. 
 
Human Social and Political Practices, and Human Agents are Mutually Conditioned 
and Supplementary  
 
Differences from Neoliberalism’s  Personal Autonomy  
Another difference that the new theory of autonomy can make is by interrogating 
neoliberalism’s theory of autonomy. The autonomy of non-interference regarding social, 
economic, and political activities is one of the foremost theories of neoliberalism. The reason for 
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this is as Fernando I Levia
67
 points out that neoliberalism applies the framework of laissez-faire 
and a circular ideological principle to form social and political theory. This circular principle is 
that “society does not exist. It exists for individual man and woman” (ibid.). Hence, one is 
entitled to maximize self-interest. Moreover, “personal freedom leads to economic efficiency, 
and economic efficiency requires unregulated market” (ibid.). If we allow free trade and free 
markets, everybody will benefit. Also, the freedom of personal economic decisions should not be 
interfered with by politics. Alternatively put, neoliberalism’s theory of autonomy is primarily 
founded on three components: privatization, deregulation, and marketization. That is, the theory 
aims to deregulate governmental supervision, promote privatizing public institutions and 
enhance business markets. Originally, neoliberalism’s goals focused on economic development, 
but as Wendy Brown notices, its political and cultural effects expanded to become “a specific 
form of normative political reason organizing the political sphere, governance practices, and 
citizenship.” 68   Brown explains that neoliberalism is not confined to the economic sphere. 
Rather, it depicts free markets, free trade, and entrepreneurial rationality as achieved and 
normative, which maintains that  “the state itself must construct and construe itself in market 
terms, as well as develop policies and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens 
exhaustively as rational economic actors in every sphere of life.”  Accordingly, every area of 
society employs a “criteria of productivity and profitability,” and “governance talk increasingly 
becomes market speak, businesspersons replace lawyers as the governing class in liberal 
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democracies, and business norms replace juridical principles” (38). The privatization of a 
university mentioned by Brown clearly illustrates the case in point.  
Brown, in her talk “Save the University,” given at UC Berkeley, mentions the factors that 
contribute to the problems in applying neoliberalism’s theory of autonomy to public practice, 
such as in the case of privatizing and administrating a university (ibid.). Brown says that 
privatization means many things, including replacing public funding with increasing student 
fees, the growth of sponsorship of corporations for academic research, reliance more on 
endorsement of stock and markets and so forth. It essentially transforms a public institution from 
“its public support for the public service to one that serves its product to consumers,” be they 
students or investors who purchase research results. In this way, a public university, which was 
founded to promote the common good, equality, inclusiveness, and the ability of human 
development is converted to an institution that is tied to entrepreneurship and capital 
appreciation. Also, it becomes an institute governed by a hierarchical organization and 
commodifiable ability. Consequently, several phenomena emerge in the privatization of a 
university. Brown’s talk lists ten. Here I only summarize relevant part.  
First, privatization involves a decreasing commitment to education of the best local 
students, and causes an institution to be increasingly driven by purchasing power. This is a turn 
away from equal opportunity, it ignoring the people that public education was meant to serve. It 
also fails to generate social equality and justice through education.  
Second, privatization entails increasing inequality in every aspect of the university, and 
diminishing a sense of shared purpose within the university. This can be seen in the huge 
unprecedented differences in salary across faculty within and between departments, as well as in  
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the distribution of departmental financial resources, and graduate funding packages. This 
overlooks the principles of diverse teaching and the need for all the departments to depend on 
each other and work within the university as whole. The fact is that some departmental research 
requires expensive labs or field work whereas others only need a library. It is only when the 
university apprehends the shared purpose that this balance can be maintained and 
accommodated. Yet, this purpose is entirely undone by entrepreneurialism across campus.   
Third, privatization decreases support for curricula and research that are not applicable 
and commodifiable, such as those in the humanities, social sciences and physical sciences.  
Privatization also means research gradually comes to buy and cooperate with state funders. 
Consequently, academic research is not just geared toward its sponsors, but often risks 
compromise and corruption due to the need to serve and attract sponsors. Harvard medical 
school scandal is a case in point.
69
 
Fourth, privatization means restricting academic freedom on many levels, from free range 
of imagination and innovation to literally silencing faculty who are seen as standing in the way 
of obtaining the financial support of a private donor. Brown says that several years ago, during 
the British Petroleum Company (BP) controversy, the president of UC Berkeley privately 
warned a young faculty member that if he continued to object to the BP deal, he would discredit 
him and harm his future career.  
Fifth, privatization means that education increasingly organizes its instructional delivery 
systems to generate human capital.  Yet, this instruction does not aim to nurture students to 
become develop, widen, or deepen their minds with new perspectives, historical consciousness,  
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diverse knowledge and with literacy. Rather, it is designed to produce machine-like human 
capital that generates new bits and links.  
        If we apply the four components of autonomy founded on neocaring theory to interrogate 
these phenomena due to the privatization of a university produced by neoliberalism’s theory of 
autonomy, many differences may be pointed out. 
         First, the effective power of personal and political freedom: neoliberalism not only restricts  
academic freedom on personal level but also on administrative (i.e., political) level, including the 
organization for a university’s curriculum, recruitment of students and faculties, an increase in 
support of marketable subjects and a decrease in support for the humanities, social science, basic 
research and so forth. Alternatively put, neoliberalism’s theory of autonomy exclusively focuses 
on prioritizing big corporations’ freedom of management, organization and decision making, but 
ignore the rights and freedom of students, faculty and academic research. However, as my 
previous chapter demonstrated, human autonomy cannot be fulfilled if a theory concentrates 
exclusively on objective factors, especially only in economic terms. An authentic autonomy 
requires the development of a human agent’s capability, knowledge and caring mind, as well as 
the freedom of making decisions on a political (i.e., administrative) level. Yet, this is clearly not 
the case in neoliberalism’s privatization of the university. As opposed to neoliberalism, the 
neocaring theory of autonomy, in my view, would pay attention to fostering students’ and 
faculties’ academic freedom and provide room for them to develop critical, reflective thinking 
and a caring mind. Also, it would respect research freedom, and encourage public education to 
serve the common good and pay attention to social justice. After all, the wellbeing of humans is 
one of the foremost concerns of the neocaring theory.  
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     Second, in neocaring theory, reflective thinking is defined as: thinking reflectively with a 
caring mind of lovingkindness based on the interconnected and interdependent nature of 
personhood and sociopolitical activity. As Noddings and Gilligan indicate, that personhood in 
reality is the existence of a social self whose life involves not simply oneself, but also family, 
friends and other people.  Tronto, Hankivsky, and Held also point out that an individual’s self-
identity is closely related to his/her social status, and to the political organization and activity in  
which (s)he participates. Hence, a theory of autonomy cannot be formed based on an isolated 
image of a self-agency. Rather, it has to be situated in relation to the interconnection and 
interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical activity as well as to the three 
characteristics of human existence mentioned by both Merleu-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s 
philosophies. These three characteristics are: the fabric of human existence is a synthesized field 
of subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the private, as well as affectivity and rationality; 
human life as an on-going process of synthesizing and becoming; and human life is a dialectic 
process of mutually conditioning and defining of human agents and sociopolitical activity.  I 
think this is why Noddings, Clement, Mayers and Sen suggest that a positive sense of the theory 
of autonomy has to embrace the cultivation of an agent’s capacity for autonomous thinking with 
respect to what (s)he wants to do, and what (s)he considers to be significant and meaningful for 
both her/him and others. In other words, the theory of autonomy would nurture an individual to 
become a thinker who can think reflectively with a caring mind based on the interconnection and 
interdependent nature of human existence, specifically, (s)he will think reflectively with a caring 
mind about the way in which a sociopolitical activity is good for both an individual and the 
society as a whole.  
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      However, in the aforementioned example of privatizing a university via neoliberal theory, 
neither human agents, i.e. students, nor the public wellbeing, is a core concern. The core concern 
lays in marketizing the university and making profit from students and the public. Moreover, the 
educational goal here does not aim to nurture a thinker or a student who cares about public 
wellbeing, equality and social justice. Rather, financial support is decreased for those subjects 
that are not profitable, such as the humanities, arts, social sciences and physical science research. 
Ironically, these subjects are essential for cultivating students’ imagination, creativity, and 
reflective thinking as well as for developing knowledge and research capability. In addition, 
instead of promoting the public values of social justice and equality, neoliberalism’s 
management and administration highlights disparities in the salary of faculties, unequal 
distribution of graduate funding packages and departmental financial resources. Also, the results 
of research are not used to serve the public good, but rather to help a sponsor’s to make money.  
     Third, a caring mind: a caring mind in my terminology refers to a caring mind of 
lovingkindness. It is the fountain spring of humanness and humanity, involving not only 
affectivity but also reflective thinking. This reflective and caring mind would keep a balance 
between personal freedom of autonomy and the welfare of the public. An individual would think 
contextually with respect to the way in which his or her behavior contributes positively and 
constructively to her/himself as well as a society. This is because the individual is conscious of 
the interconnection and interdependent nature of human existence and the mutually conditioned 
and supplementary nature of personhood and society as a whole. Hence, neocaring theory pays 
attention to the nurturing of an individual’s potential, capability, caring mind, and the 
development of society. This is not simply because humans are diverse in their talents and 
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personalities. More importantly, human existence and development need resources for the 
enhancement of humanity and technology development. The development of technology and 
scientific research will be greatly confined without agents’ capability for imagination, creativity, 
and conceptualization, which are primarily trained through the humanities, arts education and the 
social sciences. Some empirical studies show that arts education can nurture not only students’ 
creativity and imagination but also their sense of temporality and spatiality. These capacities, in 
turn, can either increase a student’s IQ or his/her capability to carry out scientific research.70 
Similarly, in a digital age, video for game design and film creation both require technology, a 
knowledge of artist design, and a capability for creativity, imagination, conceptualization as well 
as the rich culture derived from the research carried out within these subjects. Without the help 
of these subjects, both technological and scientific research would be limited and lose its 
objective and significance, because they are the tools resources for the improvement of humanity 
and the public wellbeing. Without the humanities, arts, and the social sciences, research would 
only be manipulated by a few big corporations to make money, rather than being used for the 
wellbeing of the public and social justice. The abovementioned BP deal is a case in point. Hence, 
it is reasonable to say that neoliberalism’s educational goal of making profitability and 
marketization is too narrow to appreciate the interconnected and interdependent nature of human 
existence. The outcome of following neoliberalism’s policy can only benefit a few big 
corporations but not the society as a whole. In the short term, it may look good, but in the long 
run, as Brown (2005) notices, this policy will deracinate a society, decimate a cultural heritage, 
deplete resources and destroy the environment (38). 
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       Fourth, the interconnected and interdependent nature of human agents and sociopolitical 
reality: I have explained the meaning of interconnection and interdependence at the outset of this 
section. Now, let’s take the relation between citizens and a democratic society as example. In 
America, adult citizens can vote for their ideal political leaders, i.e., the president or the prime 
minister. Yet, there are countries, such as North Korea and Burma where political leaders are not 
chosen by citizens. Rather, leadership is inherited from the leader’s father (North Korea) or 
assigned by the political party in power (Burma). This example reveals two implications 
regarding the relation between citizens and a particular political system: first, different political 
systems have the power to condition and define to what extent their citizens can exercise their 
rights, such as whether they can choose their political leader. Second, on the other hand, in a 
democratic society, adult citizens have elective rights to choose their political leader, that is, they 
possess the power to shape and define the development of their country. These two implications 
illustrate the interconnected and interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical activity. 
In fact, interconnected and interdependent nature is deeper than what I just said. As Nāgārjuna 
has shown previously, human life cannot function without a reliance on the epistemological and 
ontological dependence between other people and things that co-exist in the same society. 
Epistemologically, humans can communicate with each other because we share languages and 
concepts that are encoded with terms of mutual reference, such as “long” and “short”, “parents” 
and “children”. If no term means “short”, the term “long” would meaningless. Ontologically, a 
child cannot grow up properly without substantial nutrition and proper education and 
socialization, let alone parents, who give birth to the child. This implies that both the nature and 
fabric of human life are synthesized fields constituted by components related to both humans and 
substantial resources in the world.  Hence, humans cannot exist without a dependence on the 
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things and people who co-exist in the same society. Yet, our interdependent nature and 
interconnection are overlooked by neoliberalism because its political theory claims that there is 
no society, only men and women as individuals. Consequently, neoliberalism emphasizes 
personal freedom and conceives that everyone should take care of him/herself but not others. 
Also, it states that if we let everyone decide and choose what they want to do without 
interference, we will be able to work effectively.  
         However, this is a paradoxical view because if one only cares about oneself and indeed 
does the things one wants to do is a more effective way, why do we need to organize a company, 
and set up rules for employees? Why can an employee freely choose what (s)he prefers to do? 
Also, why does a big corporation hire many employees instead of its owner operating the 
business alone?  More importantly, why do big corporations interfere with the administrative 
affairs of a university which (s)he gives financial support, and restricts the research freedom of 
students and faculty, if individuals, such as students as professors, are allowed to make choices 
and their decisions are more productive and effective? If we use these questions to interrogate 
the social, economic and political activities founded on neoliberalism’s theory of autonomy, we 
can see that the practices of neoliberals rarely follow the rules they have established. Why? Is it 
because neoliberalism itself is aware that those rules are not valid for the public but only good 
for deregulating governmental supervision? All these questions reveal the untenable nature of 
neoliberalism’s theory of personal autonomy.  On the other hand, these questions also show that 
a better theory to characterize human existence has to consider interconnection and our 
interdependent nature. Hence, the social, economic and political theory of autonomy cannot 
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work effectively without taking the interconnected and interdependent nature of human existence 
into account as the neocaring theory of autonomy does.  
        In fact, much empirical evidence discloses the downfall of neoliberalism’s theory, which 
ignores the interconnection and interdependent nature of human existence. Gar Alperovitz, the 
author of America beyond Neoliberalism, notices that “[t]he ‘occupations (of Wall Street)’ now 
building around the country (America) are a necessary and justified response to the outrages of a 
political-economic system that substitutes posturing for decision-making, and looks the other 
way as the top 1 percent runs off with almost a fourth of the nation’s income and more wealth 
than the bottom 90 percent together.” With 1% of population possessing more financial resources 
than those of 90% population together, American democracy cannot work well. Alperovitz says 
that, thanks to the shortcomings of neoliberal theory, more and more people tend to accept 
shared small ownership, rather than instead of letting a few big corporations dominate the 
business market.
71
 Now more than 50% of young Americans under the age of 30 no longer 
believe in capitalism (ibid.).  Instead, they are seeking to de-construct corporate ownership and 
adopt the shared ownership of a community. For instance, in the last three decades, “more 
workers have become owners of their own companies than are members of unions in the private 
sector.” 72 In fact, the number has increased to more than 5 million people now. In addition, there 
are more than 4,500 nonprofit community development corporations that operate affordable 
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housing and other neighborhood programs, and approximately 130 million Americans are 
members of co-ops (ibid.). 
       Both Brown’s criticisms of the privatization of universities proposed by neoliberalism, and 
Alperovitz’s observation of the young Americans’ departure away from neoliberalism’s policy, 
and incline toward shared small ownership, verify the deficiency of neoliberalism’s theory of 
autonomy, which underscores individual freedom and ignores the interconnection and 
interdependent nature of human existence. Specifically, those authers’ talks and writings reveal 
that, although a big corporation has the power to condition public life, the public also has the 
power to shape and define the development of a big corporation, particularly, if the big 
corporation does not care for the public, the public in return will abandon it accordingly. This is 
the power of interconnected and our interdependent nature. Hence, a better social, economic and 
political theory of autonomy has to treat interconnection and interdependence as perquisite 
factors to the characterization of a theory of autonomy as the neocaring theory did in the 
previous chapter. This is particularly relevant to a democratic society that promotes freedom, 
equality and social justice, because in order to implement social, economic and political ideals of 
human rights, equality, and social justice, citizens must be nurtured to develop these qualities. 
Otherwise, social and political ideals cannot be actualized. Neoliberalism restricts research 
freedom and silences faculty who attend to social justice, warning, for example in the against, the 
young faculty member who argued against the BP deal. This illuminates that in neoliberalism’s 
sociopolitical environment, standing firm for social justice and advocating equality are 
impossible. People would be forced to ignore these public virtues. In the short run, this seems to 
be a triumph for neoliberalism. Yet, in the long term, the damage is not limited to public values 
190 
 
or human agents’ wellbeing. Many social and political problems would emerge as Brown’s talk 
and Alperovitz’s study demonstrated previously.   
Conclusion 
Recap 
My thesis has taken up the debate of the (in)compatibility of caring theory with rational 
moral philosophy, and the way in which these two can be integrated into a more inclusive moral 
theory for modern education. My thesis argues and demonstrates that by unifying Noddings’ 
caring theory and Tronto’s and Hankivsky’s ethic(s) of care,  and then enhancing the relational 
ground of the unified new caring theory,  it is not only compatible with rational moral 
philosophy, but also  more inclusive and effective for tackling problems emerging from the age 
of information technology.  
 In the first chapter, my thesis reviews the debated issue, identifies the research problem 
and explains the methodology and philosophical framework used in this thesis.  My study 
unveils that most caring theorists believe that their theories can either co-exist or reconcile with 
rational moral philosophy except Slote. Slote argues that the foundation of caring theory is 
incompatible with that of rational moral philosophy, because the former is empathetic caring, 
whereas the latter is rational thinking. Yet, a close examination of the debate and corresponding 
literatures reveals that Slote’s argument is only partially true, because in the course of the 
development of this issue, many scholars from different disciplines have participated in the 
debate. They characterize and define caring theories in various terms. For instance, whereas 
Noddings and Slote focus on characterizing the subjective experience (or mental phenomena) of 
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caring nature, empathetic care and caring relation, Gilligan, Tronto, Held, Hankivisky and other 
scholars from social and political science concentrate on articulating the social and political 
aspects of caring theory, and define care as an activity or practice with respect to social and 
political policy, structure, organization and social works. Noddings often calls her theory a 
caring theory, whereas Tronto and Hankivsky name their theories as ethic(s) of care, although 
the three of them assert that these two names are interchangeable.
73
  Hence, at least two different 
characterizations are presented.  Slote’s claim as to the incompatible foundations of caring theory 
and rational moral philosophy, in fact, is in line with Noddings’ earlier view, which underscores 
caring as human nature derived from affectivity or mothering love.  Yet, he fails to notice that a 
deeper implication for relational grounds is presented later by Noddings, Tronto and Hankivsky. 
This relational ground is named as “caring relation” by Noddings, and called interconnection and 
interdependent nature by Tronto and Hankivsky. Yet, again, Noddings and Tronto-Hankivsky 
define relational ground or relational ontology differently. Hence, it is necessary to delve into the 
contents of caring theory and ethic(s) of care before discussing whether caring theory is 
compatible with rational moral philosophy.   
           In the second chapter, my thesis picks up the discussion left by the previous chapter and 
focuses on two tasks: first, analyzing, and clarifying the core components involved in 
Noddings’s, Tronto’s, Hankivsky’s and Held’s core concepts and characterizations of caring 
theory; and second, based on this clarification, I identify four core components for combining 
Noddings’s and Tronto-Hankivsky’s theories to form a unified new caring theory, which I call 
neocaring theory. These four components are: caring nature, caring as activity or practice, 
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contextuality or motivation replacement and relational ontology. Except for caring nature, which 
is only mentioned by Noddings and Slote, the other three are shared among caring theorists. The 
first three components have been studied to a great extent, but not the fourth one (relational 
ground). This relational ground is one of the foremost factors that determine whether caring 
theory/ethic is compatible with rational moral philosophy, but it is defined using various terms. 
Whereas Noddings conceives it as a caring relation, Tronto and Hankivsky define it as the 
interconnection and interdependent nature of personhood and socio-political activity. Noddings 
(1984) maintains that the relational ground is a caring relation that indicates “a set of ordered 
pairs generated by some rules that describe the affect—or subjective experience—of the 
members” (3-4). It is “the special relatedness of caring” (173), that involves “[t]o receive and to 
be received, to care and be cared-for” (ibid). Alternatively put, in Noddings’s view caring 
relation is  a relation in which we do meet the other morally, it arises out of  natural caring, and it 
occurs when “we respond as one-caring out of love or natural inclination”(4-5). These passages 
clearly show that Noddings’s relational foundation characterizes the human caring relation as 
when people interact with each other with caring nature and love. Tronto and Hankivesky, on the 
other hand, refer the relational ground to the interconnection and interdependent natures, which 
characterize the intersection and mutual reliance of personhood and sociopolitical activity, 
specifically, the affect that social any political activity has on humans’ lives. Tronto says that 
peoples’ identities and interests are greatly shaped by the cultural, social and political societies 
that they are part of.  Hankivsky (2004, 34 and 111-112) also contends that an individual’s 
identity, social status, and needs are shaped and constructed through their intersection with a 
range of private and public social and institutional arrangements. But she expands to include the 
interconnection between people as well. Hankivsky says that at different periods of our lives and 
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in different contexts, we alternate between the roles of care-provider and the one who is cared-
for. Accordingly, “human beings are interdependent and in need of other for their growth and 
survival” (105). The above says that both Tronto and Hankivsky’s relational grounds indicate the 
interconnection and interdependence of an individual with others and with social and political 
activity, rather than a subjective experience of caring relation and love. That is, while 
characterizing the relational ground of caring theory, Noddings highlights the subjective 
experience but Tronto and Hankivsky emphasize the interrelatedness of personhood and 
sociopolitical practice.  
   Yet, neither Noddings nor Hankivsky notices their differences, let alone mentions how to 
bridge the gap between these different characterizations. Thereby, in the third chapter, I apply 
three characteristics of human existence derived from Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s 
philosophies to bridge the gap between these two characterizations. These three are: first, the 
fabric of human existence is a synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the 
private as well as affectivity and rationality; second, human life is an ongoing process of 
synthesizing and becoming; and third, human agents and sociopolitical activity are 
interconnected with and interdependent on each other. Hence, they are mutually conditioned and 
supplementary to each other.  
     Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising articulates that every existence, including 
a person, entity or event, depends on the co-emergence of a particular major cause and its 
corresponding conditions. No one and nothing can exist alone without reliance on corresponding 
factors.  For instance, one’s subjective experience and objects in the world seem to be two 
separated entities. Yet, Nāgārjuna points out that “[a] seer does not exist either separated or not 
separated from seeing. When a seer does not exist, whence can there be seeing and the object of 
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seeing?” (Kalupahana 1986, 137). This means that the action of seeing involves at least three 
factors: an agent who sees, an object perceived and the sensing faculties. If there is no agent who 
can see, such as if one is blind, or does not exist, where does the function of seeing come from? 
Similarly, if no object can be perceived, such as in an empty room, in what sense can we say that 
a chair is seen? Also, if a seer does not possess healthy sense faculties, such as in the case of a 
color blind person, how could (s)he perceive color correctly. This example illustrates that there is 
an interrelated and interdependent relation between the seer, his/her seeing faculty and a 
perceived object. In a broad sense, it indicates that our world view is formed not solely due to the 
existence of objective objects in the world, nor does it because we possess seeing faculty.  It is 
rather due to the combination of subjective and objective factors that the experienced world 
exists. In other words, the formation of our worldview is closely interconnected to and 
interdependent on both subjective and objective components. This point is even clearer when 
Nāgārjuna says that a human’s formation of knowledge regarding the world always depends on 
four means of knowledge—perception, inference, recognition of likeness and testimony. These 
four not only make objects perceivable and understandable to us but also synthesize objects 
perceived into our existing knowledge system. Perception enables us to perceive objects and 
presents a mental image of the objects perceived. Through our inference, we then figure out the 
possible relation between the object perceived and its function in our lives. After perceiving it, 
we further make a connection between the perceived object, and those we have known by 
identifying the likeness between them. Lastly, we will testify on the object recently perceived, 
and synthesize it into our knowledge system, and mark it as a new or old object.  For instance, a 
new mathematical problem for a child in grade school may not be a new problem for a high 
school student. This is because the knowledge foundations of these two students are different. 
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Since the acquisition of our knowledge of the world always precedes in relation to  our inference, 
recognition of likeness and testimony, our knowledge of the world, including cultural, social, 
political and natural world, is impossible to be separated from one’s subjective experience. 
Moreover, the process of synthesizing old knowledge with new is an ongoing process. 
      Similar to Nāgārjuna’s view, Merleau-Ponty also points out that our sense experience is 
not an independent, subjective mental state that is separated from the outside world. In fact, the 
world, one’s body and empirical (psychological) self together constitute the whole system of our 
experienced existence. Merleau-Ponty (1965) says that the social world is “not as an object or 
sum of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of existence.” Even if we may be able to 
turn away from the social world, we cannot cease to be situated relatively to it. Both our 
objective and scientific consciousness of the past, and of civilizations, would be impossible had 
we not learned them through the intermediary of society, our cultural world and their horizons 
(422).  On the other hand, if we did not possess the basic knowledge structures from history 
relating to our society, and our culture in our experience, we would not be able to know them 
(422). The reason that we can understand a certain cultural environment along with behavior 
corresponding to it, and we can interpret the behavior, is because our experience teaches us the 
significance and intention of perceived gestures, and the action of others. Hence, there always 
exists an interconnectedness and interdependence in our subjective experience and social and 
cultural world. In a deeper sense, Merleau-Ponty (410) continues, as far as the others reside in 
the world, and are perceivable to us, they form a part of my perceptual field. The perceived other 
is never an Ego who is independent from my existence, and I myself alone constitute the whole 
world for myself.  Merleau-Ponty use the communication and dialogue as an example and says 
that when we communication and dialogue with others, there is a constituted and shared ground 
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between the other person and myself. My thought and his/her thought are inter-woven into a 
single fabric, and our words and those with whom we communicate are called forth by the state 
of our discussion. These words and thoughts are inserted into a shared operation of which neither 
is the sole creator. “We have here a dual being, where the other is, for me, no longer a mere bit 
of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in 
consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a 
common world” (406). 
        We can see that the fabric of human existence is not simply constituted by one individual, 
or objective social and natural factors alone. Rather, it is the participation of both the subjective 
experience of perceiving, inferring, recognizing and so on and the existing objective social, 
cultural and political world that human existence are formed. Moreover, the formation of our 
worldview and knowledge is an ongoing process which synthesizes new perceptions, and 
knowledge into our existing knowledge system. Accordingly, there is always interconnection and 
interdependence between an individual and the social, political and natural world, as far as we 
can see, hear, smell, taste and feel an object. Thereby, it is incomplete only to characterize 
personhood based on subjective experience alone or to define social and political activity solely 
based on objective factors. Nor is it correct to think that an individual’s life is always private and 
social and political activity is constituted only by public practices. By means of these three 
characteristics of human existence illustrated by Merleau-Ponty and Nāgārjuna, the relational 
ground for Noddings’ subjective caring relation and Tronto-Hankivsky’s social and political 
connection and interdependence are connected. A more inclusive relational and ontological 
ground for neocaring theory, thereby, is formed. 
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           In the fourth chapter, I apply the four core components of unified neocaring theory (i.e., 
caring nature, care as an activity, contextuality and relational ontology), and the three 
characteristics of human existence found in Merleau-Ponty’s and Nāgārjuna’s philosophies to 
construct a neocring theory of autonomy.  Specifically, I use the first characteristic of human 
existence to argue that a more complete and inclusive theory of autonomy needs to embrace both  
subjective experience and objective sociopolitical activities as well as an individual’s affectivity 
and rationality. Through reviewing caring theorists’ and Sen’s criticisms of rational concepts of 
autonomy, and a careful analysis and clarification of the different components of Kant’s moral 
autonomy, Rawls’ political procedure autonomy and neoliberalism’s personal autonomy, I 
propose a new caring theory of autonomy, which includes four components: effective power of 
personal and political freedom, reflective thinking, a caring mind of lovingkindness and 
relational ontology.   
The way for me to proceed my argument is that after comparing and examining the 
meanings of the three key components of Kant’s vision of moral autonomy and those of the 
caring theorists, I  propose three tasks for constructing a neocaring theory of autonomy. The first 
is combining the three components of autonomy mentioned by Noddings, Meyers, Clement, and 
other caring theorists to form a comprehensive conceptual framework for the theory of 
autonomy. The three components are personal choice, reflective thinking and interconnection 
between individuals, and sociopolitical activity. The next task is using this conceptual framework 
to integrate Kant’s three components of autonomy (freedom of choice, rational thinking, and 
universal law). This was done by first expanding the scale of freedom of choice to include both 
personal and political freedom, the latter including not just the political structures that protect 
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personal right of choice but also the political freedom, the right to capacity, including the 
capacity for reflective thinking and contextualizing a particular issue in relation to social and 
political factors, and the right to access to basic material utilities. Alternatively put, constitutional 
law should not only protect a citizen’s political rights of freedom to speak and act responsibly 
but also ensure that the goal of freedom is not merely defined in economic terms, as by 
neoliberalism. At this, I rename the first factor to “an agent’s effective power of personal and 
political freedom.”  
Hence, my theory of autonomy consists of three primary components: an agent’s effective power 
of personal and political freedom, reflective thinking, and the three elements of human existence. 
We see that these do not match the four components of the integrated neocaring theory— 
relational ontology, contextuality, caring as an activity, and a caring nature, Contextual thinking 
can be achieved by an autonomous agent engaging in reflective thinking with an awareness of 
interdependence, as discussed above. Yet the components of a caring nature and caring as an 
activity are still missing. Hence, I add the caring mind of lovingkindness as the fourth 
components of the neocaring theory of autonomy. The reason of adding the caring mind is 
explained in the fifth chapter. I then conclude that with these four components, this theory is not 
only compatible with Kant’s moral autonomy, but also more inclusive and effective in tackling 
the new problems emerging from a digital age.   
        In the final chapter, I continue to apply the second characteristic of human existence 
(human life is an ongoing process of becoming and synthesizing), and the third characteristic 
(personhood and sociopolitical activity are interconnected and interdependent. Hence, they are 
mutually conditioned and supplementary to each other) to unveil the differences that a neocaring 
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theory of autonomy can make in a digital age and in the higher education compared to, first, 
Kant’s moral autonomy, and second, to neoliberalism’s personal autonomy. First, my discussion 
focuses on comparing the differences between applying a caring mind with reflective thinking on 
interconnected and interdependent nature, and Kant’s rational thinking grounded on either 
logical reasoning or his universal laws with respect to facing emerging problems of the digital 
age, such as cyberbullying, and the posting of violent videos and other negative messages on the 
web. My finding is that an individual with a caring mind and reflective thinking, while 
considering the effects of the interconnected and interdependent nature of human existence, 
would be more conscious of the effects of their online posting, and more willing to control 
him/herself. Accordingly, many harmful or violent messages and images will be canceled by the 
individual before being posted online. In addition, a caring mind and reflective thinking also 
provide a better way to help people to use open resources for the public wellbeing, equality and 
social justice. This is because if students are nurtured to possess a caring mind with reflective 
thinking on the interconnected and interdependent nature of personhood and sociopolitical 
activity, they tend to care for others and care about not doing harmful things in society. This is 
different from training students by logical formulas or a pre-established universal law to think 
rationally or abstractly to tackle  problems.   
         Second, in contrast to neoliberalism’s personal autonomy regarding administrating higher 
education, my thesis uses the four components of neocaring theory of autonomy to interrogate 
phenomena evident in the privatization of universities based upon neoliberalism’s theory. The 
differences are that first, whereas neocaring theory emphasizes both freedom for human agent 
and politics, neoliberalism exclusively underscores the freedom of economic development even 
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at the expense of personal and political freedom, such as the restriction of student and faculty 
research freedom, and intervening in a university’s recruitment of new students and faculty. 
Second, neocaring theory pays attention to nurturing a student’s caring mind and reflective 
thinking with reference to the interconnection and interdependent nature of human existence. 
Accordingly, the theory suggests that an individual, while solving a problem, has to figure out a 
solution that is good for both oneself and the society as a whole. Neoliberal theory, conversely, 
maintains that one only needs to care for him/herself but not others, let alone the society as a 
whole. Neoliberal theory leads to the expansion of market freedom, such as with free markets, or 
the deregulation of governmental supervision, but it disregards social equality, justice and the 
development of the human capacity for creativity, imagination and reflective thinking. Lastly, in 
neocaring theory, both human agents and social, economic and political practices are equally 
important for the development of a society. Thereby, developing the human capability for 
imagination, creativity and reflection with a caring mind and professional knowledge is the core 
concern of neocaring theory. Yet, neither an ordinary individual nor the public is the concern of 
neoliberalism. Its chief concern is big corporations’ productivity and profit. This is the reason 
why neoliberalism puts its educational goals only in applicable and profitable subjects, such as 
science and technology, but decreases support fir other subjects, such as arts, humanities, social 
science and basic research. These three differences reveal that neoliberalism fails to see the 
interconnection and interdependent nature of personhood and social, economic and political 
activity. Accordingly, neoliberalism ignores the wellbeing of the public. This ignorance, in turn, 
backfires. This is as Brown (2005) notices, neoliberalism’s policy in the long term leads to 
“social deracination, cultural decimation, long-term resource depletion, and environmental 
destruction” (38). Moreover, the recent Occupy Wall Street movement and the distrust of 
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neoliberalism shown in the majority of young Americans mentioned by Alperovitz are cases in 
point. 
Contribution and Future Study 
           Through the above presentation, my thesis aims to contribute a new theory of autonomy to 
modern education, and sociopolitical practices. The most important feature of this new theory is 
that it embraces the four major components originated from both caring theories and Kant’s 
moral autonomy, and three characteristics derived from both Nāgārjuna’s  and Merleau-Ponty’s  
philosophies. Different from both Rawls’ political autonomy and neoliberals’ personal 
autonomy, the neocaring theory of autonomy emphasizes that a complete, inclusive and effective 
theory of autonomy needs to embrace the non-dual relationship of subjectivity and objectivity, 
the public and private, as well as affectivity and rationality. This is because, as Nāgārjuna’s  and 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies reveal, the fabric of human existence is a synthesized field of 
subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the private, as well as affectivity and rationality. 
Every individual plays multiple roles in his/her life. An individual may be a caring parent of a 
child as well as a teacher in a public space. Also, (s)he may argue rationally in a public debate 
but show affective feelings toward his/her friends. Moreover, since human life is an ongoing 
process of synthesizing and becoming, a rational person may encounter people with love or 
hostility in any social setting. Accordingly, (s)he needs to learn how to interact with them. A new 
component of affectivity, thereby, is synthesized into the individual’s life. In addition, there is an 
interconnected and interdependent nature between personhood and sociopolitical activity. Hence, 
both human agents and sociopolitical activity, including economic development, are mutually 
conditioned and supplementary to each other.  
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          The case in point can be illustrated by the open resources and neoliberalism’s privatization 
of a university discussed previously. Even if the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research where  
open resources aim to empower the public and low-income areas in California, such as resources 
would not be fully used, had the target populations not been taught how to employ the resources. 
This is because they are unaware of the availability and modes of utilizing these resources. This 
implies that when people are not taught to possess corresponding knowledge, they would not 
have the capacity to improve their social and political environment. Similarly, as Alperovitz 
reminds us that because of its indifference toward social inequality, neoliberalism’s policy leads 
to a backfire. This backfire, in turn, leads the financially disadvantaged people to participate in 
the movement such as Occupy Wall Street, or to turn away from the capitalism advocated by 
neoliberalism. Hence, a complete, inclusive and effective theory, as my thesis presented above, 
has to be grounded upon the three characteristics of human existence presented in Nāgārjuna’s  
and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. Also, it would be better to define the theory of autonomy in a 
positive sense, that is, the theory has to care about the development of human agents’ knowledge, 
capability in conjunction with the social, economic and political improvement. That is, if our 
society wants to become a caring society, our education needs to nurture a citizen’s caring mind, 
and reflective thinking with reference to the interdependent nature of human existence. It is most 
unlikely to apply a theory which only focuses on economic development (neoliberalism), 
political procedure (Rawls) or rational reasoning (Kant) to expect at the same time to develop a 
citizen’s caring mind and to actualize the ideal of a caring society.      
However, the theory of autonomy presented in my dissertation is a project that focuses 
more on developing a new moral theory. My next step, I plan to study further relevant issues. 
Here, I briefly list three: first, analyzing and clarifying the educational relation of personal 
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morality and public virtue; second, providing empirical examples to illustrate how to implement 
the neocaring theory of autonomy in education; and third, demonstrating the way in which to 
apply neocaring theory to tackle the problems emerging in the digital age.  
  First, the relation between personal morality and public virtue: The reason for me to 
conceive that it is an important issue because through the study of my thesis, I found that moral 
theory although is invisible, it affects not solely how an individual thinks, believes, and behaves 
but also influences the way in which a corporation or a government organizes, distribute and 
control resources and society. Alternatively put, the theory will shape the social, economic and 
political practice and the formation of citizenship. This fact can be illustrated by the different 
ways of administrating higher education proposed by the neocaring theory of autonomy and that 
of neoliberalism. Whereas neoliberalism emphasizes privatizing higher education, and directs its 
educational goal and academic research toward productivity and profit-making for a big 
corporation, neocaring theory underscores the public function of higher education and the use of 
research result to improve the public wellbeing, equality, social justice and the development of 
human knowledge, capability and reflective thinking with a caring mind. Hence, it is important 
to be aware that the moral theory plays a very important role in guiding and shaping our citizen’s 
education and sociopolitical practice. Unfortunately, neither moral theory nor moral education 
receives enough attention from education nowadays. The core problem is that in America, the 
moral education is defined in a very narrow sense. That is, moral education, as Noddings’ 
observes, indicates only the education of cultivating personal virtue or character.
74
 Yet, through 
the demonstration of my dissertation, it is clear that the moral education based on the neocaring 
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College, Columbia University, 2002), 1-10. 
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theory of autonomy would not be confined to nurturing a student’s mind or reflective thinking 
only. These qualities would also show in the individual’s behavior when (s)he participates in a 
social event or an economic and political practice. The social and political behaviors in turn 
would affect the operation of a democratic society. Hence, it is incomplete to consider that the 
moral education is an issue of personal matter. A more complete view is that moral education is 
related to both personal morality and public virtue, which permeates every aspect of human life, 
including personal development, social, cultural, economic and political activity even if it is a 
theory of autonomy. Traditionally, civic education is defined in a very narrow sense of the study 
of civil law, civil code, and the right of citizen, such as voting, free speech and so on. Yet, in my 
thesis, this term is used in a broad sense. That is, I agree with Amy Gutmann’s claim,75 which 
defines civic education as “the cultivation of the [citizen’s] virtues, knowledge, and skills 
necessary for political participation” (1987, 287). In this sense, moral education, specifically, the 
moral theory of autonomy, is closely related to civic education, and becomes one of the central 
issues that deserves great attention in the digital age. 
Second, providing empirical examples to illustrate the way in which neocaring theory is 
implemented in education. When I tackle this issue, I would like to combine it with the third 
issue. The third issue is to show how the neocaring theory of autonomy will face the challenges 
emerging in the modern digital age. The reason is that since a moral theory is closely tied to our 
personal life and public social, economic and political activity, it becomes even more so than 
ever before now because of the utility of information technologies or the coming into being of 
the digital age. This is particularly true for the theory of autonomy.  
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As Castells notices, the digital technologies provide more power, tools, spaces and 
resources for autonomous expression. Accordingly, citizens, including both children and adults, 
have more freedom to express themselves through the Internet, such as posting a personal 
favorite image, sending a funny message, or participating in a revolutionary activity through the 
Internet, and the like. Jack M. Balkin (2005, 297-354)
76
 also observes that the digital 
technologies make digital resources easy to be copied, modified, annotated, collated, transmitted, 
and distributed through its digital form (302). Accordingly, it fundamentally changes not only 
citizens’ social life, but also the way to define citizens’ rights of freedom of speech (302). For 
instance, the digital revolution drastically reduces the costs of copying, and distributing 
information through weblogs (or blogs). As such, it lowers the costs of publication and 
distribution. Second, the technologies also makes one’s expression online across cultural and 
beyond geographical borders. An individual now can reach more people, not only in his/her own 
country, but also across the global. Third, the decrease of costs helps people to innovate with 
existing information. One can comment on it, and building upon it simply by editing the 
information. Balkin says that this kind of editing is particularly noticeable when people have a 
common metric for storing images, music, and text, because “they can copy, cut, and paste 
images, music and text not only make it easy to copy and distribute content, they also make it 
easier to appropriate, manipulate, and edit content”(295). Thanks to decreasing cost, the 
transmission, distribution, appropriation, and alteration of digital information resources not only 
become easier and faster, but also widespread. Accordingly, Balkin observes, the information 
technologies create more opportunities to express one’s opinions or post a message online. As 
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such, it “democratizes speech” because it lets more citizens participate and interact in the 
cyberspaces. It also lets certain messages spread wider and farther, and has more production and 
distribution to affect more citizens (298).  A democratic culture, Balkins says, is more than 
“representative institutions of democracy”, and public issues (298). Rather, it is a culture in 
which “individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making that 
constitute them as individuals. Democratic culture is about individual liberty as well as collective 
self-governance; it is about each individual’s ability to participate in the production and 
distribution of culture” (ibid.). In a democratic society, the digital technologies can strengthen 
the cultural and participatory features of freedom of expression to promote a democratic culture. 
However, this freedom also presents new challenges of freedom of speech, and brings out the 
emerging conflicts, such as the conflicts regarding digital capital and property rights. Hence, it is 
very important to reconsider the moral or ethical theory of autonomy, which we apply to guide 
and define the freedom of speech. The reason is, as Balkin explicates, if we define and guide the 
freedom of speech in a wrong way, they may “erode the system of free expression and 
undermine much of the promise of the digital age for the realization of a truly participatory 
culture” (298).  Alternatively put, since the social, cultural, economic and political environment 
have been greatly altered by the utility of the digital information technologies and resources, it is 
important that we apply a new theory of autonomy to discuss the emerging issues, particularly, 
the new theory has to place the development of an human’s capability of reflection with a caring 
mind in relation to the interdependent nature of human existence at the forefront. This is because 
as Rebecca MacKinnon, an international journalist, and co-founder of the citizen media network 
Global Voices, and Joseph Turow, a professor at university of Pennsylvania, points out that we 
need to educate our citizen to be a conscious and autonomous user rather than a passive 
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consumer in the digital age. This is because, as Mackinnon warns, “a convergence of unchecked 
government actions and unaccountable company practices threatens the future of democracy and 
human rights around the world.” Hence, she says that “[i]t is time to stop thinking of ourselves as 
passive “users” of technology and instead act like citizens of the Internet – as netizens – and take 
ownership and responsibility for our digital future.”77 In other words, “[o]ur freedom in the 
Internet age depends on whether we defend our rights on digital platforms and networks in the 
same way that people fight for their rights and accountable governance in physical communities 
and nations.” Similarly, Turow in his book, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is 
Defining Your Identity and Your Worth,
78
 reveals that we have been told that the Internet is a 
means to enhance our consumer’s power. Yet, in reality, Turow points out, the customized media 
environment which we inhabit today shows the other way round, that is, it diminishes consumer 
power. This diminishment does not take place only in ads and discounts but also in news and 
entertainment, because many corporations are collecting our data without our consent and notice. 
These data then are employed to create our identity in cyberspace. Accordingly, we, as 
consumers, are unaware of “how is this data being collected and analyzed? And how are our 
profiles created and used?” Neither do we know if we have “been identified as a ‘target’ or 
‘waste’ or placed in one of the industry’s finer-grained marketing niches?”   
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The questions raised above not only are closely related to our daily life but also very 
relevant to the way in which the digital technologies and resources shape and affect the 
formation of our citizenship, and democratic culture. Hence, it is important to discuss them 
through the neocaring theory of autonomy in our education, particularly, higher education.  
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